Das Risiko fehlender Sicherheiten
Das Thema der fehlenden Sicherheiten – Pfänder in Form von risikolosen Staatsanleihen – im Finanzsystem war in den vergangenen Jahren immer wieder ein Thema auf bto. In den USA scheint das erneut eine Gefahr zu sein, meint die FINANCIAL TIMES (FT):
- “‘Don’t create an artificial shortage of good collateral! No! No!’ (But) we can count on the US Federal Reserve and Congress to do the stupid thing. In this case, that would be congressional inaction on the artificial debt ceiling limit and the real (as distinct from rhetorical) budget. This nonsense is limiting how many Treasury bills and short-term government securities can be issued.” – bto: Es gibt also weniger Angebot an Pfändern.
- Während gleichzeitig die Notenbank immer mehr aufkauft: “For its part, the Fed is ensuring that much of the short-term US government paper that might be available is locked up in accounts where it cannot be used to secure the myriad financial transactions that keep the global economy ticking over.” – bto: Das wirkt wie eine Pyramide, die auf dem Kopf steht und wo unten Steine weggenommen werden.
- “Short-term paper from the highest-rated government issuers, such as the US Treasury or the German government, can be lent and re-lent multiple times after its purchase. This ‘collateral reuse’ is a form of leverage that turns borrowing by trusted governments into liquidity for the world monetary system.” – bto: Dieselbe Sicherheit wird also öfter weitergegeben und damit mehrfach genutzt.
- “Financial markets have always required collateral for many transactions, especially when buyers and sellers do not completely trust each other. But in the wake of the financial crisis, banking regulation changes known as Basel III and new securities market rules have dramatically increased the demand for government securities to be used as collateral. As usually with disasters, it started with good intentions. If, say, a ‘Lehman Brothers’ defaults on its obligations, its counterparties can claim title to collateral that will keep them solvent. And, perhaps as an afterthought, the regulator-induced demand for good collateral will make it easier for governments to finance themselves. Then they can send out childcare checks, build highways or send drones on vengeance missions.” – bto: Das Problem – die Regulierung verlangt mehr Sicherheiten, während die Notenbank sie aus dem Markt nimmt.
- “Fed chair Jay Powell finally seemed to acknowledge the problem during his recent testimony before the House Financial Services Committee. Towards the end of his appearance, he muttered like a scientist who realises his experiment has gone very, very wrong, saying: ‘You could say there is a shortage of safe short assets . . . so yeah, that’s why that’s happening, there’s a shortage of T-bills, not a lot of T-bills . . . ” – bto: Damit wird aber die Grundlage für eine mögliche nächste Krise im Finanzsystem gelegt.
- “It would be better now if the major banks were able to expand their deposit base, buy bills and short-term notes from the Treasury and the Fed, and re-lend those securities for use in the collateral chain. The ‘Basel’ rules must be rethought. (…) the collateral shortage will get steadily worse, which will be a drag on growth.” – bto: Es sieht aber nicht danach aus, dass dies rasch geschehen wird.
Fazit FT:
“(…) god help us if there is any global margin call — a demand for leveraged traders to place more collateral with counterparties — before then. The required paper won’t be there.” – bto: Und Auslöser für eine mögliche Panik gibt es genug.
