Es lohnt sich, die Folgen der Energiepolitik in Europa und Deutschland nüchtern zu betrachten – angesichts der Irrationalität der Diskussion. Dieser Beitrag in der FINANCIAL TIMES (FT) hat mir gefallen:
- “Even as European power companies report ever-greener long-term transformation plans, they are planning to burn more coal in the near term. Economically, they have little choice if they are to follow European regulations on carbon price charges while also minimising electricity costs for their end consumers. And in any case, they are likely to be short of gas this winter.” – bto: weshalb beispielsweise die Aktie von Gasprom sich sehr erfreulich entwickelt.
- “The intent of Europe’s regulations and its emissions market has been to raise the total cost of coal-fired power to the point where economics compel the fuel’s replacement with renewables, nuclear, or (somewhat cleaner) gas. (…) Under the EU Emissions Trading System, polluters have to buy permits to emit carbon above agreed levels. Companies that emit less than agreed levels can sell permits to pollute, thus providing an incentive to cut emissions. In theory, this should make coal more expensive and gas cheaper.” – bto: In Großbritannien hat das ganz gut funktioniert.
- “(…) after taking into account the price of emissions allowances, the cost of generating power with gas in Germany in the last week of August was about €104 per megawatt hour, while the cost of generating power with coal was about €97 per megawatt hour. (…) Part of the reason for this is that the prices of carbon emission allowances have not risen as sharply as those for coal or gas.” – bto: weil die Rohstoffpreise stärker gestiegen sind – mehr Nachfrage – funktioniert das System nicht?
- “This could be due to the imperfect operations of the European carbon credit scheme. But I would also suspect that energy trading desks would be chary of owning a lot of carbon emissions credits because of the potential for Russia to increase gas supplies more than expected, leading to a price crash. At the moment though, “natural” gas, the transition fuel to a fully renewable energy, circular economy future, is in short supply. This is thanks in part to Gazprom, the Russian gas giant and instrument of state energy policy.” – bto: Warum sollteRussland den Preis drücken?
- “Gazprom has long been a convenient villain for those looking to attribute blame for rising gas prices. It has always vigorously defended its actions in the gas market in the past and can be expected to continue to do so. (…) However, it has done well out of the European gas supply squeeze, with the rouble share price increasing from 210 in January to 315 this past week. Even in dollars, Gazprom is above the five-year share price high and has a forward dividend yield in the low double digits. But then other Russian energy company shares have high yields and low prices.” – bto: Das zeigt, wie wir uns in Abhängigkeiten bringen, wenn wir auf Wind, Sonne und Importe setzen. Versorgungssicherheit sieht anders aus.
- “(…) European gas prices, should peak in December or January, just as Nordstream 2 is planned to come fully on line. Even then, though, gas prices will be substantially higher than they were in 2019 and two or three times what is expected in the US. Demand is likely to continue to stay strong.” – bto: Und darauf kommen dann noch die CO2-Abgaben. Das trägt zu höherer Inflation in Europa bei.
- “Like other European generators, Uniper is closing (or mothballing) coal facilities and spending on “hydrogen infrastructure development”. If such moves push gas prices higher, though, there has to be a populist political risk to European greening. As ratepayers’ bills are opened this winter, we will see if demagogues seize an opportunity.” – bto: Das wiederum befürchte ich nicht. Aber es zeigt, wie man die Energieversorgung einer Industrieregion politisch vor die Wand fahren kann.