Inflation – das Thema der 2020er? III

Nochmal Inflation: diesmal anhand des Kommentars von Ambroise Evans-Pritchard vom Telegraph:

  • “Christine Lagarde is taking a big economic risk by doubling down on stimulus when the eurozone money supply is already exploding at rates unseen since the launch of the euro. She is taking an even bigger political risk in doing so after Germany’s top court ruled that the European Central Bank abused its power in earlier bond purchases, straying from monetary management into broad economic policymaking without a treaty mandate.” – bto: Nun ja, da könnte man meinen, dass die EZB schon seit Jahren eine Politik verfolge, die nicht durch das Mandat gedeckt ist.
  • “‘The ECB has no legal or democratic mandate for what it is doing, and it is giving the false impression that there is a free lunch,’ said Thomas Mayer, Deutsche Bank’s ex-chief economist. ‘We are heading for a constitutional crisis in the European Union and there are no means for diffusing it. The euro is simply not viable and the next couple of years are going to determine whether it all breaks apart. The markets don’t understand what is happening,’ he said.” – bto: eine Meinung, die ich bekanntlich teile.
  • “‘We could be heading for 1970s inflation. The ECB is creating all this money but at the same time the supply side of the economy is being constrained (by deglobalisation). If the German people wake up to 5pc inflation when this is over, they’ll conclude that the euro is out of control.’” – bto: nein. Sie werden sagen, es sei gut, dass es so ist und sich freuen, den Euro auf diesem Wege gerettet zu haben. Ich höre jetzt schon unsere Politiker. Außerdem kann man die Messmethoden noch anpassen.
  • “Prof Mayer says there is no consensus for treaty changes to permit debt pooling or fiscal transfers, so EU bodies are instead ‘bending the law’ in order to hold the euro together. This has run smack into the Verfassungsgericht in Karlsruhe.” – bto: Wobei ich – wohl überaus naiv – davon ausgehe, dass Staaten einen Vertrag über einen Schuldentilgungsfonds relativ leicht aufsetzen könnten. Bei uns müsste der Bundestag zustimmen, doch wieso sollte er dagegen sein? Gleiches gilt für die anderen Staaten.
  • “The ECB may be right that a deflation spiral is the greater risk – and implicitly that inflation is part of the cure for Club Med debt dynamics – but it is in uncharted waters and economic opinion differs widely.” – bto: Natürlich ist es so.
  • “The Verfassungsgericht ruled that the ECB had ‘manifestly’ breached the principle of proportionality with mass bond purchases. The Bundesbank will be prohibited from taking part in QE operations from August onwards unless the ECB can meet the court’s objections. Markets are bravely assuming that politicians will not allow this to happen.” – bto: Ich gehe weiter. Nicht mal die Bundesbank will das. Man wird einen fudge finden.
  • “Every feature that the court disliked about the original QE scheme is pushed further in the €1.35 trillion (£1.2 trillion) pandemic scheme. It is open-ended and therefore increases fiscal risk, eroding the budgetary powers of the German parliament and violating the Grundgesetz. The liabilities are real. The Bundesbank has extended almost €1 trillion of ‘credits’ to Club Med peers – above all the Bank of Italy – through the ECB’s Target 2 payments network. Large losses will be crystallised whether the euro holds together or fails.”
  • “Under pandemic QE, bonds purchases deviate from the capital key (GDP share) and are therefore skewed towards Club Med.” – bto: Natürlich, denn darum geht es doch!
  • “The backlash against the ECB’s latest move has so far been muted in Germany because key figures in the Left-Right coalition are content to let central bankers save EMU. But this quiescence is misleading. German taxpayers suspect that they are being taken for a ride. Resentment is festering.” – bto: Das sehe ich nicht. Die meisten interessiert es gar nicht.
  • “The Institute of International Monetary Research says ‘broad’ M3 money has been growing at a 19pc rate over the last three months (annualised) and will rise further. (…) Pandemic QE is different from post-Lehman QE. Banks were crippled after 2008 and drastic central bank stimulus was needed to offset monetary contraction. This time M3 is turbocharged. Monetarists say it will catch fire as Covid-19 recedes and ‘velocity’ returns to normal.” – bto: was die große Frage ist.
  • “While Weimar inflation stemmed from the upheavals of the First World War, Germany did succeed in stabilising the mark and controlling prices for a while. The rot set in when the Reichsbank stepped up money creation to cover falling tax revenues. Inflation spiralled higher in early 1923 after French troops occupied the Ruhr to extract war reparations. Germans stayed at home under a policy of passive resistance, a form of lockdown. Printed money covered the shortfall.” – bto: Das waren natürlich ganz andere Zeiten.
  • “A jump in inflation to 5pc today would be less dramatic but it would nevertheless be corrosive. Home ownership rates in Germany are the lowest of the big OECD states. Half live in rented property – the working class – and few have much financial wealth beyond bank savings. An inflationary bubble would impoverish them, while enriching others. It is a formula for a Trumpian turn in German politics.” – bto: Das stimmt sicherlich, aber ich halte einen “Trumpian Turn” für völlig ausgeschlossen. Keine Sorge!

→ (Anmeldung erforderlich): “Germans fear the ECB is following the Weimar Reichsbank into an inflation trap”, 7. Juni 2020