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McKinsey: Wir müssen die Ver­mögen relativ zum BIP ent­werten

Morgen (4. Juni 2023) geht es im Podcast um die Risiken einer erneuten Finanzkrise und den geeigneten Gegenmaßnahmen. Wie groß die Probleme sind, fasst die Unternehmensberatung McKinsey in einer aktuellen Studie zusammen.

McKinsey hat (erneut) eine Analyse der globalen Bilanz vorgelegt. Im Kern ist es der Versuch, alle Vermögenswerte der Welt zu bewerten und diesen Wert in Relation zur Wirtschaftsleistung, bzw. dem Einkommen zu setzen. Etwas, das Thomas Piketty in seinen Analysen auch gemacht hat.

Die Studie ist sehr interessant, wenngleich sie nur das beschreibt, was wir schon wissen.

Zur Methodik:

  • „To construct a global balance sheet, MGI added up all real assets in the economy (for example, real estate, infrastructure, machinery, commodities, and intangibles) as well as all financial assets and liabilities (for instance, equity, debt, loans, deposits, pension assets, and liabilities). All sectors are included—households, government, and nonfinancial and financial corporations. All assets and liabilities are valued at market prices.“ – bto: Es ist allein schon zu loben, all diese Daten zusammengetragen zu haben.
  • „Countries included in MGI’s global balance sheet work are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Central and Eastern Europe (including the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia), China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The global average is an extrapolation derived from a weighted average of 30 countries (based on GDP) that account for approximately 77 percent of global GDP.“ – bto: … und ich würde sagen, weitaus mehr als 77 Prozent der Assets. Insofern ist die Analyse als vollständig und relevant anzusehen.

Quelle: McKinsey

  • „The past two decades stand in marked contrast to the post–World War II historical trajectory of global wealth (and debt) accumulation. Before the turn of the millennium, growth in global net worth largely tracked GDP growth. But then something unusual happened. Around the year 2000, with timing that varied by country, net worth, asset values, and debt began growing significantly faster than GDP.“ – bto: Bei Piketty zeigen sich seit Mitte der 1980er-Jahre diese Tendenzen. Es dürfte auf der Hand liegen, dass die Ursache die sinkenden Zinsen sind.
  • „In contrast, productivity growth among G-7 countries has been sluggish, falling from 1.8 percent per year between 1980 and 2000 to 0.8 percent from 2000 to 2018.“ – bto: Hier sehe ich einen inhaltlichen Zusammenhang. Wenn das Geld in unproduktive Zwecke fließt und Financial Engineering mehr bringt als echte Investitionen, muss das die Folge sein.
  • Leider hat McKinsey nicht beschriftet, welches Land da so durch die Decke geht. Interessant ist aber China (Schuldenboom), Japan (was scheinbar nicht richtig runter gekommen ist), Deutschland (welches in kurzer Zeit enorm zugelegt hat) und die USA (wo die Unternehmensbewertungen, enthalten in den Zahlen für die Haushalte, so stark gestiegen sind).

Quelle: McKinsey 

  • „Between 2000 and 2021, asset price inflation created about $160 trillion in ‘paper wealth.’ Valuations of assets like equity and real estate grew faster than real economic output. And each $1.00 in net investment generated $1.90 in net new debt. In aggregate, the global balance sheet grew 1.3 times faster than GDP.“ – bto: Man musste 1,90 Dollar neue Schulden für einen Dollar Investitionen machen, bzw. floss ein großer Teil der Schulden eben nicht in Investitionen, sondern an die Vermögensmärkte.
  • „It quadrupled to reach $1.6 quintillion in assets, consisting of $610 trillion in real assets, $520 trillion in financial assets outside the financial sector, and $500 trillion within the financial sector. Balance sheet expansion accelerated during the pandemic as governments launched large-scale support for households and businesses affected by lockdowns. During 2020 and 2021, global wealth relative to GDP grew faster than in any other two-year period in the past 50 years. The creation of new debt accelerated to $3.40 for each $1.00 in net investment.“ – bto: Das nennt man abnehmenden Grenznutzen.
  • „A structural decline in real interest rates underpinned the expansion of the balance sheet, all while economic growth remained sluggish. (…) Low interest rates encouraged borrowing, lowering the cost of loans and bonds and spurring commercial banks to collect—and create—deposits. In highly simplified terms, an overhang of capital chased too few productive investment opportunities, and much of it flowed to real estate and equity, driving up prices. Debt rose faster than net investment, and paper wealth grew.“ – bto: Eine Vermögenspreisillusion – nur so kann man es beschreiben.

