Ist es richtig, dass die Notenbanken (un-)schuldig sind an der Inflation? Roger Bootle von Capital Economics diksutiert das Thema in The Telegraph:
- “(…) a fascinating document entitled ‘How Central Bank mistakes after 2019 led to inflation’, by Graeme Wheeler and Bryce Wilkinson (was published last week). What makes this document particularly striking is that from 2012 to 2017, Graeme Wheeler was governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. They argue that central bank policies are the main cause of the current inflation. Central banks operated interest rates that were far too low, and in some cases negative, and pursued massive expansions of the money supply at the same time as huge fiscal expansions engineered by governments.” – bto: Das argumentierte Tim Congdon in meinem Podcast. Letztlich war es MMT.
- “But why did central banks pursue such policies and why did they carry on pursuing them even as the inflationary clouds gathered? The authors give some fascinating answers. They say that central banks became overconfident in their inflation targeting frameworks. The key to this was that they overestimated their own contribution to keeping inflation ultra-low in the ‘Death of Inflation’ era. They believed it was their deft handling of the monetary levers, plus the consequent secure anchoring of inflation expectations, that produced this result.” – bto. Das war schon vorher objektiv Blödsinn. Wissen wir doch um die Wirkung von China und Demografie.
- “In contrast, the authors argue, a major role was played by the wave of helpful supply shocks associated with globalisation and the rise of China, falling prices for information technology and growing international competition. (…) I was conscious that at some stage these factors would lose their influence – or even go into reverse. And they have.” – bto: Richtig, wir erleben eine Zeitenwende.
- “(…) having underestimated the importance of these supply-side factors in the past, central banks at first missed, and then underestimated, the significance of the turnaround of these influences in recent years and continued with their hugely expansionary policies well past their sell-by date.” – bto: in der Eurozone auch getrieben von der Aufgabe, die Währungsunion zu “retten”.
- “As part of their critique, the authors contend that central banks became overconfident in the economic models that they use as the basis for policy decisions. Models have their place but they are not the be-all and end-all. Model-based forecasts rest on the assumption that the economy will behave as it has in the past. But sometimes the past is another country. The key to successful forecasting is spotting the changes that mean that things will not turn out as they did in the past.” – bto: Die Notenbanker haben einfach eine Trendfortschreibung gemacht und nicht, was man von so gut ausgebildeten und bezahlten Akteuren erwarten würde.
- “Many people complain about the prevalence of groupthink at the Bank. But there has also been groupthink between central banks. (…) Admittedly, not all countries are experiencing the degree of inflation that we are. Switzerland, China and Japan are notable exceptions. Mind you, this point can easily be overdone. In Switzerland inflation is 3.4pc. This may not sound much but by Swiss standards it is a disaster and the Swiss National Bank is rapidly tightening its policy stance.” – bto: Dennoch zeigt es die Wirkung der nationalen Politiken.
- “(…) painful though the surge in inflation is, in the early months of next year the inflation rate should fall back pretty quickly from its peak, which I suspect will be about 12pc. But with pay settlements rising alarmingly, I cannot see that inflation will fall back readily to the 2pc target. By contrast, it is easy to see it settling in a range of something like 4pc to 6pc.” – bto: Und damit haben wir dann ein anhaltendes Inflationsumfeld.
- “If this happens, what is the Bank of England to do? Against inflation at this rate, interest rates of 1.75pc just don’t cut the mustard. Even if interest rates rise to 3pc by the end of this year, real interest rates would still be decidedly negative. We may be in for a shock with regard to how high the Bank Rate will rise.” – bto: So? Werden wir? Nun, das würde aber die Schuldner und die Vermögensmärkte massiv unter Druck setzen.