Die Erkenntnisse zur Ursache von Krisen und Finanzmarktturbulenzen von Hyman Minsky sind sehr bemerkenswert. Deshalb verwies ich in meinen Kommentaren und in Beiträgen, die ich bei bto verlinkt habe, häufig auf seine Thesen. In einem Kommentar bei Bloomberg warnt ein anerkannter Fondsmanager vor dem nächsten “Minsky Moment”, also der Wiederholung der Finanzkrise (ich würde sagen Fortsetzung):
- “Today, we may be approaching a second Minsky moment. After the 2008 debt crisis, central bankers reacted with unconventional tools. If the problem was excess debt, the remedy applied was to lower interest rates and buy large quantities of it. Quantitative easing helped to avoid an even deeper recession, but it didn’t solve the root causes of the crisis. Global debt levels are up 276 percent in the last decade to $217 trillion, or 327 percent of GDP, according to the Institute of International Finance.” – bto: Lesern von bto ist dies wohlbekannt.
- Daneben gibt es erhebliche Nebenwirkungen: “The first is a misallocation of economic resources. By keeping rates at record-low levels, central banks have made it easier for inefficient firms to survive, as in a rising tide that lifts all boats. The second is a rise in wealth inequality, where the wealth effect from rising asset prices benefited asset owners and the old more than the young and the poor. The third is a suppression of risk premia and volatility across financial markets.” – bto: Das Erste schwächt das Wachstum, das Zweite führt zu noch mehr staatlichen Eingriffen (auch schlecht für Wachstum) und Letzteres macht die Märkte gefährlich.
- “Unlike in 2008, the culprit isn’t low-quality subprime mortgage debt, but sovereign bond markets. Central bank purchases of government paper reduce yields and volatility. In turn, this pushes investors to search for yield in other markets, such as investment-grade and high-yield bonds. This search for yield lowers funding costs for firms, but also risk premia associated with default risk and credit volatility. The next step for investors is to turn to other means to achieve yield, selling volatility for example. Over the years following the crisis, short volatility strategies have flourished, gathering record sums of assets under management. Similarly, credit spreads and implied volatility from option premia in equities, rates and currencies are at or near record lows.” – bto: alles Treiber für künftige Probleme.
- “While in theory central bankers should not base their policy decisions on financial market developments, a sharp rise in volatility could lead to an excessive tightening in financial conditions, threatening their inflation targets. This interdependence contributed to the ECB’s dovish tone before this year’s French elections and around uncertainty over the Italian elections.” – bto: Das verdeutlicht faktisch, wie politisch die Notenbanken geworden sind. Was er übrigens mit “inflation targets” meint, ist dies: Kommt es zu einem Crash, haben wir wieder offenen deflationären Druck.
- “The situation is somewhat of a Catch-22 for central bankers. Withdrawing stimulus may result into a return of volatility and perhaps a crisis today, while keeping it going may create an even bigger one tomorrow. Sooner or later, volatility will rise again. When it does, the tail risk may come from “risk-free” assets.” – bto: die das natürlich auch nicht sind!
- “Nine years after the crisis, regulators have tightened capital and liquidity requirements. Yet central banks continue to encourage investors to buy dips and sell volatility as part of the wealth effect and portfolio rebalancing channels of QE stimulus. Financial stability oversight and macro-prudential policy remain a side game, generally outside their core mandate. Last week, Yellen went even further, saying a financial crisis is unlikely to happen in our lifetimes. If he were alive, Minsky would be shaking his head.” – bto: Und wir alle tun es auch!