Indonesien, Mexiko, Argentinien und Chile als nächstes?

Ein Leser hat mir nachfolgenden Aufsatz aus den GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES zugeschickt. Er zeigt sehr schön, wo die Krisenherde liegen, abhängig von Auslandsverschuldung und Devisenreserven: 

  • “What do the Turkish lira, the Iranian rial, the Russian ruble, the Indian rupee, the Argentine peso, the Chilean peso, the Chinese yuan and the South African rand all have in common? They’ve all declined steadily this year, and some have depreciated dramatically in the past two weeks alone. But this isn’t the whole story. The whole story is that each of these countries is sitting on a ticking time bomb of U.S. dollar-denominated debt.” – bto: angefeuert von der Liquiditätsschwemme der letzten Jahre.
  • “In its latest quarterly report, the Bank of International Settlements found that U.S. denominated debt to non-bank borrowers reached $11.5 trillion in March 2018 – the highest recorded total in the 55 years the bank has been tracking it. Meanwhile, the dollar has strengthened amid a tepid global recovery from the 2008 financial crisis. As the currencies of indebted countries weaken against the dollar, it is becoming harder for some countries to pay their debts. This could be a bubble waiting to pop, especially if vulnerable countries don’t have the monetary policy options to protect themselves.” – bto: “if”? Wenn sie es haben, gibt es keine Krise und eigentlich auch keine Notwendigkeit, sich in USD zu verschulden.
  • “Such was the case for Turkey, (…). The value of the lira had been declining for some time, but it dropped dramatically late last week. At nearly $200 billion, almost 50 percent of Turkey’s gross external debt is denominated in dollars. The situation became progressively more dire through a combination of political uncertainty, unorthodox monetary policy and, most important, U.S. interest rate hikes. Turkey’s dollar-denominated debt is now almost twice as much as its total foreign reserves.” – bto: Das bedeutet, dass das Land das Problem nicht leicht lösen kann.
  • “The starkest decline was the Argentine peso, whose value against the dollar dropped 9.5 percent in just a week, and the South African rand, which fell roughly 8 percent. Other currencies have been affected too – the Chilean peso, for example, has fallen 3.4 percent in the past week, while the Indian rupee hit a record low on the dollar during trading on Aug. 14. What these countries have in common is that they are all on a 13-country list released by the Bank of International Settlements. Together, they constitute 62 percent of all dollar-denominated debt held by emerging market economies.” – bto: Und die 13 sind in der Abbildung tiefer analysiert.
  • “(…) Mexico, which, at $271 billion, holds more dollar-denominated debt than any other country on the list except China. This far exceeds Mexico’s official reserves. As with Turkey, dollar-denominated debt is a disproportionately large share of Mexico’s gross external debt, at roughly 60 percent. (…) Mexico could be as bad off as Turkey is now.” – bto: Vielleicht würde sich Donald Trump darüber sogar freuen, stärkt es doch seine Verhandlungsposition.
  • “(…) Indonesia doesn’t have a lot of reserves, and its currency has been showing signs of weakness, down almost 10 percent against the dollar this year. Chile’s percentage of dollar-denominated debt as a proportion to GDP is the highest of all BIS reporting countries – a whopping 36 percent. Chile’s gross external debt-to-GDP ratio is 66 percent. Most concerning, however, is that Chilean reserves totaled just $37 billion in June 2018, equal to about a third of its total dollar-denominated debt of $100 billion.” – bto: Man sollte sich diese Analyse anschauen, wenn man darüber nachdenkt auszuwandern.


  • “Particularly well insulated from the budding currency crisis are China and Saudi Arabia. (…) China holds $548 billion in dollar-denominated debt, but that makes up just 4 percent of China’s GDP, and China’s gross external debt to GDP is 14 percent – the lowest of the countries on this list. China also has a war chest of $3.2 trillion in foreign reserves that it can deploy.” – bto: was nicht bedeutet, dass die Binnenverschuldung des Landes kein Problem ist.
  • “The economies surveyed by BIS make up just 37 percent of total dollar-denominated debt held worldwide, meaning there is another $7.2 trillion in such debt in the global system to account for. What started in Turkey may well spread to other countries excluded from the BIS report. Again, Turkey was uniquely susceptible to this sort of thing. The country has low savings rates and high inflation rates and all but refused to make the politically unpopular decision to raise interest rates before it was too late.” – bto: Deshalb möchte Frau Nahles dort auch deutsche Steuergelder versenken.
  • “The more important question now is whether that will spread to other vulnerable countries. The most worrying at this point are Argentina, Mexico, Indonesia and Chile. It’s too early to call a full-blown global financial crisis, but it’s not too early to begin to consider whether what’s happening in Turkey is simply a Turkish matter.” – bto: Ist es nicht.