“Only government action can resolve a global solvency crisis”

Für Leser von bto ist der ehemalige Chefvolkswirt der BIZ, William White, ein guter Bekannter. Er warnt seit Jahren vor den Folgen einer völlig fehlgeleiteten Politik immer noch lesenswert:

→ Ultra Easy Monetary Policy and the Law of Unintended Consequences

→ „Europa hat nichts gelernt“ – Warum uns eine noch schlimmere Finanzkrise droht

→ Monetarisierung: Rettung oder Desaster?

→ „Helicopter Money is a highly risky and perhaps even terminally risky policy“

Heute nun äußert er sich in einem Gastbeitrag in der Financial Times. Wie immer die Essenz:

  • “Central banks have been engaged in unprecedented monetary experimentation. Unlike scientists developing drugs, fear of the unknown has had no moderating influence on their activities. That in itself is alarming.”
  • The monetary stimulus provided repeatedly over the past eight years has failed to produce the expected expansion of aggregate demand. Debt levels have risen, especially in emerging market economies, constraining expectations of future spending and current capital expenditures. Consumers have had to save more, not less, to ensure adequate income in retirement.” – bto: die auch bei mir  immer wieder vertretene These.
  • “(…) current policies foster financial instability. By squeezing credit and term spreads, the business models of banks, insurance companies and pension funds are put at risk, as is their lending. The functioning of financial markets has also changed, with market “anomalies” indicating hidden structural shifts, and many asset prices bid up to dangerously high levels.” – bto: Die Gewinne wurden schon vorweggenommen.
  • (…) current policies threaten future growth. Resources misallocated before the crisis have been locked in through zombie banks supporting zombie companies. And with neither financial institutions nor financial markets functioning properly, real misallocations since the crisis have been further encouraged.” – bto: siehe auch China!
  • “Two vicious circles are at work with a wounded financial system contributing to both. On the demand side, accumulating debt creates headwinds, leading to more monetary expansion and more debt. (…) On the supply side, misallocations slow growth which again leads to monetary easing, more misallocation and still less growth.” – bto: Auch hier ist China am abschreckendsten.
  • This explanation seems far more convincing than “secular stagnation” in an era of extraordinary technological advances.
  • “If expected profits have collapsed as a side effect of past monetary policies, this hardly seems to justify maintaining such polices.”
  • The problem is that damage cannot be undone. All the problems identified above have rendered both the real and financial side of the global economy enormously fragile.”
  • “To please John Maynard Keynes, two sets of solutions are commonly suggested. First, governments with fiscal room for manoeuvre should use it. (…) Second, emphasis should be put on infrastructure investment with the private sector.”
  • To please Friedrich Hayek, two sets of solutions are also suggested. Excessive debt must be solved by write-offs and restructuring. This might require recapitalisation or closure of financial firms that made bad loans. Second, structural reforms to raise growth potential and the capacity to service debt will pay longer-term dividends.”

Fazit von White: “We must please both Keynes and Hayek. It is not an either/or world. (…) We need a paradigm shift in thinking about how the economy and policy works. Further, we need legislation to allow implementation of many of the policies suggested above. Finally, we need the political will to accept that central banks can only buy time for governments to act. That time is now up.”

bto: theoretisch richtig, praktisch meines Erachtens nicht realistisch.

→ FT (Anmeldung erforderlich):”Only government action can resolve a global solvency crisis”, 25. September 2016