Hans-Werner Sinn erinnert an das ungelöste Grundproblem des Euro
Hans-Werner Sinn, zweifellos einer der einflussreichsten Ökonomen Deutschlands, äußert sich in einem Beitrag für Project Syndicate zu den Beschlüssen auf Ebene der EU. Wenig verwunderlich stimmt er nicht in die allgemeinen Lobgesänge ein.
- “(…) during the lengthy negotiations over the package, it became increasingly clear that Europe’s pandemic-induced economic crisis is an extension of the euro crisis that has been festering since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008.” – bto: So ist es und wir wären an diesem Punkt auch ohne Corona angekommen!
- „In essence, this is a competitiveness crisis brought about by the distortion of relative prices within the eurozone, which is a result of inflationary overpricing in Southern European countries. This overpricing, in turn, stemmed from the flood of capital that entered these economies after they joined the euro.“ – bto: oder aber eine Folge des Verschuldungsbooms in diesen Ländern, ausgelöst von zu tiefen Realzinsen.
- „The collapse of the euro bubble following the 2008 financial crisis reversed the direction of private capital flows, leading to several rounds of intense capital flight from the Mediterranean region to Germany. This was reflected in a surge in the so-called TARGET balances that measure net payment orders and provide a sort of public overdraft credit within the eurozone. And now COVID-19 has triggered another phase of capital flight that eclipses all the others.“ – bto: Das ist sichtbar am Kontostand bei der Bundesbank und wie wir wissen, heftig geleugnet von den Verteidigern des Euro-Projektes.
- „Although capital markets cooled off slightly in April and May of this year, German TARGET claims increased again in June, this time by €84 billion. Between February and June, they rose by a total of €174 billion, to reach a record-high €995 billion. Conversely, Italian and Spanish TARGET debts increased by €152 billion and €84 billion, respectively, during the same period. That implied debts of €537 billion and €462 billion, respectively, at the end of June – or €999 billion in total. Both this figure and the German claims number are so close to the €1 trillion threshold that one cannot help but wonder what secret forces in the background might have pulled the emergency brake.“ – bto: Wie Hans Albrecht auch bei uns vorgerechnet hat, gibt es durchaus Möglichkeiten, dies zu beeinflussen, und wir sollten anfangen, sie für uns zu nutzen.
- „Investors fled Spain and Italy because they no longer viewed these countries as safe bets. And the two countries’ central banks made their flight possible by providing extra liquidity via national printing presses. Part of this liquidity came from the European Central Bank’s various asset-purchase schemes (…) the ECB and all national central banks in the eurozone, (…) bought a disproportionately large volume of Italian assets.“ – bto: So viel zum Thema, man würde den Italienern nicht helfen.
- „(…) the eurozone remains internally unbalanced. This also becomes apparent if one looks at manufacturing output in Southern Europe. Unlike domestic sectors, the region’s manufacturers must compete internationally, and therefore have suffered the most from high relative prices. Even before the coronavirus crisis, manufacturing output in Italy was 19% below its level in the autumn of 2007, just before the real economy reacted to the financial crisis; in Spain, it was 21% lower.” – bto: was nichts anderes bedeutet, als dass wir noch mehr Transfers leisten müssen.
- „The new EU recovery fund is meant to address this fiasco, but money cannot solve the problem of distorted relative goods prices within the eurozone. Fixing it requires an open or real devaluation. But no one wants to talk about that. Instead, the EU’s strategy seems to be based on hope and prayer.“ – bto: Nein, sie basiert darauf, zunächst Vermögen umzuverteilen und danach die EZB finanzieren zu lassen.
→ project-syndicate.org: “The Euro Crisis’s New Clothes”, 24. Juli 2020
