Warum die Lage an den Börsen so fragil ist
Die Notenbanken beschreiten einen schmalen Grat. Höhere Zinsen – aber auch sinkende Ertragsaussichten – könnten den Börsen deutlich zusetzen. Eine durchaus reale Gefahr, meint auch die FINANCIAL TIMES (FT):
- „(…) while we love to talk about bubbles, periods of extreme valuation in the stock market don’t really happen very often. Of the 29 business cycles in the US since 1881 only a few have ended in one, according to Professor Russell Napier. But, while each has had its own peculiarities, the basic driver has been much the same: the ability of investors to believe absolutely in something that always turns out to be impossible. Namely that, thanks to some ‘marvels’ of technology, corporate profits will stay high (and probably rise) indefinitely and that interest rates will also stay low indefinitely.“ – bto: Genau das erleben wir im heutigen Umfeld – vor allem die Erwartung, dass Geld dauerhaft nichts kostet.
- „(…) equities aren’t really about feelings or show ponying: they are about the net present value of all future income streams discounted at whatever the discount rate is at the time. That’s it. So discount rate up, value down (usually when inflation hits about 4 per cent).“ – bto: Das wird sehr gern vergessen oder es werden sehr optimistische Annahmen über künftige Erträge formuliert.
- „A proper bubble can then only develop if investors do not assume cyclical normality but instead manage to convince themselves (against all historical experience) that it is possible for a high-profit, low-inflation environment to be permanent. This always ends badly. Think 1901, 1921, 1929, 1966, 2000, 2007, briefly 2020 and possibly right now.“ – bto: Dafür, dass Blasen so selten sind, häufen sie sich seit 2000.
- „The only question is how fast it ends badly. The key thing here, says Napier in his lectures, is which bit of the equation investors have been getting wrong. If it is the belief that interest rates will never rise, you tend to get a long drawn out bear market (from 1966, when it would have been hard to imagine the inflation of the late 1970s). If it is more the belief that corporate earnings will stay high forever, it tends to be shorter and sharper (2020 was a mini classic of this genre of crash).“ – bto: In welcher Art von Bubble befinden wir uns heute? Ich denke in einer, in der beides gilt: übertriebene Ertragserwartungen und der Glaube an dauerhaft tiefe Zinsen. Das könnte sich beides als großer Irrtum herausstellen.
- „Inflation has been minimal for years. US corporate profits have been very high and rising for years: they hit yet another record high in the third quarter of 2021. And of course, as a result, US stock market valuations hit bubble levels some time ago: by the end of last year the cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratio was knocking at about 40, more than double its long-term average.“ – bto: Sie wetten auch darauf, dass das Erpressungspotenzial gegenüber den Notenbanken ausreicht.
- „(…) which bit have we got most wrong this time around. Is it the discount rate or corporate profits? The discount rate feels like the obvious one, although rising interest rates obviously hit corporate margins too.“ – bto: Das ist ein ganz wichtiger Punkt, denn steigende Zinsen kosten Gewinn. Der Leverage-Effekt wirkt auch umgekehrt.
- „Most fell for the nonsense from central banks last year that the fast-rising inflation they were seeing was transitory. (…) The Federal Reserve, under pressure from the inflation itself and possibly also from polls suggesting that said inflation is not helping President Joe Biden, is now changing tune (no more “transitory”).“ – bto: wie im Sonderpodcast vom 27. Januar 2022 besprochen.
- „With that in mind, it is worth noting that the FTSE 100, with its reasonably valued income generating stocks, is outperforming the S&P 500 (…).” – bto: Heutige Erträge sind wertvoller als spätere, wenn die Zinsen steigen. So simple.
