Wir wissen schon lange, dass die Notenbanken nur noch so tun, als wären sie unabhängig. Mit Helikopter-Geld und MMT ist damit bald auch offiziell Schluss. Meint auch die FINANCIAL TIMES (FT):
- “(…) there was a time when central banks in advanced countries were supposed to be independent of their governments. That meant they were not expected to bend policy to meet the political requirements of the day or the election cycle.” – bto: Ich kann mir das in der Eurozone nicht mehr vorstellen.
- “There were times when the precept was violated. For example, it is generally believed that in 1971 Arthur Burns, then chair of the Federal Reserve, succumbed to pressure from the White House to imprudently loosen monetary policy to ensure a strong economy for Richard Nixon’s re-election. The economy boomed and Nixon won but the consequent inflation and damaged Fed credibility were not overcome until Paul Volcker’s Fed imposed high rates and a deep recession.” – bto: Und alle sehen es als Fehler an, was damals passiert ist.
- “Now that lesson is forgotten. In the US and Europe, it would seem, central bank independence is as dead as vaudeville. (…) Mr Trump and his advisers have recognised the political threat represented by the partially inverted yield curve. Inverted curves probably mean recession, which would mean no re-election. That is a risk the White House cannot accept, whatever the blather about Fed independence and policy stability.” – bto: Andere würden meinen, dass Trump ein besseres Gespür für die Wirtschaftslage habe als die Fed.
- “Most economists, and, for that matter, corporate America, think the US is already pushing the bounds of non-inflationary growth. Labour shortages are endemic, shipments are late, profit margins are under pressure, consumers grow more cautious. Time to pull back and wind in — unless you need one more year of euphoria to ensure you stay in office. Then you might be willing to settle for inflationary growth, even if it comes with future instability. True, your trading partners may think you are engaging in a competitive devaluation and irresponsible behaviour, but you probably do not care about their opinion.” – bto: Nun muss man allerdings sagen, dass der Dollar zur Zeit eher zur Stärke neigt und außerdem die Inflation höchst erwünscht wäre, um die Schulden tragbarer zu machen.
- “If we do not get this sort of policy bouleversement out of the White House and the Fed, then we could find out how all those post-crisis reforms in the financial system will work when the pressure is on. For example, if there were to be a bear market in equity, we are likely to see a considerable amount of BBB corporate debt pushed below investment grade by the rating agencies. (…) the concentration of corporate paper teetering on the BBB bubble is historically large. Much of it has been pledged to the banking system for what is called ‚collateral transformation‘ in repo transactions.” – bto: Was hier steht, ist interessant. Wenn wir eine Rezession nicht aufschieben, wird sie unangenehm. Das spräche doch für aufschieben – und dann ist das Problem in ein paar Jahren noch größer!
- “In the event of ratings downgrades and greater market volatility, the banks will impose deeper haircuts in return for meeting the consequent higher margin calls. This is the sort of mechanism that feeds on itself. If you are a White House economic adviser, do you want to be at weekend after weekend of crisis meetings dealing with that problem? Or would you prefer to be at the post-election victory parties?” – bto: Haha, das ist ein gutes Bild.
- “Unfortunately, there is also considerable pressure in Europe. There is another interesting drama playing out between the European Central Bank and its member countries over who gets to supervise clearing houses. This has been well reported in this newspaper but mostly ignored by European political commentators. The critical faultline in Europe could well run through the clearing houses. The ECB has long believed that it should be in charge of crisis management should there be an issue with the orderly functioning of clearing and settlement systems. The national regulators (and governments) believe it should be part of their competence. European markets would be short of good collateral to meet margin calls in a crisis. Control over the ECB’s vast balance sheet might then shift to the national governments. So much for its independence.” – bto: die im Zuge der “Euro-Rettung” ohnehin nur noch in der Theorie besteht.