Manche Beobachter sehen eine andere Strategie im Verhalten der US-Regierung, nämlich den Versuch durch eine Schwächung der chinesischen Wirtschaft das dortige Ponzi-Schema ständig steigender Verschuldung zum Einsturz zu bringen und das Land damit um Jahre zurückzuwerfen. Undenkbar ist das keineswegs, stimmt es doch, dass China massiv von der Neuverschuldung abhängt und schon der kleine Versuch der Regierung das Schuldenwachstum zu dämpfen negative Wirkungen auf das Wachstum hat.
Chinesische Schuldenkrise in Folge der Trumpschen Sanktionen?
- “There’s no chance China will cut its trade surplus with the U.S. in response to President Donald Trump’s tariff threats. For starters, Washington has made no specific demand to which Beijing can respond. But its efforts may have an unexpected side effect: a debt crisis in China.” bto: Das wäre, wie gesagt, nicht so erfreulich. Es würde die Welt als Ganzes treffen.
- “The 25 percent additional tariffs on exports of machinery and electronics looked, at first blush, like a stealth tax on offshoring. (…) It seems, though, that offshoring wasn’t the target after all. Now, with the imposition of new tariffs on low-value exports that mostly involve Asian value chains, the simple fact of selling cheap products that the U.S. buys has become the problem.” – bto: Ich denke, das Problem ist der wirtschaftliche Aufstieg Chinas, verbunden mit den machtpolitischen Implikationen.
- “Distress has already been registered in China. On July 19, the yuan (also known as the renminbi) hit 6.80 to the dollar, the weakest in a year and 7 percent lower than at the end of May. Such a move is nothing earth-shaking for less controlled currencies. But a stable renminbi is a key plank in the leadership’s promise to its people, and the exchange rate is tightly managed by the central bank.” – bto: also spricht es dafür, dass die chinesische Regierung es bewusst zulässt.
- “Chinese investors have been buying official assurances for a year that the renminbi would be a fortress, but now they’re not so sure and are exporting money again: May saw net capital outflows and a decline in the foreign-exchange reserves. The currency is the most visible sign of slippage in the image that China tries to project of an economy so brilliantly managed that the bright sun of GDP expansion is untroubled by even temporary clouds on trade, employment or consumption.” – bto: Oder es ist ein Ventil, das man nutzt, solange es noch geht.
- “The Shanghai Composite Index of stocks has declined 7 percent in a month, dropping below the government’s red line of 3,000 for the first time since September 2016. Corporate bonds are about to set a record for the most defaults in a year. The chorus of anxiety about debt is reaching a crescendo, with daily press reports on governments that can’t pay their employees or meet pension obligations. Property prices are tumbling in some cities and frozen in others whose governments have placed a finger in the dyke by halting transactions.” – bto: Das liegt aber am Kampf gegen die Verschuldung.
- “That the massive burden of debt will drag the economy into recession is as obvious as the empty towers that rise on every landscape. Precise estimates are difficult, since the government’s dedication to the optics of invincibility induces financial institutions to push debt into alternate, opaque channels. But on any metric, the amount of new lending each year grows faster than the economy, and the interest newly owed exceeds the incremental rise in GDP. In other words, the whole economy is a Ponzi scheme.” – bto: Wenn die zusätzliche Zinslast das zusätzliche BIP übersteigt, ist wirklich schnell Game over.
- “Many analysts point out that the Chinese government owns everything, including the banks, and can just issue renminbi to infinity to keep the economy solvent. The flaw in that argument is China’s role in the global economy: It’s the world’s biggest exporter and second-biggest importer. The currency acts as the interface between the domestic and international economies, and its value is a matter of supply and demand.” – bto: weshalb die dortige Krise die überschuldete Welt in die nächste Krise und die Existenz des Euro beenden wird.
- “The Ponzi economy has been sustained by cheap dollars coming in through legitimate or illegitimate channels, and the problem now is that structural surpluses are disappearing and there is less ‘hot’ money from the U.S. seeking yield. When dollars enter, the central bank buys them and issues renminbi.” – bto: und treibt damit die Wirtschaft an, mit noch mehr Schulden zu wachsen.
- “It is tempting to see the recent yuan depreciation as a strategy to blunt the effect of U.S. tariffs, but really, the capital account is of much greater import to China Inc. than the current account. China’s central bank will almost certainly try to pull back the exchange rate in the near term: Authorities care more about the pile of reserve gold, successful stock-exchange debuts for Xiaomi Corp. and Ant Financial, and lucrative bond issues than about the private and largely foreign-owned companies that dominate exports.” – bto: was allerdings nichts an dem grundlegenden Schuldenproblem ändert.
- “Until now, China has managed to keep its huge raft of nonperforming debt afloat thanks to capital inflows, as successive waves of quantitative easing pushed dollars into the world. A tighter dollar would seem to make the bursting of China’s credit bubble an inevitability. When that happens, the renminbi will have to depreciate sharply. This will have a deflationary impact on the world. It will also lead to a decline in China’s share of global GDP, dramatically reduce the nation’s demand for commodities, and diminish its role on the international political stage.” – bto: Und dann hätten wir ihn, den Margin Call für die Weltwirtschaft.