Immobilien

  • „The decline in real interest rates has played a remarkable role in driving real estate valuations. Investors could afford to pay more for a property with a given rent, and therefore value-to-rent multiples rose. The cost of equity for real estate also fell, amplifying the effect. This meant that the effective yield of real estate, or cap rates, dropped.“ – bto: Das ist besonders in Deutschland der Fall gewesen.
  • „Despite this marked decline in yields, rents (including imputed rents on owner-occupied buildings) kept growing. The rent share of GDP expanded (in the United States) or declined (in the United Kingdom and Germany) modestly while growth in the number and quality of buildings trailed GDP growth by a wide margin.“ – bto: Ja, da steht, dass die Mietkosten relativ zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt gesunken sind. Stimmt. Wird aber vergessen, weil man nur auf den Anstieg in den letzten Jahren blickt. Das deckt sich übrigens mit der Studie des Internationalen Währungsfonds, die wir hier früher diskutiert haben.

Quelle: McKinsey

Aktien

  • „Falling real interest rates boosted equity values across economies as future earnings were discounted at a lower rate. In both the United Kingdom and Germany, falling rates were responsible for all of the growth in equity values relative to GDP between 1995 and 2021. In the United States, they contributed about one-third of this growth.“ – bto: Was für eine traurige Nachricht! Die Unternehmen waren nicht mehr wert, weil sie nicht entsprechend mehr Gewinne gemacht haben. Das ist kein gutes Zeichen für den Standort!

Quelle: McKinsey

  • „(…)  another powerful factor was also at work in the United States: a rising GDP share of corporate earnings, which contributed two-thirds of the growth in equity values versus GDP. (…) A number of factors contributed to this increase in earnings relative to GDP (…) One was company-level superstar effects, particularly in the digital economy. Others include rising automation and a decline in labor bargaining power in some sectors, including from globalization, offshoring, and shifts in production to less unionized states. Changes in corporate tax rates may also have played a role.“ – bto: In den USA wird das Geld verdient, auch für viele deutsche Unternehmen!

„For each $1.00 of net new investment, $1.90 of new debt was created.“

  • „With equity values climbing, debt rose sharply, too, and, with it, equivalent wealth for lenders and bond holders. By the end of 2021, in the United States, Japan, China, and all major European economies other than Germany, debt was not only higher relative to GDP than in 2000 but even increasing from the peak following the 2008 global financial crisis. In the United States the figure climbed from 2.5 to 2.8 times GDP, in the United Kingdom from 2.5 to 2.8, in Japan from 3.4 to 4.3, and in China from 1.6 to 2.7. In Germany, debt remained stable at about 2.0 times GDP.“ – bto: Wir wissen doch: Wer spart, ist der Dumme in dieser Welt.
  • „Globally, for every $1.00 of net investment, $1.90 of additional debt was created. Much of this debt financed new purchases of existing assets. Rising real estate values and low interest rates meant that households could borrow more against existing homes. Rising equity values meant that corporates could use leverage to reduce their cost of capital, finance mergers and acquisitions, conduct share buybacks, or increase cash buffers. Governments also added debt, particularly in response to the global financial crisis and the pandemic. Interestingly, rising bond prices as interest rates declined played only a minor role driving the debt-to-GDP ratio, as the time range used is much longer than typical bond maturities.“ – bto: Es war eine umfassende Wohlstandsillusion, die nun platzt.

„Currency and deposits in commercial and central banks have expanded“

  • „Growth in deposits exceeded GDP growth in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. In the United States, the volume of currency and deposits in commercial and central banks expanded from 0.6 times GDP in 1995 to 1.2 times GDP in 2021; it is now 80 percent higher relative to GDP than the average of the past century. In the United Kingdom deposits grew from 1.9 times GDP in 2000 to 3.5 times GDP in 2021, and in Germany from 1.4 times GDP to 1.9 times GDP.“ – bto: Das haben wir auch schon diskutiert, weil es die Finanzstabilität zumindest in den USA gefährdet, wenn die Einlagen abgezogen werden.

Und jetzt kommt McKinsey mit den Gründen für eine Zeitenwende. Bekannt, aber die Erinnerung lohnt:

