Auch Putins Scheitern wirkt ne­gativ auf Märkte und Welt­wirtschaft

Es ist klar, dass Putins Strategie nicht aufgeht. Doch was bedeutet das für Wirtschaft und Märkte? Vieles wird dazu geschrieben und nicht weniges davon ist rasch veraltet. Doch warum soll es anderen anders ergehen als mir? Dennoch fand ich diese Zusammenfassung recht gut:

  • “The ferocity of Ukrainian resistance is the polar opposite of the collapse of the Afghan government, which exited in jets filled with US cash. (…) Overall, the Russian military is performing extremely poorly: they still don’t have air superiority due to Ukraine moving its air defences around, and Russian missile strikes having only hit old, static targets. Russia’s attempts to rapidly seize Kyiv while minimising losses to Ukrainian civilians and its infrastructure are resulting in massive losses on their side. According to the Ukrainians, as of Sunday Kyiv claimed to have taken out: 540 IFVs, 16 airplanes, 18 helicopters, 102 tanks, 504 APCs, 1 Buk-1 system, 20 armoured cars, and 5,000 soldiers. The latter is a third of the total losses suffered in the entire Soviet-Afghan war (1979-89).” – bto: Das wiederum ist der Punkt, die Russen halten es innenpolitisch nicht aus.
  • “It seems the Russian army, despite lavish budgets, has rotted away below an elite tip due to corruption and yes-men needing to please the unwavering ideologue at the top rather than pointing out that things are not going well. If so, Putin’s profoundly anti-Western regime ironically displays the same institutional failures –and flawed supply chains– his fans in the West bewail as our own peculiar failure.” – bto: Das mag jetzt erfreulich sein. Im Kern ist es jedoch so, dass wir insgesamt im europäisch-asiatischen Kontinent Handlungsbedarf haben.
  • “If Putin wants to win militarily he will have to get even more destructive; yet the more he does, the more Ukrainians and the West will resist. (…) There is no political means by which Putin can reintegrate Ukraine with Russia: he has irretrievably broken the ‘Russkiy mir’ (Russian world) he wanted to recreate. Some now start to fear Putin may decide if he cannot hold Ukraine then he will cause massive damage in order to punish it for its defiance.” – bto: Deshalb brauchen wir eine gesichtswahrende Lösung.
  • “Europe has woken up from a 30-year geopolitical slumber. Ukraine will be resupplied militarily by NATO members and the EU – including sending military aircraft, and within hours. Previous holdouts like Germany and the Netherlands will send Stinger missiles. There has been a total reversal of the past 30-years of German policy: Berlin will raise its defence spending to more than 2% of GDP, put this in its constitution, and initiate an immediate EUR100bn defence fund, while building more LNG terminals and renewables to diversify away from Russian gas.” – bto: Das ist ein wesentlicher Punkt. Auch ich habe eine so breite Unterstützung der Ukraine nicht erwartet.
  • “The train tracks from Russia to Europe via Ukraine have been dynamited, so no goods can flow. Trucking to Russia may be halted by Poland and Slovakia. The Black Sea is effectively closed, following a slew of attacks on civilian shipping. There was even a brief moment where it appeared Turkey would close the Bosporus to Russian shipping – it still can according to the Treaty of Montreux if it announces it feels threatened. Russian commercial ships are also being seized under sanctions.” – bto: Kurz gesagt, es wird einen Angebotsschock geben und in vielen Märkten, vor allem bei Nahrungsmitteln, stehen deutliche Preissteigerungen bevor.
  • “So, we have the likelihood of a protracted war in Ukraine, including across the key grain ports of the south; massive economic and financial damage in Russia; spillovers into the real economy globally; a remaining risk that Russia turns off the energy taps; and finding out what being forced out of the US/global financial system really looks like – for the world’s largest nuclear power. A key tail risk is that a paranoid Putin will see this as the foreign interference he already stated would entail terrible consequences.” – bto: Das ist kein schönes Szenario, wobei ein Atomschlag mehr als zweifelhaft ist. Allerdings ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit leider nicht null.
  • “Central banks were already stuck on the horns of a damned-if-you-do-damned-if-you-don’t policy dilemma: the probability of either biting deflation or choking stagflation just increased – and that is not the primary concern for our leaders for obvious reasons.” – bto: Es dürfte viel mehr in Richtung Inflation gehen.
  • “Moreover, as the West gets back into the frame of mind for defense, decoupling, sacrifice, and self-reliance for its values, will it really end with Russia, or will it begin to *peacefully* extend to other potentially irredentist and revanchist powers to prevent any such future crises now? Markets really won’t like that.” – bto: Das wäre aber nichts Neues. „Rabobank: If Putin Has Lost, So Have Markets”, 28. Februar 2022