China: Das Schuldenwunder geht weiter

China und seine Schulden habe ich regelmäßig erwähnt. Heute quasi zur Auffrischung ein paar Charts unter anderem von Goldman Sachs, die zeigen, dass die wahre Verschuldung noch höher liegt als bisher geschätzt und die Wirkung immer mehr abnimmt. Es ist ein klassisches Ponzi-Schema und die Frage ist, wann kommt der Minsky-Moment (nicht ob, sondern nur wann):

Quelle: Zero Hedge

Zero Hedge: (…) in its infinite financial engineering ingenuity, China has found a way to push beyond the conventional Minsky Moment envelope.  Recall that according to Minsky the third and final stage before a financial regime hits its terminal collapse moment, is the so-called Ponzi finance stage, a regime in which borrowers have insufficient cash flows to pay either principal or interest and therefore must either borrow or sell assets to make interest payments.

Und weiter: China passed that stage over a year ago.  Instead, where China finds itself now is in that nebulous void between Ponzi Finance and Minsky Moment, where unable to find traditional investors, Chinese Ponzis are now investing in other Chinese Ponzis (and vice versa) just to kick the can longer for a few more months, weeks or days. As Bloomberg writes, WMPs, which traditionally funneled money from Chinese individuals into assets from corporate bonds to stocks and derivatives, are now increasingly investing in each other. Such holdings may have swelled to as much as 2.6 trillion yuan ($396 billion) last year, based on estimates from Autonomous Research this month.

Damit haben wir einen potenziell gefährlichen Verstärkungseffekt. (…) it means that bad investments by one WMP could infect others, causing a loss of confidence in products that play an important role in bank funding. It also suggests WMPs are struggling to find enough good assets to meet their return targets. In the event of widespread losses, cross-ownership will create more uncertainty over who’s vulnerable a key source of panic in 2008 when soured U.S. mortgage securities triggered a global financial crisis.

When will China’s finally move on to its Minsky moment? One possible answer is that once all possible profits from WMPs are exhausted. For now, many of these ponzi schemes are still profitable. (…) The most common source of funds for repayment of WMPs is the issuance of new WMPs. bto: Die klassische Definition eines Ponzi-Schemas: Nur, wenn neues Geld zufließt, kann altes bedient werden.

Dies alles vor dem Hintergrund einer immer schneller wachsenden Verschuldung der Realwirtschaft.

Zunächst die Erinnerung, dass die Verschuldung alleine im ersten Quartal um mehr als eine Billion US-Dollar gestiegen ist:


Quelle: Zero Hedge

Und die Wirkung der Schulden auf die Realwirtschaft ist nicht mehr gegeben:

Quelle: Zero Hedge

Dies ist ein Zeichen für die unproduktive Verwendung der neuen Kredite. Überkapazitäten und Fehlinvestitionen schlagen sich so nieder: weniger Wachstum und relativ ansteigende Schulden.

Goldman Sachs errechnet noch deutlich mehr Schulden in einer Studie: (…) a substantial amount of money was created last year, evidencing a very large supply of credit, to the tune of RMB 25tn (36% of 2015 GDP). This is about RMB 6tn (or 9pp of GDP) higher than implied by TSF (=total social financing) data (even after adjusting for municipal bond swaps). Divergence from TSF has been particularly notable since Q2 last year after a major dovish shift in policy stance.

Quelle: Zero Hedge

Zero Hedge: In other words, not only was China lying about everything else, it was also fabricating its broadest credit creation aggregate, with the underlying “new credit” number turning out to be far greater than anyone had expected (or believed). And for someone as traditionally conservative and Goldman to warn that that the trend of China’s leverage has probably deteriorated, that that the economy’s dependence on credit has deepened significantly and that it likely needs sizeable flow of credit on a persistent basis to maintain a stable level of growth and that such a scale of deterioration certainly increases our concerns about China’s underlying credit problems and sustainability risk, must mean that China’s economy is about to fall off a cliff.


Zero Hedge: Goldman Finds That China’s Debt Is Far Greater Than Anyone Thought, 5. Juni 2016

Zero Hedge: Beyond The Minsky Moment: China’s Ponzi Schemes Are Now Investing In Other Ponzi Schemes, 30. Mai 2016