  • „(…) There was a relative paucity of productive options for savers (…) GDP growth remained below its structural potential. Central banks kept interest rates low (…) classic ‚secular stagnation.‘ Might this be changing? Much in the world certainly seems to be shifting, from geopolitics to technology, energy systems, and demographics. It is possible that the more structural forces behind high savings and weak investment will themselves shift, although this remains a matter of uncertainty and debate.“ – bto: Klar, keiner weiß es genau, nur die Experten des IWF haben sich auf eine Fortsetzung der säkularen Stagnation festgelegt.
  • „Over the past several decades, there has been too little productive investment. In advanced economies, net investment has declined as a share of GDP. In the 2010s, this ratio was roughly 50 percent lower than before the 2008 financial crisis in Europe, and 40 percent in the United States. (…) And there are good reasons to expect more investments:
  • Infrastructure investment rises. Particularly in the United States, a shift appears to be emerging after decades of underinvestment in infrastructure.“ – bto: Das könnte uns auch gut tun.
  • „Energy transition gains momentum. MGI research suggests that the net-zero transition alone will need incremental investment equivalent to about two percentage points of GDP in the 2020s. This will likely initially dampen productivity growth at first but could accelerate it in the long run.“ – bto: Naja, ob es mittelfristig so gut ist, wird sich noch zeigen müssen.
  • „Intangible assets continue to grow. Investment in intangible assets, such as in digitization and R&D, has risen and will continue to rise steadily as they become structurally more important for the economy.“ – bto: Gerade hier kann natürlich auch viel Missbrauch erfolgen…
  • „Geopolitics drive a stepping up in investment related to defense, supply chains, and industrial policy.“ – bto: Zoltan Pozsar lässt grüßen.

 „Three factors that drove a glut of savings in the past stand out. Each of them may be shifting:

  • For decades, inequality rose and the labor share of income declined. This has reduced consumption by channeling a disproportionate share of value creation to the wealthy, who tend to save more than the population overall. (…) Workers’ bargaining power could rise if the labor market remains tight and unions regain influence, particularly in the United States. Superstar dynamics and globalization, which lifted incomes for all but not in the same way for everyone, are being exposed to changing domestic and global politics and rules. (…) The advent of generative AI may affect the wage premium for skills.“ – bto: Nett umschrieben. Die Steuern werden steigen.
  • „An aging population has consequences for an economy’s aggregate savings rate. (…) Do demographics therefore imply a continuous savings glut, or are we more likely to experience a ‚great reversal‘? The mainstream view’s answer is that the savings surplus is set to continue for an extended period. But a minority position holds that the trend is about to break, that consumption expenditure (such as old-age healthcare costs) could rise substantially, and aggregate savings could fall. (…) If retirees no longer benefit from the same rate of asset price appreciation as in past decades, they will have to consume more of their savings.“ – bto: Das halte ich auch für ein ziemlich wahrscheinliches Szenario.
  • „Particularly after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, economies in the region built up large foreign reserves to self-insure as a buffer against future shocks, (…) Much of this pool of reserves was invested in US Treasuries, bidding up their prices, which is tantamount to lowering their yields. (…) China’s foreign reserves peaked at nearly $4 trillion in 2014, of which more than $1 trillion was directly invested in US Treasuries. But those holdings have since declined. Amid rising geopolitical tensions, the future path remains to be seen.“ – bto: Auch hier würde ich, Pozsar folgend, festhalten, dass viel dafürspricht, dass dieses Recycling zu Ende ist.

„Can supply respond?“

  • „(…) as the population continues to age, the relative number of working-age people will continue to fall. In addition, about 60 million workers around the world ultimately serve North American demand, and about 50 million European demand. Geopolitical forces may affect these global flows and increase supply pressures locally.“ – bto: … weniger Angebot an (qualifizierter) Arbeit.
  • „On the upside, technology promises to generate tailwinds for supply. Could they move the economy from productivity stagnation to more innovation in and diffusion of technology?“ – bto: Man denke an die KI + Robotics.

Das führt McKinsey zu vier Szenarien:

„Return to past era scenario: Unsustainable balance sheet expansion at the expense of GDP growth

  • It remains possible that shocks will prove temporary, the structural overhang of savings will prevail, low interest rates will return, and balance sheet expansion will resume.“
  • „What happens: Secular stagnation returns. In this scenario, inflation comes down over the next couple of years to well below 2 percent. Labor market tightness subsides, and unemployment settles at previous or slightly elevated rates. Demand is weak and mediocre GDP growth resumes, averaging roughly 1 percent between now and 2030. The earnings share of GDP continues to grow. Smart money chases opportunities in capital appreciation, such as real estate, rather than productive investment. Real interest rates turn slightly negative again. Capital is misallocated, and productivity growth remains low.“ – bto: Das ist „Team IWF“.
  • „Balance sheet outcomes: Continued expansion and vulnerability. The balance sheet continues its secular expansion relative to GDP, but, as before, remains vulnerable to future shocks and disruptions. The total market value of equity, adjusted for inflation, grows roughly in line with past rates as the tailwinds of strong earnings and low interest rates continue. The value of real estate continues to benefit from low interest rates. The total value of bonds grows as leveraging resumes.“ – bto: Das bedeutet eine noch weitere Entfernung der Vermögensmärkte von den Fundamentaldaten. Schwer zu glauben.

„Higher for longer scenario: Using inflation to lower balance sheet vulnerabilities at the expense of price stability.

