“Why American Workers Aren’t Getting A Raise: An Economic Detective Story”
Es gibt eine alles entscheidende Frage: Bekommen wir Inflation (in den USA) und damit höhere Zinsen und damit einen Auslöser für eine Fortsetzung der Baisse an der Börse? Ich weiß zwar, dass tiefe Zinsen kein Grund für hohe Bewertungen sind, der Markt dachte das aber lange.
So kommt es zu der Frage: Warum steigen die Löhne (als Voraussetzung für Inflation) nicht, trotz boomender Wirtschaft und steigenden Börsen (zumindest bis Ende Januar)? Schon früher hatte ich an dieser Stelle darüber diskutiert, dass es zu früh sein könnte, die Phillips-Kurve abzuschreiben, die bekanntlich die Beziehung zwischen Beschäftigungslage und Inflation herstellt.
Jonathan Tepper ist der Frage – wie ich finde – sehr interessant auf seinem Blog nachgegangen. Hier seine Überlegungen, wie immer fokussiert und kommentiert:
- “Our leading indicator for wages normally provides a 15 month advanced warning of changes in wages. It is pretty good and all the ingredients are the same ones that have accurately worked for decades, yet the relationship has broken down. It was annoying me: why are wages not following growth?” – bto: In der Tat bestand lange ein Zusammenhang zwischen den Indikatoren und der tatsächlichen Entwicklung. Nun nicht mehr:
Quelle: J. Tepper
- “(…) employers are saying that it is hard to find workers and many small businesses say they expect to raise wages, initial unemployment claims are extremely low. This should be an economy that is good for workers to get higher wages, yet wages stink.
Danach erklärt er, woran das seiner Meinung nach liegt. Und das ist interessant:
Unternehmen behalten einen höheren Teil der Wertschöpfung
- “The flipside of low wages is that companies have taken a record part of the economic pie. Corporate profits as percentage of Gross Domestic Profit (GDP) are near record highs and labor’s share of GDP is near record lows. (…) The divergence started in the early 1980s when the regular rise and fall of corporate profits and workers’ compensation broke down. (…) If margins don’t revert something has gone wrong with capitalism.” – bto: und zwar, weil es dann offensichtlich an Wettbewerb fehlt.
Quelle: Economic Cycle Research Institute, J. Tepper
- “Rising industrial concentration is a powerful reason why profits don’t mean revert and a powerful explanation for the imbalance between corporations and workers. Workers in many industries have fewer choices of employer, and when industries are monopolists or oligopolists, they have significant market power versus their employees.” – bto: Das ist ein neuer Gedanke für mich. Klar ist, dass es Oligopolen leichter fällt, höhere Margen zu sichern. Beispiel: Industriegase. Dass es auch für die Arbeitnehmer schwerer ist, leuchtet aber ein. Es wäre doch Wahnsinn, wenn VW, Daimler und BMW sich mit immer höheren Löhnen Konkurrenz machen würden – oder?
- “One of the most comprehensive overviews available of increasing industrial concentration shows that we have seen a collapse in the number of publicly listed companies and a shift in power towards big companies. (…) despite a much larger economy, we have seen the number of listed firms fall by half, and many industries now have only a few big players. There is a strong and direct correlation between how few players there are in an industry and how high corporate profits are.” – bto: Wie zu erwarten, kann man da nur ausrufen!
Arbeitnehmer sind produktiv, werden dafür aber nicht bezahlt
- “(…) worker productivity has been steadily rising for decades. Unfortunately, earnings have not kept up with productivity increases. Workers are producing more goods with less labor, and companies are making higher profits, but the benefits are not being shared with workers. Notice that productivity growth has been rising in a straight line since the 1950s, but starting in 1980 hourly compensation has not risen much.” – bto: Mögliche Erklärungen sind, der internationale Wettbewerb auf dem Arbeitsmarkt nahm zu (China, Osteuropa), Teile des Gehaltes gehen als Optionen an die Mitarbeiter und werden nicht in den Zahlen erfasst?
