Die Welt hängt an der chinesischen Immobilienblase

Gestern Morgen habe ich die Bedeutung der chinesischen (Schulden-)Wirtschaft für die Welt diskutiert und die sich daraus ergebenden Risiken. Hier nun zwei Studien von der Deutschen Bank und der Bank of America zur Bedeutung des chinesischen Immobilienmarktes (via Zero Hedge). Der Tenor geht die gleiche Richtung:

Schulden kaufen Wachstum

  • “As all China watchers knows, and as DB confirms, the root cause of this bubble is ‚excessively loose monetary policy set to achieve growth above its potential‘. (…)  the question is how hard will Beijing push to prevent the same hard landing that took place in late 2014 when the bursting of the second housing bubble led to substantial slowdown in China, and sent rippled effects around the globe.” – bto: Das zeigt nur erneut, wie sehr wir uns weltweit auf den Weg der kurzfristigen Stimulierung begeben haben. 

Quelle: Zero Hedge, Deutsche Bank

Immobilien im Boom

Das ist schon beeindruckend, vor allem wenn man auf die Tier-1-Städte blickt.

  • “So why is it so important for China to periodically and consistently reflate this bubble? The answer is simple: a gargantuan wealth effect, to the tune of 24 trillion yuan, or roughly $3.5 trillion.” – bto: Das habe ich nicht bedacht. Ich habe immer nur auf den direkten Nachfrageeffekt geblickt.
  • Deutsche Bank: “We estimate that in 2016 the rise of property price boosted household wealth in 37 tier 1 and tier 2 cities by RMB24 trillion, almost twice their total disposable income of RMB12.9 trillion.” – bto: was natürlich eine Wirkung hat. 

Quelle: Zero Hedge, Deutsche Bank

Der Wealth-Effekt 


  • “(…) the (rather fleeting) wealth effect ‚may be helping to sustain consumption in China despite slowing income growth. A decline of property price would obviously have a large negative impact.‘ And not just in China, but around the globe, as this incremental $3+ trillion in demand provide a material boost to not only China’s direct trading partners, but set the economic pulse around the globe via various ‚soft‘ sentiment surveys, via transposition of the ‚EM to DM‘ growth narrative, as well as via direct purchases of offshore assets by capital controls-circumventing Chinese residents.” – bto: Vor allem für uns Deutsche ist das relevant.
  • Und: “(…) the ‚property sector has become the critical pillar for fiscal revenue and the economy. The property and construction sectors accounted for 33% and 15% of local government tax revenue growth between 2010 and 2015. They contributed 43% of local government tax revenue in 2015,  compared to 11% from manufacturing. Besides taxes, local governments also heavily rely on land sales to finance infrastructure projects.‘” – bto: Was natürlich die guten Staatsfinanzen in einem anderen Licht erscheinen lässt!

Quelle: Zero Hedge, Deutsche Bank

Alles hängt an Immobilien 

  • Banks, developers, urban property owners, and government all benefited tremendously from the property sector so far. This makes it difficult for the government to tighten monetary policy or roll out straightforward measures such as property tax to contain the bubble. The reluctance to prick the bubble only makes it larger.” – bto: Klartext: Es ist viel zu schön, um aufzuhören!
  • “(…) DB warns, ‚property bubble bursts in other countries were often preceded by higher interest rates.‘ (…) ‚the chance of rate hikes in China rises in 2018 as we expect higher inflation in China and six more rate hikes in the US over 2017/18. In the longer term, unfavorable demographic trend and slowdown of urbanization are the ultimate constraints.‘” – bto: was immer wieder gerne vergessen wird. Die Fundamentaldaten sind auch immer schlechter.
  • “(…)Bank of America’s David Cui writes, ‚China’s housing market is among the least affordable globally. Although this doesn’t necessarily mean a sharp price correction anytime soon, it leaves the government with less scope than most others in our view to manage housing price, should interest rate jump or income growth slow. In addition, we believe that high asset prices, including housing price, is one of the main drivers of capital outflow.‘” – bto: weil nicht alle dumm sind und ihr Vermögen außerhalb des Landes retten wollen. Doch wohin? Sie blasen nur weitere Blasen auf, siehe Vancouver.
  • Und weiter: “We believe that the ratio of housing value over household income is more telling – after all, households spend their income buying houses, not businesses nor the government. Based on this ratio, China’s is the second most expensive market among the countries that we track, all with a reputation of excessive housing price at various times.”

Quelle: Zero Hedge, Bank of America


  • “(…) China’s high ratio currently doesn’t necessarily mean that housing price will drop sharply anytime soon – Japan’s and Ireland’s had reached far higher levels before theirs corrected while Australia’s, Korea’s, and indeed, China’s have stayed at high levels for years without any major price correction so far. However, a few factors could make housing price in China over the next few years more vulnerable than most, including financial system risk posed by a rapid rise of leverage economy-wide, and a lack of exchange rate flexibility.” – bto: Dennoch kann es weitaus länger weitergehen. Ich denke, dies ist die entscheidende Nachricht.

bto: So oder so spielt China eine entscheidende Rolle und diese Rolle basiert auf Schulden und Spekulation. Das ist zumindest bedenklich.

→ Zero Hedge: “Why The Fate Of The World Economy Is In The Hands Of China’s Housing Bubble”, 17. März 2017