„Here’s Mervyn King’s plan to rescue global economy“

Schon vor einigen Wochen habe ich auf das neue Buch des ehemaligen Chefs der Bank of England hingewiesen. Er ist sehr skeptisch bezüglich der Zukunft des Euros und sieht uns in einer Schuldenspirale gefangen. Hier äußert er sich in einem Interview zu seinem „Rettungsplan“ für die Weltwirtschaft. Kein kleines Unterfangen!

Denn eines ist klar: Die Zeichen stehen auf Abkühlung. Auch in der bisherigen Zugmaschine USA, wie Zero Hedge gestern gezeigt hat:

Zunächst der 16. Rückgang der Bestelleingänge in Folge:


Auf dem tiefsten Stand seit 2011:

Während der ISM Konjunkturindikator (beinhaltet u. a. Beschäftigung, Lagerbestände, Auftragseingänge und Auslieferungen) für New York ebenfalls fällt:


Nun zu den Aussagen von King:

  • „What King wants to address is the fundamental imbalance between the U.S. economy that spends too much and other countries, like Germany, that supply the goods.“ – bto: was wiederum ein wichtiges Thema ist, auch für uns. Es ist aber nicht die Hauptursache unserer Probleme, es verschärft sie allerdings.
  • „There are no easy quick fixes. (…) I think it is a mixture of getting rid of fixed exchange rates, a serious attempt to raise productivity, and I think some cooperation between countries about the timetable that they intend to follow to rebalance their economies.“ – bto: Mit festen Wechselkursen meint er die Bindung der chinesischen Währung an den Dollar. Produktivitätszuwächse wären in der Tat wichtig, nur kommen die nicht einfach so. Letztlich denke ich, dass die Geldpolitik diese mit verhindert, weil sie alte Kapazitäten am Leben erhält.
  • „I think a lot of the damage was done in the past through the strategy of export-led growth that made sense for China but it just became so big that its export surplus became very large relative to the rest of the world and that was not a sustainable position. (…) In many ways, the attitude of government in China is very similar to Western politicians which is they know they need to make a structural change, they can see which firms are going to lose jobs but they can’t identify the firms that will create the new jobs, and they are worried about the transition.“ – bto: Auch das ist sicherlich richtig, allerdings gilt das schon seit Jahren und ist ein Grund dafür, dass man mit immer mehr Geld versucht hat, dagegen anzukämpfen.
  • „How worried are you about a Chinese slowdown? I think we should take that more seriously. I think the growth rate is significantly below the official estimate and I think the financial system is in not good shape. I think you can see from the headlines in today’s papers that even their authorities are nervous about the scale of indebtedness that’s been inherited from the past.“ – bto: wobei sie noch die finanziellen und geldpolitischen Instrumente haben, das Spiel fortzusetzen.
  • „I think that, in Europe particularly, and increasingly now in China and probably other emerging markets, that the bank system is a lot weaker than people would like to feel it is and we should be concerned about that because we haven’t made the fundamental reforms to banking that I think are necessary to mean that we are immune from bank runs.“ – bto: Ich denke nach wie vor, dass das europäische Bankensystem insolvent ist.
  • „The eurozone is a fixed exchange-rate region. Should this be broken up? Either they’ve got to go towards a closer degree of political union, and I would worry about that because I feel there is no democratic legitimacy for that whatsoever. (…) Or it will have to recognize it will need to have a partial or a total breakup.“
  • „In the long run, certainly raising the U.S. savings ratio is important. I can’t see this happening without the dollar being somewhat more competitive against other countries. I think that can’t happen easily without some kind of implicit cooperation with China and Europe about the pace of which this is going to happen.“ – bto: Japan hat er vergessen. Da aber alle ihre eigene Wirtschaft stimulieren wollen, ist eher das Gegenteil zu befürchten.
  • „And I think what central banks can do is to provide a bridge to that new equilibrium. What they can’t do is to create that new equilibrium. (…) it is a terrible mistake to think that just a bit more monetary and fiscal stimulus and we’ll be home and dry. We won’t.“ – bto: Immerhin sagt dies ein anerkannter Notenbanker.
  • „I don’t think that zero or negative long-term real interest rates can possibly be a feature of a successful market economy for a prolonged period. (…) There is nothing to discriminate between good and bad investment projects. There is no incentive to save (…). Monetary stimulus is a bit like a pain killer. It works in the short run but it takes you further away from where you need to be in the long run.“ – bto: Klingt wie die BIZ!
  • „I think as we go forward, there will be a need for cooperation. (…) And there is no way that the U.S. can rebalance its economy without the rest of the world being prepared to accept that. If they don’t, then we all end up with a lower level of total demand and output in the world as a whole, so that cooperation is important.“
  • „And I think this pawn broker rule, forcing the banks to take out insurance upfront in peacetime, means that you would not get bank runs again. (…) I think it would modify the tendency of banks to lend too much when times are good but it would mean that banks would never find themselves in the position they were in late 2008 of desperately having lost the confidence of the market and being unable to finance lending to the real economy.“
  • „My point is this could have radical consequences in the sense of making banks safer, but it doesn’t require radical changes to the nature of the banking system.“ – bto: Er will den Banken das Recht zur Geldschöpfung lassen und lediglich die Kapitalanforderungen erhöhen und vereinfachen (Leverage-Ratio). Ich fürchte, hier springt er zu kurz. Wir müssen die Banken wieder zu Dienstleistern für die Realwirtschaft machen.

Market Watch: „Here’s Mervyn King’s plan to rescue global economy“, 22. März 2016