Heute Morgen habe ich nochmals vertieft auf die chinesische Finanzsituation geblickt. Hier nun ein anderer Blickwinkel auf das Thema, wiederum aus der FT, die aufzeigt, dass die Lösung – so man davon sprechen kann – für das chinesische Schuldenproblem so oder so auf Weltfinanzsystem und -wirtschaft ausstrahlt:
- “Since it started to open up its economy in 1978 the country has contributed considerably to global growth, though not always in benign ways. A mercantilist exchange rate policy whose goal was to maintain an undervalued currency helped create the global imbalances that lent impetus to the great financial crisis. That said, Beijing is given too little credit, especially in the US, for having launched the first big stimulus package to offset the maelstrom.” – bto: Ja, das ist beides richtig. Die Chinesen haben die Weltdepression damals verhindert.
- “As well as pumping up public spending the government lent on the big four state-owned banks, which expanded their balance sheets from 98 per cent of gross domestic product in 2007 to 109 per cent by 2010. The equivalent numbers for the smaller state-owned banks operating mainly in the regions saw balance sheets grow from 82 per cent in 2008 to 103 per cent of GDP by 2010.” – bto: Sie haben halt Schuldenwirtschaft nach westlichem Vorbild betrieben.
- “This (…) had the result that from late 2008 to early 2010 real domestic demand grew at close to 20 per cent in the midst of a colossal investment boom engineered by state-owned borrowers. While undertaken in China’s own interest it imparted an enormous stimulus to the world at large.” – bto: und uns damit eine Runde weitergebracht.
- “Today there is growing concern among international investors that China’s debt-to-GDP ratio has topped 270 per cent, while the aggregate balance sheet of its undercapitalised banking system comes to 310 per cent of GDP or 387 per cent if the off-balance sheet activity in shadow banking is included.” – bto: in der Tat beeindruckende Summen.
- “In fact, China’s global systemically important banks are bigger as a percentage of GDP than those of the US. And the OECD points out that the size of off-balance sheet activity is larger as a share of the economy than the securitisation that played such a big part in the 2007-8 crisis.” – bto: Ich denke aber, sie noch kleiner als die in der Eurozone.
- “Yet worries about the damage a Chinese financial crisis might wreak on global financial stability can be overdone. The financial system remains largely closed with the debt owed mainly to the Chinese themselves. The government still has sufficient fiscal capacity to recapitalise the banks. The authorities have also been sure-footed in their pursuit of measures to reduce leverage in the financial system.” – bto: Also wären auch in dieser Hinsicht “gemanagte” Staaten besser als demokratische?
- “The real financial stability threat to the outside world is indirect, stemming from the impact of a financial crisis on China’s economic growth rate. And we are already seeing an indirect impact from the deleveraging programme. An incipient Chinese credit crunch is contributing towards tightening of global liquidity just as the Federal Reserve is raising interest rates and shrinking its balance sheet.” – bto: Wir haben die säkulare Stagnation sofort wieder, wenn es zu einer Abschwächung in China kommt.
- “For the world more generally there may be good news, too, in the recent weakening of Chinese economic data. The Communist Party leadership’s intense preoccupation with stability means that fiscal and monetary policy could revert to expansion.” – bto: genau, einfach wieder Gas geben. Also das Problem weiter anwachsen lassen …