Zunächst zur Erinnerung: Die entscheidende Größe für den Zustand der Weltwirtschaft und noch mehr der Kapitalmärkte ist die weltweite Liquidität:
Beim Betrachten dieser Darstellung fällt vor allem eine Farbe auf. China stand für die gesamte Nettokreditschöpfung der letzten Monate in der Welt.
Ökonomen der New York Fed haben die Entwicklung genauer analysiert:
50 Prozent der neuen Schulden der letzten 10 Jahre in China
- “Debt in China has increased dramatically in recent years, accounting for roughly one-half of all new credit created globally since 2005. The country’s share of total global credit is nearly 25 percent, up from 5 percent ten years ago.” – bto: China hat uns allen Zeit gekauft.
- By some measures, China’s credit boom has reached the point where countries typically encounter financial stress (…).” – bto: Gemeint sind Korea, Japan, Schweden, die USA, …
- “Nonfinancial debt in China has increased from roughly $3 trillion at the end of 2005 to nearly $22 trillion, while banking system assets have increased sixfold over the same period to over 300 percent of GDP. In 2016 alone, credit outstanding increased by more than $3 trillion, with the pace of growth still roughly twice that of nominal GDP.” – bto: Ja, die Schulden dienen immer mehr dazu, die Illusion der Bedienung von Schulden aufrechtzuerhalten.
- “As a result, the ‚credit-to-GDP gap‘—the difference between the debt-to-GDP ratio and its long-run trend—has reached almost 30 percentage points. The international experience suggests that such a rapid buildup is often followed by stress in domestic banking systems. Roughly one-third of boom cases end up in financial crises and another third precede extended periods of below-trend economic growth.” – bto: Dazu kommt noch die schlechte demografische Entwicklung.
Vor allem Unternehmen machen Schulden
Schattenbanken wachsen deutlich
- “The chart below shows that while bank lending is the largest component of China’s credit boom, nontraditional or “shadow” credit has also grown rapidly. (…) This shadow credit (in the form of trust loans, entrusted lending, and undiscounted bankers’ acceptances) is included in official data and accounts for about 15 percent of total credit—31 percent of GDP—compared with 5 percent ten years ago.” – bto: was ebenfalls kein gutes Zeichen ist.
- “More recently, rapid mortgage lending has been a key driver of credit growth, with residential mortgage loans increasing by 35 percent year over year at the end of December 2016. Mortgages account for roughly 18 percent of bank loans in China (compared to 30 percent in South Korea, 23 percent in Japan, and 25 percent in the United States).” – bto: Das wiederum beruhigt, es ist trotz hoher Immobilienpreise noch keine Gefahr.
- “As shown in the chart below, the pace of total credit growth is higher when swaps of local government-related bank loans for municipal bonds are included. China’s credit measure excludes swapped bank loans but does not add back the municipal bonds they were exchanged for.” – bto: Auch hier ein Bild, das wir von den westlichen Ländern kennen. Man schönt die Zahlen.
Banken verschleiern Risiken
- “(…) China’s credit expansion has been driven by relatively small banks, which have been growing their total assets at two to three times the pace of the largest commercial banks. (…) primarily by tapping the interbank market and issuing wealth management products (WMP), as seen in the chart below. WMPs are predominantly short-term investment products sold by banks and nonbank financial institutions that provide investors with higher rates of return than bank deposit rates.(…) The growing reliance of Chinese banks on this type of funding has increased concerns over potential shocks to market-based funding, a risk highlighted by the International Monetary Fund in its October 2016 Global Financial Stability Report.” – bto: Das erinnert an die Schattenfinanzierungen der US-Banken vor der Subprime-Krise.
Die Schulden wirken immer weniger
- “An interesting development is that credit appears to be providing less of a boost to Chinese GDP growth than it used to. As shown in the chart below, the credit impulse—the change in the flow of new credit as a percentage of GDP—appears to be providing less bang to output for each additional yuan of credit, (…).” – bto: Und damit kommt der Tag des Erwachens näher …
China steht trotzdem gut da
Dann bringen die Autoren begründete Argumente, dass es doch gutgehen dürfte:
- “Unlike many emerging-market credit booms that have ended in busts, China’s credit growth has been funded primarily by high domestic saving, of which bank deposits are the vast majority.” – bto: Außerdem wächst China noch, was eine höhere Schuldentragfähigkeit bedeutet.
- “Chinese authorities have ample liquidity tools, including high required reserve ratios, the ability to extend short-term liquidity via an array of facilities, and a financial sector dominated by state-owned lenders and borrowers.” – bto: Sie können also noch so reagieren wie wir 2009.
- “China has substantial fiscal resources to address losses in its financial system and among troubled state-owned debtors. According to IMF projections, China’s total government gross debt (including off-balance-sheet borrowing implicitly guaranteed by the state) was around 60 percent of GDP at the end of 2016—lower than the level seen in most advanced economies.” – bto: Und sie können noch Schulden machen wie Japan 1990 und Spanien 2009
Dann wiederholen die Autoren den entscheidenden Punkt für Optimismus noch einmal: “(…) the Chinese government’s strong balance sheet should give it sufficient capacity to absorb potential losses from a financial disruption.” – bto: Das bedeutet nicht, dass es so weitergehen kann, wie bisher. Schon weniger Wachstum in China wäre genug, um die Welt in die nächste Krise zu stürzen.