Die Politik der Notenbanken steht schon lange in der Kritik. War es richtig, den Systemkollaps 2009 zu verhindern? Wir merken immer deutlicher, dass die Medizin in diesem Fall zwar am Leben erhält, aber keine Heilung verspricht. Die Nebenwirkungen dieser Politik werden zudem immer offensichtlicher. JP Morgan fasst diese eindrücklich zusammen (bei Zero Hedge gefunden):
1. “Results in Asset Bubbles and a Collapse in CapEx: Even as QE has likely exerted downward pressure on bond yields, the significant increase in central banks’ balance sheets makes an exit potentially more difficult, and raises the risk of a policy error or of an increase in perceptions about debt monetization. It potentially creates asset bubbles by lowering asset yields relative to historical norms, that an eventual return to normality could be accompanied by sharp price declines. Perceptions about asset bubbles can thus also increase long term uncertainty. In turn higher uncertainty might prevent economic agents such as businesses from spending, i.e. the collapse in CapEx observed over the past decade as company used cheap debt to purchase their own, making management teams richer.” – bto: O. k., das ist etwas von hinten durch die Brust …, dennoch hat es was. Die Akteure der Realwirtschaft spüren, dass es eben kein natürlicher Boom ist. Folge demzufolge weniger Investitionen. Zugleich wird an den Vermögensmärkten ohne Anstrengung mehr verdient, also fließt das Geld eher in diese Richtung.
2. “Creates Zombie Companies and Crushes Productivity. (…) By allowing unproductive and inefficient companies to survive, helped by low debt servicing costs, QE could potentially hinder the creative destruction taking place during a normal economic cycle. In principle, QE could thus make economies less efficient or productive over time. Which should answer the long-running debate over the chronic lack of economic productivity in the new normal. The debate about so called ‚zombie‘ companies has been particularly intense in Japan given the low business turnover rate.” – bto: So ist es. Die Zombies vergiften wie tote Fische das Wasser für alle. → Totentanz der Zombies
3. “Low Rates crush savers, make the rich richer. One of the most visible impacts of QE has been the decline in discount rates, which in turn has created wealth effects via supporting asset prices. However, an argument could be made that these wealth effects are not evenly distributed, and that low discount rates mean savers suffer from an erosion of income.” – bto: Es ist einfach eine Umverteilung von Geld- zu Vermögensbesitzern und von Gläubigern zu Schuldnern. Dazu braucht man keine Forschung zu betreiben.
4. “Exacerbates currency wars. QE could exacerbate so called ‚currency wars‘. The value of the Japanese yen collapsed after Abenomics started in November 2012 and has stayed at historical lows since then helped by BoJ’s ultra accommodative monetary policy. This is shown in Figure 5 by the real trade weighted index of the Japanese yen. Japan’s main competitors across EM and DM have been feeling the pressure from this depreciation, though it is not clear that the depreciation necessarily means the yen is undervalued.” – bto: Aber auch die Fed hat es vor allem getan, um den Dollar zu schwächen, was zunächst auch wie gewünscht funktionierte.
Quelle: JP Morgan, Zero Hedge
5. “NIRP hurts the economy, and chokes off credit supply. Beyond a certain threshold, negative interest rates can have unintended consequences such as lower bank profitability, higher bank lending rates, reduced credit creation to the real economy, impaired functioning of money markets and reduced liquidity in bond markets. (…) Deeply negative policy rates had taken their toll on Danish and Swiss banks’ net interest income. Net interest income as % of assets declined in 2015 for both Danish and Swiss banks following the introduction of very negative policy rates in these countries in January 2015.” – bto: Also führt die Geldpolitik zu einer Schwächung des Bankensystems und zu keiner Stärkung.
Quelle: JP Morgan, Zero Hedge
6. “Chokes Repo markets due to collateral shortages. It is not only commercial banks that are hurt as a result of QE. Reduced liquidity in money and repo markets is another side effect. UST collateral shortages have hampered US repo markets. The BoJ and the ECB inflicted similar damage to European and Japanese repo markets as government collateral was withdrawn at an even stronger pace. (…) Negative yields can hamper trading volumes and liquidity as money market participants are less willing to trade at negative yields.” – bto: Diesen Effekt habe ich schon früher bei bto diskutiert. Faktisch hat dies erhebliche Folgewirkungen im gesamten Finanzsystem und macht gerade im Fall eines Schocks das System anfälliger.
7. “Cripples pension funds by increasing funding deficits. Lower bond yields increase pension fund and insurance company deficits putting pressure on pension funds to match assets and liabilities. This pressure to move further away from equities and other high risk assets into fixed income is even stronger in countries like Japan where demographic pressures are more intense. For example, old age dependency ratios, i.e. the proportion of the population aged 65 years and over as a percentage of the population aged 15-64 years, have been rising steadily, with Japan aging more rapidly than the US or Europe (Figure 1). Generally, an aging population means that allocations are likely to shift towards relatively safer instruments as the ability to withstand larger drawdowns on capital diminishes as individuals age.” – bto: Also wird die ganze Welt wie wir Deutschen? Sparen mit garantiertem Verlust? Auf jeden Fall vernichtet die Geldpolitik Renten- und Pensionsansprüche und wird so zu erheblichen sozialen Konflikten führen.
Quelle: JP Morgan, Zero Hedge
8. “QE Forces consumers to save even more. The yield-to-worst on the Bloomberg Global Agg Yen denominated bond index currently stands at close to 0.15%, around one-sixth of its average in the expansion preceding the financial crisis. In addition to the effect of deleveraging after the financial crisis and the Euro area sovereign crisis, QE has played a role in pushing down on long-term yields. (…) These low yields in turn depress the income that investors receive from bonds, inducing them to save even more, in the process making a mockery of the key ‚widely accepted‘ economist axiom behind QE.” – bto: Es bleibt ja auch keine andere Wahl, als mehr zu sparen, wenn die Ersparnisse nicht automatisch mehr werden.
9. “The rise of populism and extreme political frictions. A longer-term tail risk created by QE is the potential for political frictions, which could escalate in the future especially once QE becomes a negative carry trade for central banks, i.e. when the interest on excess reserves starts rising above the yield they receive on their bond holdings.” – bto: Das ist die Folge der verschleppten Krise.
Die Zentralbanken werden vielleicht noch einmal die großen “Retter” sein, doch danach dürfte sich die Wut gegen Draghi und Co. richten.