Was, wenn die Vermögensmärkte nur noch an den Notenbanken hängen?
Das ist eine immer entscheidendere Frage. Angesichts der realwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung sind es die Interventionen der Notenbanken, die dazu führen, dass die Börsen steigen und die Anleihen immer neue Höchstkurse erzielen. Eigentlich müssten die langfristigen Aussichten über die Bewertung entscheiden. Doch ist das noch so?
Die FINANCIAL TIMES (FT) wirft einen Blick auf die Abhängigkeit der Märkte von den Notenbanken:
- “One innocent explanation for the extraordinary bounce back in global equity markets in the second quarter is that investors have concluded that the worst of the pandemic is over and that recovery is within reach. A less innocent — but all too plausible — alternative reading is that investors now believe central banks will exercise complete control over asset prices for the foreseeable future. In other words, the categorical imperative of policymakers doing ‘whatever it takes’ to counter the current crisis could ensure a lasting decoupling of equity prices from ailing economies.” – bto: Wenn das so ist, muss man sich fragen, warum wir das nicht schon immer so gemacht haben …
- “Lending support to this latter view is the growing conviction in markets that the US Federal Reserve may now move to a policy of yield curve control. (…) It would amount to financial repression of the kind operated by the Fed in and after World War II, as a means of managing exceptionally high levels of government debt.” – bto: Und es geht ja nicht nur um Staatsschulden, wie wir wissen. Damals waren die Nominalzinsen aber deutlich höher. Heute geht es nur bei sichtbar negativen Zinsen, was ein Problem ist.
- “(…) such measures would require markets to have enormous patience (…) When patience runs out, the traditional policy response is to resort to capital controls to prevent outflows to countries where debt looks more sustainable. Yet with the US, custodian of the world’s dominant reserve currency, this would pose extraordinary, maybe insurmountable, difficulties. There could be investor strikes in fixed-income of the kind that disrupted markets in the 1970s.” – bto: Aber die USA müssten vielleicht keine Beschränkungen einführen, sondern die wenigen soliden Länder. Denn die Eurozone wird laut rufen, “da samma dabei”!
- “There would also be malign side effects (like) maintaining life support for zombie companies that earn less than they need to cover interest payments. Since the pandemic hit, many such companies now survive thanks to direct central bank largesse. The resulting misallocation of capital damages productivity and thus economic growth.” – bto: Genauso ist es.
- “The mispricing of assets that has been a feature of capital markets over the past 20 years — as central banks have bought more and more bonds — would then become yet more extreme, as would the search for yield regardless of risk.” – bto: Die künftigen Gewinne werden mit noch geringeren Zinssätzen abgezinst, der Anreiz zur Verschuldung geht nochmals nach oben.
- “The biggest challenge for the central banks would be the potential threat to their credibility. (….)nyield curve control requires the central bank to commit to keep interest rates low over a set timeframe. This is how it can help encourage spending and investment. But it also means, they add, that the central bank runs the risk of letting inflation overheat while holding to its promise.” – bto: Das müssen sie auch, einfach, weil sonst steigende Zinsen zu Massenpleiten führen.
- “A pick-up in inflation is a far more probable outcome than markets currently allow. It is, moreover, part of the solution to countries’ excessive debt burdens. The likelihood is that greater resort to direct monetary financing of spiralling government deficits will have a powerful impact on inflation, which will also be encouraged as the labour force gains more bargaining power and governments come under pressure to reward key workers.” – bto: Pack dazu noch die Störungen auf der Angebotsseite und wir haben die inflationäre Mischung.
- “The prevalent belief that ever-increasing debt is manageable, because servicing costs are low, will ultimately prove toxic.” – bto: Denn, wenn die Nominalzinsen steigen, gibt es nichts, was das Kartenhaus noch stabilisiert.
