Wo wir schon bei Blasen sind …

Heute Morgen haben wir uns die platzende Immobilienblase in den USA angeschaut. Nun als Ergänzung die aktuelle Diskussion zum Thema “Blase in den Anleihemärkten”, wahrlich nicht neu. Die FT kommentiert:

  • “Stocks are not in a bubble, but bonds are. When the bond bubble bursts we should all beware, and it could burst soon. That, in a nutshell, is an argument that has echoed throughout the eight years of the most hated bull market for stocks in history.” bto: Das klingt ja auch erstmal nicht so falsch.
  • “(…) Alan Greenspan, long the chairman of the Federal Reserve, made a boldly bearish prognosis (…): By any measure, real long-term interest rates are much too low and therefore unsustainable. When they move higher they are likely to move reasonably fast. We are experiencing a bubble, not in stock prices but in bond prices. (…) The real problem is that when the bond-market bubble collapses, long-term interest rates will rise. We are moving into a different phase of the economy to a stagflation not seen since the 1970s. That is not good for asset prices. bto: Das wäre es in der Tat nicht. Im Gegenteil, das wäre der gefürchtete Margin Call.
  • “This is not a particularly novel argument. (…) What is different this time is that the person making the argument is viscerally hated by many of the people who do not believe in the recovery, and indeed blamed by them for most of the financial system’s current problems.” bto: wohl zurecht. Greenspan ist nicht alleine daran schuld, aber die Fed hat unter seiner Führung einen wichtigen Beitrag geleistet.
  • “Mr Greenspan’s choice of metric, real interest rates which take inflation into account do appear to explain moves in markets neatly since the end of 2009. In that period, 10-year real yields only exceeded 2 per cent, while the two-year real yield only turned positive, for a period of about a year that ended in early 2016 when stocks’ growth stalled and moved sideways. For further circumstantial evidence, note that this came immediately after the Federal Reserve halted QE bond purchases at the end of 2014. If equity prices do not depend on the remarkably expensive bond market, it certainly looks like it.” bto: Es gibt eine klare Korrelation zwischen der Bilanzsumme der Notenbanken und der US-Börse.
  • “Is it in a bubble, or could the current low interest rates conceivably be justified by fundamentals? Persistent slow growth would entail low bond yields and there is a welter of demographic factors that also push down on bond yields. The point that equity valuation depends on the bond market is well made; the contention that bonds are in a bubble remains more contentious.” bto: Dazu habe ich bei bto einige Beiträge besprochen.
  • “(…) if you want to follow Mr Greenspan and cover yourself against impending rising rates, (do) a gloriously politically incorrect trade: companies with low labour costs (and therefore less exposed to higher inflation) have been outperforming companies with high wage costs for the past 12 months. That should continue if wage inflation takes off, and shows that the market is worried about wage inflation.” bto: Das ist doch mal eine gute Überlegung!

→ FT (Anmeldung erforderlich): “Greenspan’s bond bubble prognosis overblown”, 2. August 2017