Trumps Politik: Wachstumsschock und Margin Call

Die möglichen Folgen der Wirtschaftspolitik des neuen amerikanischen Präsidenten dominieren weiterhin die Diskussion. Immer deutlicher wird, dass sie erhebliche Chancen, aber ebenso erhebliche Risiken beinhaltet. Dabei sind die Risiken für den Rest der Welt deutlich höher, allen voran die Eurozone. Der Telegraph nahm das Thema wie viele andere Medien erneut auf:


  • “On the morning of the Trump victory, many hedge fund managers were celebrating, having bet big on just such a political upset; by the afternoon, they were in head-in-hands despair. They were right about the result, but as is so often the case in markets, wrong about the reaction.” bto: was gut in meine prinzipielle Haltung passt, wonach man meist nicht das tun sollte, was alle denken.
  • “The mistake made was to confuse the possible long-term consequences of a Trump presidency, (…), with the short-term impact, which should be broadly positive.”bto: was auch sonst in den Märkten viel vorkommt.
  • Even grief-struck pundits such as the Nobel economist Paul Krugman (…) have been forced to change their tune and admit that for the next several years at least, Trump could be positive for the US economy.”bto: Das ist mehr als peinlich und zeigt, wie sehr die Experten in ihrer eigenen Welt leben.
  • “(…) Trump promises to implement the very same fiscal expansion for which they have been calling for years, even if, in their terms, it is the ‚wrong kind of stimulus‘, creating all kinds of trouble further down the line.” bto: genau. Wieso ist es jetzt falsch?
  • It’s time for a reality check, for it could be that markets, in their new-found enthusiasm for fiscal irresponsibility, are getting ahead of themselves (…) and may therefore be too much focused on the positives, rather than what Trump can pull off in practice and what it means for the rest of the world.”bto: und zwar vor allem schlechtes.
  • “(…) the spill-over consequences for the rest of the world (…) are much more likely to be of the negative than the positive variety. We already see this in rising market interest rates almost everywhere, creating a monetary squeeze in economies across the globe not yet ready to follow Trump into fiscal adventurism.”bto: was sie sollten, wie ich schon vor einiger Zeit schrieb.
  • This is particularly the case in Europe, confined as it is by the straitjacket of monetary union. (…) Widening spreads (…) would feed powerfully into this potentially toxic mix of political risks.”bto: Auch das deckt sich mit meiner Meinung. So könnte Trump auch gleich den Euro mit erledigen.

Wie sehr die These vom Margin Call zutrifft, beschreibt Ambroise Evans-Pritchard (AEP) in einem anderen Beitrag:

  • The soaring US dollar is causing mounting strains for the global financial system and ultimately threatens to set off a full-blown banking crisis in emerging markets (…)” bto: Das ist das Szenario des Margin Calls, immer wieder bei bto diskutiert.
  • The danger is that the powerful and immediate effects of financial tightening will ‚swamp‘ any trade benefits for the rest of the world from Donald Trump’s stimulus plans and a stronger dollar, even for countries that export heavily to the US.” bto: Das kann sein. Wobei ja zusätzlich noch der Protektionismus drohen könnte.
  • The BIS estimates that dollar debt outside US jurisdiction – and therefore lacking a direct lender of last resort – has risen five-fold to $10 trillion over the past 15 years. (…) The debts will have to be rolled over in a stronger currency and at a much higher rates.” bto: Das ist ein massives Problem, das uns aber so oder so auf die Füße fallen wird.
  • What is less understood is that the surging dollar automatically squeezes the balance sheet of banks in Europe and Japan through the complex structure of swap contracts.” bto: was nichts anderes als potenziertes Leverage ist.
  • “The BIS said in a working paper that the old rules of global finance have broken down and the dollar now acts as a barometer of risk appetite, and specifically as a ‚proxy for the shadow price of bank leverage‘.”bto: Nicht mehr die Volatilität VIX zeigt demnach Risiken an, sondern der US-Dollar. Steigt er, wächst das Risiko!
  • The great unknown is what will happen to China, where corporate debt has mushroomed to 145pc of GDP. Fitch Ratings says bad debts in the banking system are 10 times higher than officially admitted and warns that rescue costs could reach a third of GDP.” bto: Das ist nun kein neuer Punkt, es gibt aber auch andere, die in China und nicht in den USA das größte Risiko sehen.
  • Spiralling US bond yields since the Trump shock have lifted borrowing costs in lockstep across much of the world, sending tremors through Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, Brazil and Colombia, as well as Mexico.(…) The countries with the biggest current account deficits are being hit hardest (…).”bto: was zeigt, wie vernetzt die Welt ist. China wird genauso auf die Welt ausstrahlen.


Fazit AEP: “The core problem is that international trade has become genuinely multi-polar and global, but the financial system has become more dollar-dependent than at any time in history – and more indebted.  The world is therefore acutely leveraged to the effects of the US monetary cycle.” –  bto: Es ist eine Gratwanderung und auf beiden Seiten droht ein tiefer Absturz.


→ The Telegraph: “Trump’s ‘Keynesian stimulus’ threatens to reignite dormant eurozone crisis”, 15. November 2016

→ The Telegraph: “Global dollar shock threatens fresh financial storm, warns watchdog”, 15. November 2016


Ihr Kommentar

An der Diskussion beteiligen?
Hinterlassen Sie uns Ihren Kommentar!

Schreibe einen Kommentar

Deine E-Mail-Adresse wird nicht veröffentlicht.