  • If investment picks up and the savings glut wanes in a meaningful and persistent way despite headwinds impeding GDP growth, inflationary pressure may become entrenched. Then if policy tightening remains moderate due to financial stability risks, the economy may experience a higher for longer scenario. This scenario has parallels with 1970s stagflation in the United States…“
  • „What happens: Persistently elevated inflation and rates. In this scenario, inflation settles at roughly 4 percent as tight labor supply continues and the net-zero transition, supply chain reconfiguration, and national defense add two to three percentage points to the investment share of GDP. Nominal wages rise quickly, and consumption is strong. Policy rates rise in response but, with rising stress in the financial system, not by enough to bring inflation down to target. Strong demand and higher investment—even if not all of it is productive—support GDP growth somewhat above the recent trend.” – bto: Das ist nichts anderes als finanzielle Repression.
  • „Balance sheet outcomes: Stagnation in real values and balance sheet contraction relative to GDP. The size of the balance sheet overall starts to revert toward historic averages relative to GDP, due to the combination of inflation and somewhat stronger GDP growth. As earning growth slows, the total market value of equity (adjusted for inflation) contracts in absolute terms and as a multiple of GDP. The market value of real estate falls in real terms as higher interest rates weigh more strongly for investors than inflation protection benefits …“ – bto: Wir wachsen nominal in die Vermögen hinein.

„Balance sheet reset scenario: A drawn-out recession is the worst case for wealth, income, and financial stability

  • Tighter policy, perceptions of rising risk, and stress or even failures in financial systems could lead to a sharp correction in asset values as well as a prolonged recession and a period of deleveraging. Monetary and fiscal policy cannot come to the rescue as they did in the global financial crisis because balance sheets are already large. This scenario bears some resemblance to what happened in Japan in the 1990s.“ – bto: … was nicht stimmt. In Japan konnte die Geldpolitik erfolgreich noch Schlimmeres verhindern. Das ist hier eher 1930er-Jahre… Es sind massive Verwerfungen.
  • „What happens? A very hard landing and an almost-lost decade. Forceful monetary and fiscal tightening ends the bout of inflation. But higher real interest rates expose elevated debt levels and asset prices, which drop significantly. Financial institutions come under pressure with potential additional bank closures; value losses in bonds as well as in commercial and other real estate bite strongly into capital buffers. In the worst case, liquidity crunches force a fire sale of assets, further depressing values and triggering more systemic financial stress. Affected countries—and even the global economy—face debt restructuring or a drawn-out period of deleveraging. (…) The supply side sees zombification of firms, banks, and assets, as well as capital starvation and weak investment. (…) What makes the situation particularly difficult is that almost all sectors and countries are affected simultaneously at this stage, but deleveraging of one sector or country typically requires another one to add debt. Socializing the losses could accelerate the adjustment, but it is more difficult to achieve with already-high public debt and long central bank balance sheets.“ – bto: Und das ist der entscheidende Punkt: Wir haben die Munition in den letzten Jahren verschossen und die Probleme immer größer anwachsen lassen.
  • „Balance sheet outcomes: Asset correction and deleveraging. Overall, the size of the balance sheet corrects relative to GDP. The total market value of equity declines in real terms and as a multiple of GDP. (…) Real household wealth declines by a cumulative 20 percent—as in the case of total net worth in Japan in 1990 to 2000—or $30 trillion by 2030.“ – bto: Da mussten die Autoren bestimmt auf Druck der Marketingabteilung den Text entschärfen. Ein Szenario, bei dem wir ein massives Deleveraging haben, ohne Möglichkeit staatlicher Rettung, droht in eine Debt-Deflation zu führen!

„Productivity acceleration scenario: The Goldilocks outcome; rapid GDP growth improves wealth and balance sheet health

  • The scenario decision makers should strive toward is the one in which investment strengthens and is productive, accelerating productivity growth.“ – bto: Das wäre reales Wachstum.
  • „What happens? Productive investment and technology adoption step up to drive productivity. The forces outlined in the previous section lead to continued strong demand and an abundance of attractive investment opportunities. New investment materially accelerates productivity growth and GDP growth by one percentage point compared with the past decade. Faced with tight labor markets, firms accelerate investment in and adoption of digital and automation technology, fostering productivity growth.“ – bto: Das müssen wir uns wünschen. Möglich? Ja. Wahrscheinlich? Hm.
  • „Balance sheet outcomes: Sustainable growth. Thanks to rapid GDP growth, the size of the balance sheet overall as a multiple of GDP declines slightly. The total real market value of equity grows only modestly more slowly than in the past, but it declines relative to accelerating GDP.“ – bto: … ein wirklicher Traum.

Und hier optisch die Wirkung: