Alles super mit dem Bullenmarkt

Es ist an der Zeit, optimistischer zu werden. Gerade hier bei bto. Die Börsen boomen, die Wirtschaft erholt sich, die Geldpolitik normalisiert sich. Vermutlich lese ich zu viele von den skeptischen Stimmen und das auch zu einseitig. Hier nun ein ausführlicher Kommentar, weshalb es an der US-Börse weiter aufwärtsgehen dürfte. Gute Laune zum Wochenende:

  • “(…) the bull market has persisted, and is now one of the longest on record. This persistence, along with a steadyexpansion of multiples to levels previously associated with bubble territory, have contributed to a kind of cottage industry that has churned out myth after myth about the bull market, not least in regard to the sources of its energies, and the robustness of its duration.” bto: Und diese Mythen werden dann auseinandergenommen.

The Corporate Buyback Myths

  • “(…) since the bull market began in 2009, households and institutions (which largely act on behalf of households) have been net sellers of shares, while corporations themselves have been by far the biggest buyers of shares.”  bto: Das habe ich an dieser Stelle auch immer kritisiert.

  • “While it is true that corporations have been the major buyers since the bull market began, the explanations given for it are categorically wrong, or at least misleading.  In the first place, households an the institutions that serve them are almost always net sellers of shares. In the aggregate, households are generally net spenders, while corporations are almost always net savers. There is nothing at all unusual with households selling shares back to corporations.  In fact, with few exceptions, that has almost always been the case going back to the early 1980s, when buying back shares became an approved tool of corporate policy.” bto: Das fand ich dann schon sehr interessant … Die Logik, dass Unternehmen Netto-Sparer sind und private Haushalte Netto-Schuldner finde ich schon äußerst komisch. Sollte es nicht anders sein? Ist es seit 1980 nicht mehr so, weil wir immer mehr auf financial engineering setzen?
  • “In the Anglo-Saxon corporate model, executives are employed by shareholders first and foremost to maximize shareholder value, and part of that is returning cash to them, generally in the form of dividends or buybacks.  Obviously, issuing new shares dilutes the value of existing shares, and that is why corporations rarely issue new equity, and rarely retire debt. Furthermore, since interest expenses became tax deductible early in the twentieth century, corporations have had a large incentive to issue tax-favorable debt to fund operations versus diluting shareholder value.” bto: Es geht nicht um echte Wertschaffung mit fundamentalen Hebeln, wie hier erneut unterstrichen wird.
  • “Because corporations have borrowed to buyback shares over the last ten years or so, many charlatans would have you believe that the entire bull market is essentially mirage fueled by easy money from central banks that have pushed up share prices and valuations.  Again, this is far from the truth.” bto: aha. So ein Scharlatan betreibt auch diesen Blog.
  • “For one thing demand for shares is always neutral.  For each buyer, there is a seller, and it makes no difference who the buyers and sellers are. Secondly, buybacks have little or no effect on valuations.  Consider a comparison of the S&P 500 Buyback index with the S&P 500 index.  The buyback index is composed of the top 100 stocks with the highest buyback ratios in the S&P 500, so it is a pretty good yardstick with which to assess corporate buybacks.  Furthermore, it is equal-weighted, so its valuation characteristics are less distorted than broad indices with different compositions.  That being said, it is notable that by every major valuation metric, the buyback index trades at a significant discount to the broader market.”  bto: was übrigens für den Markt spricht. Er bestraft die Unternehmen, die nicht mehr investieren.

bto: So ganz überzeugt es mich nicht. Ich denke, die Nachfrage nach Aktien verkleinert das Angebot nachhaltig, weil die Aktien eben nicht mehr existieren. Das treibt auch die Werte von
Firmen, die keine Buy-backs machen.

The Fed Myths

  • “Another myth that will not die is that quantitative easing (QE), and zero-percent interest rate policy (ZIRP) have fueled the bull market since 2009.  This is easily disproved.  Fundamental factors such as robust profit margins and commensurate earnings growth have been the biggest contributors to equity gains, not easy money.  If easy money were the main driver of equity performance, then areas of the world with proportionately larger central bank stimulus programs, like Japan, would have fared much better than areas with less stimulus.  It is worth noting that the Fed ended its quantitative easing program in October of 2014, and ended its ZIRP program in December of 2015, yet the U.S. has outperformed both Europe and Japan (in dollar terms) since, despite much looser monetary conditions in those regions.” bto: Andere Quellen sehen jedoch einen deutlichen Anstieg der Bewertungsmultiples.
  • “The idea that low rates have compelled would-be savers into riskier assets is another myth that will not die. (…) Yet this has not been the case.  For example, equity ownership in Europe and Japan is little changed over recent years, despite the incentive offered by low rates to invest.” bto: Dieser Umstand dürfte aber zum Kauf von Aktien auf Kredit animiert haben, und zwar von den Profis.


  • “Perhaps because it was born in the midst of a crisis not seen in generations, and because it has coincided with unprecedented policies, the current bull market is perhaps the most misunderstood market cycle in history.  However, when examined without bias, it is easily seen that much of the current cycle is really not all that remarkable, and that the skepticism surrounding it has, ironically, probably done more to fuel it than almost anything else.  It will, like all previous cycles, end at some point, and the usual suspects will be there to cheer the selling, lauding a return to “price discovery.”  It is doubtful, though, that their explanations for the new bear market will be any better than their shoddy rationale for the bull.” bto: Es ist auf jeden Fall eine Sichtweise, die man anerkennen muss. Ich bleibe dabei, dass sich die Politik des billigen Geldes an den Finanzmärkten niederschlägt.

bto: Um es klar zu sagen: Ich teile diese Argumentation nicht. Ich denke, wir sind (nahe) am Ende des Bullenmarktes, der vom billigen Geld getrieben wurde. Die Unternehmen haben ihre Bilanzen hoch geleveraged, um Margin und Multiples zu steigern. Wir haben eine Bewertungsblase, die korrigieren werden muss und wird.

→ “What You Probably Believe About the Bull Market Is Wrong”, 27. Juli 2017