Beim nächsten Mal wird es schlimmer als in der großen Depression

Das komische Gefühl bleibt. Zehn Jahre “nach” der Krise fühlt es sich immer noch nicht gesund an. Wie sollte es auch. Wir sind ja nicht nach der Krise, sondern mitten drin. Mein Bilderbuch (→ Die Krise ist … ) zeigte das schon 2014.

Auch gibt es genügend Indikatoren für ein sich vergrößerndes Problem, wie in einigen der letzten Beiträge schon diskutiert. Hier nun Ambroise Evans-Pritchard mit einer für ihn typischen knackigen Zusammenfassung:

  • “The world’s major economies are skating on dangerously thin ice and lack the fiscal, monetary, and emergency tools to fight the next downturn. A roster of top crisis veterans fear an even more intractable slump than the Lehman recession when the current ageing expansion rolls over. The implications for liberal democracy are sobering.” – bto: a) richtig; b) vor allem für solche Traumtänzer wie uns Deutsche. Wir werden voll erwischt werden.
  • We have no ability to turn the economy around, said Martin Feldstein, President of the US National Bureau of Economic Research. (…) a former chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisors, described a bleak scenario more akin to the depressions of the 1870s or the 1930s than anything experienced in the post-War era. He warned that a decade of super-low interest rates and monetary stimulus by the US Federal Reserve has pushed Wall Street equities to nose-bleed levels that no longer bear any relation to historic fundamentals. Stock prices will inevitably come plummeting back down to earth.” – bto: wobei Auslöser und Timing natürlich völlig offen sind.
  • “(…) the next bear market – most likely triggered by a spike in 10-year Treasury yields – risks setting off a $10 trillion crash in US household assets. The cascading ‘wealth effects’ will drain the retail economy of $300bn to $400bn a year, causing recessionary forces to mestasasize.” – bto: was ich als Margin Call bezeichne, die klassische Schuldendeflation.
  • “The eurozone faces an even worse fate when the global cycle turns since the European Central Bank has yet to build up safety buffers against a deflationary shock. The half-constructed edifice of monetary union almost guarantees than any response will be too little, too late.” – bto: Das sehe ich genauso. Allerdings dürfte es das realistische Szenario geben, dass die Bundesregierung alles stillschweigend mitgeht und die Öffentlichkeit es ohnehin nicht interessiert.
  • “Mario Draghi is going to be very happy when he has left the ECB because it is not clear how they are going to get out of this when they still have zero rates. They can’t play the trick of the cheap euro again, (…)  It is striking that bond yields are still negative on maturities of five years or more in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands (though not in France any longer, interestingly). This is evidence of a profound structural malaise.” – bto: Und die haben wir ja auch!
  • “Olivier Blanchard, ex-chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, said the US has big enough buffers to cope with a run-off-the-mill recession (…). While the Fed’s balance sheet is already “scary” at $4.2 trillion after previous rounds of quantitative easing, it could go a lot higher. (…) the Fed could buy equities. The Bank of Japan already does this. It is the biggest holder of exchange traded funds on the Tokyo bourse. (…) The Fed could even print helicopter money to fund the fiscal deficit directly, an idea floated by academics after the last crisis but deemed too radical for the political system.” – bto: Ich zweifle überhaupt nicht daran, dass die Fed es mit aller Radikalität versuchen wird, die deflationäre Depression zu stoppen.
  • “While the US could in theory experiment with helicopter money, (…) It would be a last resort. In the eurozone it would be completely impossible under EU treaty law and the restrictive fiscal rules of the Stability Pact.” – bto: Das glaube ich nicht. Sie werden alle Regeln über Bord werfen.
  • “Mr Blanchard said it took at least 850 basis points of rate cuts to fight the post-Lehman recession – directly or synthetically through bond purchases under the Wu-Xia model – and this is clearly not available now. His advice is to delay monetary tightening and run the US economy hot until it is safely out of the deflationary doldrums.” – bto: was sie nicht sein kann, da das Entscheidende nicht die Inflationsrate, sondern der Schuldenstand ist!
  • “What saved capitalism in 2008 were lightning-fast moves by the Fed and the US Treasury to shore up the markets for commercial paper and the asset-backed securities markets, and to stop a run on the money market industry. (…) The tougher rules constrain the Fed’s ability to halt fire-sale liquidation. The Dodd-Frank Act stops it rescuing individual companies in trouble (there must be at least five, and they must be solvent) or lending to non-banks. The Fed cannot issue blanket guarantees of bank debt and money market funds. It can lend only to ‘insured depository institutions’.” – bto: Ich denke trotzdem, dass die Regeln schnell gebrochen werden, wenn es darauf ankommt.
  • “The worrying question is whether Mr Trump would refuse to “bail out” Europe in a crisis – deeming it their own problem – or might try to use this enormous power as leverage for political or trade policy objectives. In short, it is no longer clear that there is a lender-of-last resort standing full square behind the dollarized global financial system and able to act instantly in a crisis.” – bto: und das bei rekordhohen Schulden!

The Telegraph: “The next downturn could rival the Great Depression and wipe $10 trillion off US household assets”, 17. September 2018