Nullzinsen als Normalität?

Adair Turner, der schon früh die Monetarisierung der faulen Schulden durch die Notenbanken in die Diskussion gebracht hat, diskutiert in einem Beitrag die Modern Monetary Theory und erinnert gleich zu Beginn: “The valid insight behind “modern monetary theory” – that governments and central banks together can always create nominal demand – was explained by Milton Friedman in 1948. But it is vital also to understand that excessive monetary finance is hugely harmful, and it is dangerous to view it as a costless way to solve long-term challenges.” Klar, es gibt halt keinen Free Lunch.

Doch nun zur Argumentation:

  • “…developed-economy interest rates are stuck far below pre-crisis levels and likely to remain so. Germany’s ten-year bond yield of -0.02% (as of March 23) signals market expectations that the European Central Bank will maintain zero policy rates not just until 2020 (the official ECB forward guidance) but to 2030. Japanese bond yields imply zero or negative interest rates for even longer. And while ten-year yields in the United States and the United Kingdom are just above 1% and 2.4%, respectively, both of these suggest minimal or no increases in policy rates for another decade.” – bto: natürlich, denn alle wissen, dass wir nur mit kostenlosem Geld die Illusion werthaltiger Forderungen aufrecht erhalten können.
  • “In this new normal, still more unorthodox policies – including forms of monetary finance – may in some countries be needed to maintain reasonable growth.” – bto: so ist es, was die Frage aufwirft, wie das im Euroraum funktionieren kann, bedeutet es doch eine massive Umverteilung zwischen Ländern.
  • “…large-scale fiscal stimulus was the only way to achieve even anemic growth. Britain’s public-finance deficit grew to 10.1% of GDP in 2009, the US deficit ballooned to 12.17%, and even the eurozone’s increased to 6.3%. But the inevitable rise in public debt led many governments to conclude that these large deficits must soon be curtailed. Fiscal austerity, combined with continued private deleveraging, led to inflation rates stuck below target, disappointing growth in real wages, and a populist political backlash.” – bto: dennoch sind die Schulden weiter schneller gewachsen als die Wirtschaft!
  • “Some, , broke the ultimate policy taboo and suggested that we might need to consider monetary finance of increased fiscal deficits. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke argued that as long as the quantity of such finance was determined by independent central banks, useful stimulus could be achieved without excessive inflation.” – bto: vor allem weil wir es mit einem erheblichen deflationären Druck wegen der Schulden zu tun haben.
  • By 2018, forecasts of global growth and inflation had risen significantly, and central banks and markets were again focused on the long anticipated “exit” from unorthodox policies. It is vital to understand what drove this sudden improvementThe answer is simple: massive fiscal expansion, which in two major economies was partly or wholly financed by central bank money. The US fiscal deficit rose from 3.9% of GDP in 2015 to 4.7% in 2018 and a projected 5.0% in 2019: China’s grew from below 1% in 2014 to over 4%, and Japan’s remained around 4%, abandoning previous plans for a reduction to zero by 2020. And while the US fiscal expansion was financed by bond sales to the private sector, in China the central bank indirectly financed large bond purchases by commercial banks, while in Japan, the entire net increase in public debt is financed by central bank purchases of government bonds. The global economy recovered because the world’s three largest economies rejected the idea that high public debt burdens made further fiscal expansion impossible.” – bto: das Problem ist natürlich schon, dass es sich nur um einen temporären Schub handelt.
  • But the impact of that stimulus has faded. (…) So we are back to facing the same question as in 2016: What to do if stagnation threatens when interest rates are already close to zero? Among the proposed answers are variants of monetary finance. Proponents of “modern monetary theory” argue that money-financed fiscal expenditure should be the normal mechanism for managing nominal demand: and the “Green New Deal” presents monetary finance as one option for financing socially and environmentally desirable investment.” – bto: so ist es und so wird es kommen.
  • Faced with slow growth, political discontent, and large inherited debt burdens, monetary finance cannot be a taboo option. In Japan, permanent monetary finance is already occurring, even though the central bank denies it. The challenge is to ensure that it is used only within disciplines such as Bernanke proposed, rather than assuming that pre-crisis normality will return any time soon.” – bto: und die Frage bleibt: wie kann die EZB da mitmachen?