“IMF admits disastrous love affair with the euro …”
Dieser Beitrag erschien zum ersten Mal am 1. August 2016 bei bto. Passt aber gut zum heutigen Griechenlandschwerpunkt:
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard bringt es im Telegraph auf den Punkt: Der IWF hat wissentlich die falsche Politik der “Eurorettung” mitgetragen. Wie bei bto schon erläutert, hat diese Eurofixierung schon früher zu deutlicher Verstimmung im IWF-Bord gesorgt, weil der Umfang der Mittel für die europäische Rettung weitaus größer ist, als für alle früheren Programme und die Schwellenländer ebenfalls für die Risiken geradestehen. Nun also die Feststellung, dass es ein Fehler war:
IWF hat Hausaufgaben nicht gemacht
- “The International Monetary Fund’s top staff misled their own board, made a series of calamitous misjudgments in Greece, became euphoric cheerleaders for the euro project, ignored warning signs of impending crisis, and collectively failed to grasp an elemental concept of currency theory.” – bto: Die Leitung des IWF liegt ja auch immer bei einem Europäer, zuletzt fest in französischer Hand.
- “The report by the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) (…) describes a ‚culture of complacency‘, prone to ‚superficial and mechanistic‘ analysis, and traces a shocking break-down in the governance of the IMF, leaving it unclear who is ultimately in charge of this extremely powerful organisation.” – bto: wow!
- Dann kommt der Punkt, in dem es um ungeahnte Größenordnungen geht, die übrigens auch zeigen, wie groß das Desaster und letztlich die Pleite in diesen Ländern ist! “The three main bail-outs for Greece, Portugal, and Ireland were unprecedented in scale and character. The trio were each allowed to borrow over 2,000 percent of their allocated quota – more than three times the normal limit – and accounted for 80pc of all lending by the Fund between 2011 and 2014.”
Greece, Ireland, and Portugal accounted for 80pc of IMF lending for three years CREDIT: IMF
Fehlende Kontrollmechanismen
- “The report said the whole approach to the eurozone was characterised by ‚groupthink‘ and intellectual capture. They had no fall-back plans on how to tackle a systemic crisis in the eurozone – or how to deal with the politics of a multinational currency union – because they had ruled out any possibility that it could happen.” – bto: wie auch die Politiker. Was nicht sein darf, kann auch nicht sein!
- “‚The IMF remained upbeat about the soundness of the European banking system and the quality of banking supervision in euro area countries until after the start of the global financial crisis in mid-2007. This lapse was largely due to the IMF’s readiness to take the reassurances of national and euro area authorities at face value‘, it said.” – bto: weil sie alle im selben Boot sitzen.
- “The IMF persistently played down the risks posed by ballooning current account deficits and the flood of capital pouring into the eurozone periphery, and neglected the danger of a ‚sudden stop‘ in capital flows.”
The IMF was asleep when the huge imbalances built up. It did not even see a funding risk in Greece CREDIT: IMF
Überoptimistisch was die Währungsunion betrifft
- “‚The possibility of a balance of payments crisis in a monetary union was thought to be all but non-existent‘, it said. As late as mid-2007, the IMF still thought that ‚in view of Greece’s EMU membership, the availability of external financing is not a concern‘.”
- “‚In a monetary union, the basics of debt dynamics change as countries forgo monetary policy and exchange rate adjustment tools‘, said the report. This would be amplified by a ‚vicious feedback between banks and sovereigns‘, each taking the other down. That the IMF failed to anticipate any of this was a serious scientific and professional failure.“
- “In Greece, the IMF violated its own cardinal rule by signing off on a bail-out in 2010 even though it could offer no assurance that the package would bring the country’s debts under control or clear the way for recovery (…).”
- Zu Griechenland: “The attempt to force through an ‚internal devaluation‘ of 20pc to 30pc by means of deflationary wage cuts was self-defeating since it necessarily shrank the economic base and sent the debt trajectory spiralling upwards. ‚A fundamental problem was the inconsistency between attempting to regain price competitiveness and simultaneously trying to reduce the debt to nominal GDP ratio‘, it said.” Kein Wunder, dass die Erwartungen nie erfüllt wurden:
The forecasts for Greek growth compared to what actually happened CREDIT: IMF
- “The injustice is that the cost of the bail-outs was switched to ordinary Greek citizens – the least able to support the burden – and it was never acknowledged that the true motive of EU-IMF Troika policy was to protect monetary union. (…) ‚If preventing international contagion was an essential concern, the cost of its prevention should at have been borne – at least in part – by the international community as the prime beneficiary‘, it said.” – bto: Das waren vor allem französische Banken! Die haben sich auch gleich aus dem Staub gemacht, während die deutschen Banken, auch auf Drängen der Bundesregierung, weitgehend dabeiblieben. Honi soit qui mal y pense („Beschämt sei, wer schlecht darüber denkt.“)
