“Are Central Banks Nationalising the Economy?”

Da hatte jemand nach der Lektüre der FT (→ “Leading central banks now own a fifth of their governments’ total debt.” ) die gleiche Idee wie ich. Während ich von den Totengräbern der Marktwirtschaft sprach, spricht man hier von der „Verstaatlichung“ der Wirtschaft. Beide Beiträge erschienen zeitgleich am letzten Donnerstag.

Hier die Highlights des Kollegen:

The figures are staggering.

  • Without any recession or crisis, major central banks are purchasing more than $ 200 billion a month in government and private debt, led by the ECB and the Bank of Japan.
  • The Federal Reserve owns more than 14 % of the US total public debt.
  • The ECB and BOJ balance sheets exceed 35 % and 70 % of their GDP.
  • The Bank of Japan is now a top 10 shareholder in 90 % of the Nikkei.
  • The ECB owns 9.2 % of the European corporate bond market and more than 10 % of the main European countries’ total sovereign debt.
  • The Bank of England owns between 25 % and 30 % of the UK government debt.
  • The Bank of Japan (…) is on course to become the largest shareholder of the Nikkei 225’s largest companies. In fact, the Japanese central bank already accounts for 60% of the ETFs market (Exchange traded funds) in Japan.”

bto: Das fand ich auch, was mich zu meinem Kommentar veranlasst hat.

  • “Overall, the central bank not only generates greater imbalances and a poor result in a “zombified” economy as the extremely loose policies perpetuate imbalances, weaken money velocity, and incentivize debt and malinvestment.”bto: was wiederum die Chancen für höheres Wachstum reduziert.
  • The government issues massive amounts of debt and cheap money promotes overcapacity and poor capital allocation. As such, productivity growth collapses, real wages fall and purchasing power of currencies fall, driving the real cost of living up and debt to grow more than real GDP. That is why (…) total debt has soared to 325% of GDP while zombie companies reach crisis-high levels, according to the Bank of International Settlements.”bto: Und es fügt sich alles zusammen.
  • The government is not issuing productive money just a promise of higher revenues from higher taxes, higher prices or confiscation of wealth in the future. Money supply growth is a loan that government borrows but we, citizens, pay. The payment comes with the destruction of purchasing power and confiscation of wealth via devaluation and inflation.”bto: Da bin ich nicht ganz so sicher. Ich kann mir immer noch den deflationären Kollaps vorstellen, wenn es eben keine Inflation gibt, sondern einen externen Schock.
  • It is a de factonationalization. Because the central bank does not go bankrupt, it just transfers its financial imbalances to private banks, businesses, and families.” bto: ja, indem sie die Preise für Geld und Finanzassets aller Art verzerrt.
  • By generating subsequent financial crises through loose monetary policies and always being the main beneficiary of the boom, and the bust, the public sector comes out from these crises more powerful and more indebted, while the private sector suffers the crowding-out effect in crisis times, and the taxation and wealth confiscation effect in expansion times.” bto: Und die Politiker können wieder auf die “Märkte” schimpfen.
  • “The government has all the incentives to overspend as its goal is to maximize budget and increase bureaucracy as means of power. It also has all the incentives to blame its mistakes on an external enemy.” bto: Das kann man auch sehr gut bei uns in Deutschland beobachten.
  • What is the hook to let us buy into it? Stock markets rise, bonds fall, and we are led to believe that asset inflation is a reflection of economic strength. Then, when the central bank policy stops working either from lack of confidence or because it is simply part of the liquidity and markets fall to their deserved valuations, many will say that it is the fault of  speculators, not the central speculator. bto: Das sehe ich genauso. Dass es Stimmen gibt wie Albert Edwards, die glauben, es gäbe beim nächsten Mal eine Revolution gegen die Notenbanken, ist Lesern von bto bekannt. Dennoch glaube auch ich, es werden andere Sündenböcke gefunden.
  • It is a clever Machiavellian system to end free markets and disproportionately benefit governments through the most unfair of competitions: having unlimited access to money and credit and none of the risks. And passing the bill to everyone else.” bto: Es ist eine andere Schlussfolgerung als die meine, geht aber in die gleiche Richtung. Die nächste Phase der Krise wird nochmals mehr Intervention des Staates mit sich bringen  und so das Wachstum weiter lähmen.

Mises.org: „Are Central Banks Nationalising the Economy?“, 24. August 2017