“Why lower for longer will remain the anthem for markets”
Auch die Kollegen von der FT müssen ihre Seiten füllen und dazu schon bekannte Analysen aufwärmen. So in diesem Kommentar, der nochmals die Gründe für die tiefen Zinsen zusammenfasst, die wiederum wohl noch lange tief bleiben werden:
- “Do you recall Alan Greenspan’s famous conundrum? Back in 2005 the then chairman of the Federal Reserve was baffled that US bond yields continued to fall despite tighter monetary policy. The persistent decline in real rates since then continues to baffle market observers and throw up multiple explanations.” – bto: Der Zinsrückgang ist durchaus historisch zu nennen.
- “In a balance sheet constrained world, expectations of growth are inevitably lower, while the decrease in the supply of safe assets, thanks in part to central banks’ bond buying activity, has put downward pressure on yields.” – bto: “balance sheet constrained world” klingt natürlich besser, als “überschuldet”, ist aber das Gleiche. Problem ist natürlich, dass bei schwachem Wachstum und tiefer Inflation/Deflation die Schuldenlast immer mehr aus dem Ruder läuft und damit zum einen das Wachstum weiter drückt und zum anderen den Druck alternative Lösungen zu finden weiter erhöht.
- “Yet there is much more to it than that. This is a global phenomenon (…) that has gone on for more than 30 years. In fact, long-term real interest rates have fallen by about 450 basis points (hundredths of a per cent) over that period.” – bto: was, wie gesagt, erheblich ist.
- Dann fast die FT die Studie der Bank of England zusammen, die ich an dieser Stelle auch schon hatte: “Changes in saving and investment behaviour are the key to understanding the underlying dynamics. (…) On the savings side of the equation, they identify three important trends. The first is demography, most notably slower labour force growth. The resulting decline in the workforce’s desired level of savings accounts for an estimated 90 bps of the fall in real rates. Then there is the impact of higher inequality within countries, which reflects the fact that the rich save more of their income than the rest of the population, which adds 45 bps to the total. Increased precautionary saving by emerging market governments since the Asian crisis of 1997-8 explains another 25 bps.” – bto: und keine Aussicht auf irgendeine Besserung!
- “On the investment side, (…) investment levels have fallen thanks to a 30 per cent fall in the relative price of capital goods since the 1980s, accounting for 50 bps of the fall in real rates, along with a preference shift away from public investment projects that explains 20 bps. In addition, they reckon that the rising spread between the rate of return on capital and the risk-free rate has further reduced desired investment and risk free rates by 70 bps.” – bto: Auch hier gibt es keinen Grund von einer Änderung der Faktoren auszugehen.
- “Finally, they argue that slower global labour supply growth and headwinds at the technological frontier, such as a plateau in educational attainment, may cause global growth to slow by up to one percentage point over the next decade and that expectations of this decline could account for about 100 bps of the fall in real rates seen recently.” – bto: womit sie wie Robert Gordon argumentieren, der von geringerem Produktivitätswachstum ausgeht.
- “(…) it is worth taking the analysis and asking what the implications for policy might be if we assume it to be correct. The first potentially disturbing observation is that, in this low-growth, low-interest-rate world, central banks will remain dependent on unconventional measures. It is a world in which it would make sense to place greater reliance on fiscal policy to manage the cycle. The supply potential of the economy would also need to be enhanced by structural reform.” – bto: Wir werden es schon bei der nächsten Rezession sehen. Ich frage mich, ob es wirklich unmöglich ist, dass es dennoch zu einer breiten Inflation aufgrund eines Vertrauensverlustes kommen kann?
- “Yet only the first of these prescriptions lies within the bounds of the politically possible. (…) As for structural reform, unconventional central bank measures were meant to buy time for just that. Nothing much happened. So the most plausible bit of the forecast is, sadly, that growth will be lower for longer.” – bto: Und damit wird die Schuldenkrise doch auf die eine oder andere Art noch akut werden. Zugleich wird die politische Lage immer schwerer werden, weil alle Versprechen von Wohlstand und Versorgung auf der Erwartung ewigen Wachstums basieren. Kommt es nicht, knallt es irgendwann.