Quelle: Economic Policy Institute, J. Tepper
- “Some economists have argued (…) that much of the gap can be explained by year-end bonuses, which are not included in hourly pay, by healthcare costs, which doesn’t show up in a paycheck but the worker benefits from, and by stock options, which also doesn’t show up in a paycheck. However, we can discount these explanations. Healthcare, bonuses and options are a real expense to companies, and if companies were getting hit with these costs instead of wages, it would show up in corporate profit margins. Today, corporate profit margins would not be at record highs. If the divergence between wages and productivity is real, the difference should clearly shows up in corporate profits, and it does.” – bto: Bei den Optionen bin ich nicht so sicher, weil diese über Aktienrückkäufe gestaltet werden und die laufen außerhalb der normalen Bilanz. Oder?
Steigende Marktmacht der Unternehmen
- “The average markup was 18% in 1980, but by 2014 it was nearly 70%. Higher markups suggest an increase in what economists refer to as ‚market power‘, which is the result of more highly concentrated industries. A markup may sound like a very technical term, but you see it in everyday life. The best example is in luxury goods, where the right logo on a handbag will make the leather sell for a lot more than it costs to make. Part of what you’re paying for is status and association.” – bto: was auch mit der Konzentration zu tun hat.
“Market power has been rising in many industries. Americans have the illusion of choice, but in industry after industry, a few players dominate the entire market:
- Two corporations control 90% of the beer Americans drink.
- When it comes to high-speed internet access, almost all markets are local monopolies; over 75 percent of households have no choice with only one provider.
- Four airlines completely dominate airline traffic, often enjoying local monopolies or duopolies in their regional hubs. Five banks control about half of the nation’s banking assets.
- Many states have health insurance markets where the top two insurers have 80-90% market share. For example, in Alabama one company has 84% market share and in Hawaii one has 65% market share.
- Four players control the entire US beef market.
- After two mergers this year, three companies will control 70 percent of the world’s pesticide market and 80 percent of the US corn-seed market.”
– bto: Das dürfte bei uns nicht viel anders aussehen. Es hat auch mit dem völligen Versagen der Kartellbehörden zu tun.
Arbeitnehmer sehen sich einem Monopsonisten gegenüber
- “In a monopoly, there is only one seller, while in a monopsony, there is only one buyer. The extreme example of a monopsony is a coal town in West Virginia, where the only buyer of labor is the coal company. (…) most labor markets are very concentrated and that it has a strong negative impact on posted wages for job openings. They showed that going from a very competitive to a highly concentrated job market is associated with a 15-25% decline in wages.
Auf dem Land sieht es noch schlechter aus
- “A great divide formed between rural and metropolitan areas in the US. In 1980, if you lived in Washington D.C., your per-capita income (…) in 2013 you would be 68 percent above. In New York City, the income was 80 percent above the national average in 1980 and skyrocketed to 172 percent above by 2013. Power and money began concentrating in urban centers across the country as a rural ‘brain drain’ occurred. Major cities attract diverse talent and many corporations, which must bid competitively for workers. Workers living in these cities make significantly more money than workers elsewhere. There is power in numbers, and nurses who have 5 metropolitan hospitals to choose from will make more money than those who work in a town with only one hospital.” – bto: Das alleine erklärt nicht, weshalb die Löhne stagnieren, gibt es doch einen Zulauf in die Städte.
Abnehmende Macht der Arbeitnehmer
- “Unions maintained an important part in American working life for decades, but then declined again. In 1983, about 1 in 5 Americans were part of a union; today, only 6.4% of private sector workers in America are unionized and less than 11% of total workers. This represents a considerable decline in the ability of workers to organize. Unions, though controversial, provided a needed forum for workers to band together and advocate for their collective rights.”
Quelle: The Atlantic, J. Tepper
- “Inequality is inversely related to union membership. If you plot the percentage of national income going to the top 10%, as you can see it is almost the perfect mirror image. When union membership is low, a higher percentage of income goes to the top 10%. This may help, in part, to explain recent trends in income inequality.” – bto: Warum sind die Gewerkschaften denn so schwach? Es liegt vermutlich daran, dass sie auch wenig durchsetzen können, stehen sie doch auch im Wettbewerb mit China und Co.
Union Membership vs Income Distribution to Top 10%
Quelle: The Atlantic, Emin M. Dinlersoz and Jeremy Greenwood, J. Tepper
– bto: eine interessante Sichtweise. Ich würde – wie gesagt – den globaleren Arbeitsmarkt zusätzlich als Argument anführen, wie auch die Demografie. Offen bleibt, ob und wie sich dies ändert. Der soziale Sprengstoff nimmt zumindest zu.
