Der Wirtschafts­krieg und der Dollar

Morgen (2. April 2023) habe ich Zoltan Pozsar von der Credit Suisse in meinem Podcast zu Gast. Okay, leider nicht – er konnte aufgrund der Firmenpolitik (schon vor dem Untergang der Bank) nicht mit mir sprechen. Also werde ich morgen aus seinen Schriften zitieren.

Zur Einstimmung ein Gastbeitrag den er – als Essenz seiner Überlegungen – in der FINANCIAL TIMES (FT) geschrieben hat:

  • Since the end of the cold war, the world has largely enjoyed a unipolar era — the US was the undisputed hegemon, globalisation was the economic order and the dollar was the currency of choice. But today, geopolitics once again poses a formidable set of challenges to the existing world order. That means investors have to discount new risks.“ – bto: In der Tat haben diese globalen Konflikte deutliche Folgen für Wirtschaft und Wohlstand.
  • China is proactively writing a fresh set of rules as it replays the Great Game, creating a new type of globalisation through institutions such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Brics+ group of emerging economies and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, a collective security alliance of eight countries.“ – bto: … vor allem getragen von einer gemeinsamen Abneigung gegen den Westen.
  • If we are drifting from a unipolar world to this multipolar one, and if the G20 fractures into the camps of the G7 plus Australia, Brics+ and the non-aligned, it’s impossible that these rifts will not affect the international monetary system. Growing macroeconomic imbalances in the US further add to these risks.“ – bto: Die neuen Allianzen zielen darauf ab, den Westen zu schwächen und eine machtvolle Gegenposition.
  • De-dollarisation is not a new theme. It started with the launch of quantitative easing in the wake of the financial crisis, as current account surplus countries frowned at the idea of negative real returns on their savings. But recently, the pace of de-dollarisation appears to have picked up.“ – bto: Natürlich. Denn es ist doch klar, dass man nicht untätig zusieht, wie das eigene Geld an Wert verliert und Gefahr läuft, sanktioniert zu werden.
  • Over the past year, China and India have been paying for Russian commodities in renminbi, rupees and UAE dirhams. India has launched a rupee settlement mechanism for its international transaction while China asked GCC countries to make full use of the Shanghai Petroleum and Natural Gas Exchange for the renminbi settlement of oil and gas trades over the next three to five years. With the expansion of Brics to beyond Brazil, Russia, India and China, the de-dollarisation of trade flows may proliferate.“ – bto: … und gleichzeitig auch mehr Handel innerhalb der Gruppe.
  • CBDCs could accelerate this transition. (…) CBDCs are spreading like fast-growing kudzu vines with more than half of the world’s central banks exploring or developing digital currencies with pilots or research, according to the IMF. They will be increasingly interlinked. Central banks interlinked through CBDCs essentially recreate the network of correspondent banks that the US dollar system runs on — instead of correspondent banks, think more of correspondent central banks. The emerging, CBDC-based network — enforced with bilateral currency swap lines — could enable central banks in the global east and south to serve as foreign exchange dealers to intermediate currency flows between local banking systems, all without referencing the dollar or touching the western banking system.“ – bto: Das ist wichtig. Denn es reduziert auch die weltweite Dollar-Liquidität.
  • The current account surpluses of China, Russia and Saudi Arabia are at a record. Yet these surpluses are largely not being recycled into traditional reserve assets like Treasuries, which offer negative real returns at current inflation rates. Instead we have seen more demand for gold (see China’s recent purchases), commodities (see Saudi Arabia’s planned investments in mining interests) and geopolitical investments such as funding the BRI and helping allies and neighbours in need, like Turkey, Egypt or Pakistan. Leftover surpluses are held increasingly in bank deposits in liquid form to retain much-needed options in a changing world.“ – bto: Die lange Symbiose zwischen China und den USA ist zu Ende. Es bildet sich ein neuer Block.
  • „In finance, everything is about marginal flows. These matter the most for the largest marginal borrower — the US Treasury. If less trade is invoiced in US dollars and there is a dwindling recycling of dollar surpluses into traditional reserve assets such as Treasuries, the ‚exorbitant privilege‘ that the dollar holds as the international reserve currency could be under assault.“ – bto: Die Zinsen werden steigen. Aber die Argumentation von Pozsar geht noch weiter. Morgen dazu mehr.

→ (Anmeldung erforderlich): „Great power conflict puts the dollar’s exorbitant privilege under threat“, 20. Januar 2023