Kann China den Westen “retten”?

Ich weiß, dass der Westen nicht mehr zu retten ist angesichts der Rekordschulden und der Verzerrungen im Finanzsystem. Es ist eher das weitere Kaufen von Zeit, um das es geht. Deshalb sind die Hoffnungen hoch, dass China mehr Geld in die Wirtschaft pumpt und so die Nachfrage der Welt nach oben zieht.

Doch es mehren sich die skeptischen Stimmen: heute Ambroise Evans-Pritchard und John Authers. Zunächst AEP:

  • “Xi Jinping had to beat expectations with a crowd-pleaser in the first quarter. The number was duly produced: 6.4pc.(…) ‘Could it really be true?’ asked Caixin magazine. This was a brave question in Uncle Xi’s evermore totalitarian regime.Of course it is not true. Japan’s manufacturing exports to China fell by 9.4pc in March (year-on-year). Singapore’s shipments dropped by 8.7pc to China, 22pc to Indonesia, and 27pc to Taiwan. Korea’s exports are down 8.2pc.” – bto: Wenn China wachsen würde, sähen diese Zahlen deutlich besser aus. Zweifellos.
  • A paper last month by Wei Chen and Chang-Tai Tsieh for the Brookings Institution – ‘A Forensic Examination of China’s National Accounts’ – concluded that GDP growth has been overstated by 1.7pc a year on average since 2006. They used satellite data to track night lights in manufacturing zones, railway cargo volume, and so forth.” – bto: Es steht zu befürchten, dass das Schuldenwachstum im gleichen Zeitraum eher nach unten manipuliert wurde, was das Problem verschärft.
  • “Liaoning – a Spain-sized province in the north – recently corrected its figures after an anti-corruption crackdown exposed grotesque abuses. Estimated GDP was cut by 22pc. You get the picture. Bear in mind that if China’s economy is a fifth or a quarter smaller than claimed it implies that the total debt ratio is not 300pc of GDP (IIF data) but closer to 400pc. If China’s growth rate is 1.7pc lower – and falling every year – the country is less able to rely on nominal GDP expansion whittling away the liabilities.” – bto: Das bedeutet, dass die tatsächliche Wirkung neuer Kredite auf die Realwirtschaft noch geringer ist!
  • “Debt dynamics take an ugly turn – just at a time when the working-age population is contracting by two million a year. The International Monetary Fund says China needs (true) growth of 5pc to prevent a rising ratio of bad loans in the banking system.” – bto: einfach, weil die Zombies dann zahlreicher sind als gedacht.
  • China bulls (…)  say that what matters is the ‘direction’ of the data, and this is looking better. Stimulus is flowing through. It gained traction in March with an 8.5pc bounce in industrial output (…) Optimists are doubling down on another burst of global growth, clinched by the capitulation of the US Federal Reserve. It will be a repeat of the post-2016 recovery cycle.” – bto: Das ist aber nichts anderes als die Fortsetzung einer nicht nachhaltigen Politik. 
  • “Let us concede that Beijing has opened its fiscal floodgates to some degree over recent weeks. Broad credit grew by $430bn in March alone. Business tax cuts were another $300bn. Bond issuance by local governments was pulled forward for extra impact. But once you strip out the offsets, it is far from clear that the picture for 2019 has changed. Nor is it clear what can be achieved with more credit. The IMF said in its Fiscal Monitor that the country now needs 4.1 yuan of extra credit to generate one yuan of GDP growth, compared to 3.5 in 2015, and 2.5 in 2009. The ‘credit intensity ratio’ has worsened dramatically.” – bto: Das ist auch bei uns der Fall. Kredit hat immer weniger realwirtschaftliche Wirkung.
  • Fazit: “I stick to my view that the US will slump to stall speed before China recovers. Europe is on the thinnest of ice. It has a broken banking system. It is chronically incapable of generating its own internal growth or taking meaningful measures in self-defence.” – bto: Die Eurozone bleibt das schwächste Glied.

Ähnlich John Authers:

  • “To be honest, China is the dog and the rest of the world economy is its tail. There was an outburst of relief earlier this month when the monthly PMI manufacturing survey showed much improvement, even with no resolution to the trade dispute with the U.S. (…) China’s communist rulers continue to keep up their end of a compact made with the populace ever since the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989: no democracy, in return for sustained economic growth of more than 6 percent per year.” – bto: nur zum Preis immer höherer und ineffektiverer Verschuldung.
  • “(…) China’s leaders changed their minds (or, less charitably, lost their nerve) and allowed credit to expand again. For why this might be a problem (…) Chinese debt has exploded over the last decade in a way not seen anywhere else. (…) Fixed asset investment provided the main support to domestic demand in the fourth quarter of 2018 and we’ve seen that again in the official data for the first quarter of 2019. This tried and tested method of shoring up growth is likely to continue at least until the autumn to ensure GDP growth reaches or even exceeds the range set by the government in March.” – bto: Man schafft also Kapazitäten auf Kredit, obwohl es schon genug Kapazitäten gibt.
  • However, faster retail sales growth and a fall in unemployment don’t sit with a lot of the other evidence of factory shutdowns, collapsing auto sales and sharply slowing import growth. It also makes little sense that the surge in IP growth was led by the industries hit the hardest by tariffs and with large regional import components — telecoms (10.2%y/y), machinery (15.2%), non-metal minerals (15.4%) — when we know regional exports collapsed in March (…)” – bto: Das sind Zahlen, die die Regierung nicht gleichermaßen manipulieren kann.
  • None of this means that previous concerns were misplaced, that current stimulus will have strong traction, or that the medium-term outlook for China isn’t challenging on multiple fronts. These include excessive leverage, a vulnerable currency, trade tariffs, weaker consumption trends, and a political stance that works against needed reforms and private firms to the benefit of state enterprises and public ownership.” – bto: was den Punkt unterstreicht, dass es nur Zeit kauft und das Problem weiter aufbläst.
  • “(…) the stocks in MSCI’s EAFE index tend to be closely linked to China’s fortunes. Europe is more dependent on exports to China than the U.S. is, Australia is a massive exporter of raw materials to China, and so on.” – bto: Das weltweite Ponzi-Schema geht weiter, nur wird es immer schwerer, es am Laufen zu halten.

→ telegraph.co.uk: “Hold the champagne, China is not recovering and cannot rescue the West again”, 17. April 2019

John Authers: “China’s Economic Miracle Has Markets Wanting More”, bei Bloomberg wie immer direkt aufrufen.