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Wall Street minus 50 % +X?

Die Fed senkt die Zinsen – und die Börse reagiert verschnupft. Dabei zeigen doch viele Studien, dass die US-Börse nach Beginn eines neuen Zinssenkungszyklus über die nachfolgenden zwölf Monate deutlich zulegte. Doch könnte es gut sein, dass die Märkte erkennen, dass es eben nicht ein normaler Zinszyklus ist, der uns da bevorsteht und dass es eben auch keine normale Ausgangslage an den Märkten ist. Dazu schon vor dem Zinsentscheid Lucy Hunt von Hussman:

  • “(…) our ‘Exit Rule for Bubbles’ is straightforward: You only get out if you panic before everyone else does. You have to decide whether to look like an idiot before the crash, or look like an idiot after it.” – bto: Auf heute bezogen, bedeutet das, Risiken abzubauen.
  • “Extreme overvaluation can persist for long periods of time if investors have a speculative bit in their teeth. In prior market cycles across history, an effective approach would have been to tolerate overvaluation until either a) uniformly favorable market internals gave way to dispersion and divergence, indicating that investors had shifted from a speculative mindset to a risk-averse one, or b) extreme ‘overvalued, overbought, overbullish’ features indicated that speculation had reached a precarious limit. Once divergent internals or overextended syndromes emerged, overvaluation typically permitted steep and often immediate market losses.” – bto: Was interessant ist, denn wir haben es erneut mit dieser psychologischen Haltung zu tun, dass es angesichts der Fed nur eine Richtung geben kann: nach oben. Das zeugt von einer enormen Sorglosigkeit der Investoren. Bestätigt wurde das auch durch die zügige Erholung nach dem Einbruch vom 6. August. Handelskrieg bedeutet mehr Zinssenkungen und damit höhere Aktien. So die Logik.
  • “As long as investors had a speculative bit in their teeth, as evidenced by uniform market internals, even the most extreme ‘overvalued, overbought, overbullish’ syndromes had no consequence. Recognize that the market has been in a broadening top formation since market internals deteriorated in early 2018. (…) This has produced market action that some might label a ‘megaphone.’” – bto: Es gab neue Höchststände, aber zugleich einen Trend sinkender Tiefpunkte. Die Schwankungsbreite nahm also zu. Trendwende?S&P 500 megaphone pattern

Quelle: Hussman

 “The price-insensitive exodus toward passive investing has favored hypervalued, large-cap S&P 500 index components and ‘glamour stocks’ over any disciplined stock selection approach. That’s not terribly unusual for late-stage bull market advances.” – bto: Und diese Verschlechterung dauert weiter an.

  • “Given a hypervalued market with still-unfavorable internals, history suggests that a ‘trap door’ is already open here, which is permissive of abrupt and potentially vertical declines. (…) Prior to the current market cycle, this extreme variant has only emerged just before the worst market collapses in the past century. The list of these instances: August 1929, the week of the market peak; August 1972, after which the S&P 500 would advance about 7% by year-end, and then drop by half; August 1987, the week of the market peak; July 1999, just before an abrupt 12% market correction, with a secondary signal in March 2000, the week of the final market peak; and July 2007, within a few points of the final peak in the S&P 500, with a secondary signal in October 2007, the week of that final market peak.” – bto: Wenn das stimmt, dann müsste die US-Börse in der Tat vor einer sehr deutlichen Korrektur stehen.

Hussman bubble peak flag

Quelle: Hussman

“(…) whether or not this is the very last chance to avoid the firestorm, ‘the point is to go.’ (…) as of Friday July 12, our estimate of likely 12-year total returns for a conventional portfolio mix invested 60% in the S&P 500, 30% in Treasury bonds, and 10% in Treasury bills, has dropped to just 0.5%. A passive investment strategy is now closer to ‘all risk and no reward’ than at any moment in history outside of the three weeks surrounding the 1929 market peak.” – bto: Das zeigt, dass wir es mit einem historischen Höchst zu tun haben.

Estimated 12-year total return of a conventional asset mix

Quelle: Hussman

  • “Presently, we observe market conditions that have been associated almost exclusively, and in most cases precisely, with the most extreme bull market peaks across history. (…) Examine past bull market peaks, and you’ll invariably find that the initial decline was steep enough, usually within the first 15-30 trading sessions, to paralyze investors and keep them hoping and holding through the entire bear market that followed. Once the March 2000 peak was registered, the S&P 500 fell -11.2% over the next 15 trading sessions. Though the S&P 500 nearly recovered its peak at the beginning of September 2000, it gave back -12.6% over the next 28 sessions. Similarly rapid losses followed the 1987, 1990, and 2007 market peaks. Those initial losses are precisely what lock investors into paralysis.” – bto: Eine interessante, aber auch schwierige Argumentation, denn wir haben das Problem der Bärenfallen. Wenn der Markt gefallen ist, möchte man nicht vor der Erholung aussteigen. Wenn sie kommt, hat man was Entscheidendes verpasst. Es sind wenige gute Tage, die über den Erfolg entscheiden – und die wenigen schlechten, die man vermeiden sollte … Leichter gesagt, als getan.

Dann noch etwas zur Bewertung an der Wall Street:

  • “The (…) chart shows our measure of nonfinancial market capitalization to nonfinancial corporate gross value-added, including estimated foreign revenues. (…) The current multiple is 2.27. (…) even a retreat in valuations to the highest level ever observed at a bear market trough would take the S&P about 51% lower. I actually view that outcome as optimistic.” – bto: Das wirft die Frage auf, ob man sich das angesichts des unbedingten Willens der Akteure, die Börse oben zu halten, vorstellen kann. Davor kommt MMT.
Hussman MarketCap/GVA

Quelle: Hussman

  • “The next chart shows our Margin-Adjusted P/E (MAPE), which behaves largely as a market-wide price/revenue ratio, and allows calculation back to the 1920’s. As of Friday, July 12, the MAPE stood at 46.02. The highest level ever observed at the end of any complete market cycle was 19.83, in October 2002. A retreat simply matching that level would imply a market loss of about -57% over the completion of the current cycle.” – bto: Da haben wir sie wieder – die 50 Prozent. Eigentlich undenkbar, aber vermutlich bin ich auch in der Blase gefangen.
Hussman Margin-Adjusted P/E

Quelle: Hussman

  • “One may argue, perhaps defensibly, that aggressive monetary and fiscal policy can avoid Depression-type economic outcomes, but remember that there’s really very little correlation between Federal Reserve policy changes and more general, cyclical economic fluctuations. (…) As for the financial markets, remember that the Fed eased aggressively throughout both the 2000-2002 and 2007-2009 collapses, and that the market’s response to Fed easing is highly conditional on investor psychology and the condition of market internals. I continue to expect a market loss on the order of 60-65% over the completion of the current cycle.” – bto: Und derzeit braut sich zweifellos etwas an den Märkten zusammen.

→ hussmanfunds.com: “They’re Running Toward the Fire”, 14. Juli 2019