Vorboten der nächsten Finanzkrise?
In der FT habe ich einen sehr interessanten Artikel zum Zustand des Bankensystems gefunden. Er beschäftigt sich mit der relativen Kursentwicklung der sogenannten systemrelevanten Banken. Immerhin 40 solche Banken gibt es, von denen die Aufsichtsbehörden annehmen, dass die ihre Heimatländer (und mehr) in die Krise stürzen könnten. Fallen deren Aktien, so droht Ungemach:
- “Central bankers have lived in fear for the past 10 years of making a misjudgment, pulling off support too quickly, and bringing the banking system down in crisis once more. They will be determined to avoid this. And that could yet prompt them to stay their hands on tightening monetary policy (…).” – bto: Wir haben es eben mit Banken zu tun, die höhere Zinsen nicht verdauen können, würde doch ihr Zombiestatus untragbar.
- “(…) they may be overlooking a key source of stress. In the wake of the crisis, the world’s financial regulators decided that they needed to nominate a select few GSifis (Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions). (…) Of late, an institution’s systemically important status seems to be seen as a weakness.” – bto: Die Märkte ahnen, dass das Spiel zu Ende gehen (könnte).
- “If we take all the GSifis, and there are only deemed to be 40 of them on the planet, and weigh them by market cap (so as not to overstate the impact of some sharp recent falls for relatively small European institutions), then the team at London’s Absolute Strategy Research show that they are in a bad state. From the top of the market on January 26 until May 31, they collectively lost $800bn in market capital, or about 18 per cent. That is virtually a bear market.” – bto: Und das ist ein Zeichen für kommende Probleme.
Quelle: FT
- “A look at the full list shows that this cannot be dismissed as only a eurozone problem, as Chinese and Japanese banks are participating to the full:” – bto: Die Liste wird ausgerechnet von der Deutschen Bank angeführt!
Quelle: FT
- “Can this be seen as primarily a collection of idiosyncratic problems for particular institutions, rather than a systemic one? With Italian banks stressed by political events at home, and the seemingly intractable worries about the health of Deutsche Bank, it is tempting to say so. This is how the market values in dollars of Deutsche and JPMorgan have compared since 1998, a period in which both made a number of huge acquisitions:” – bto: Das ist natürlich eine erschütternde Betrachtung. Die Deutsche Bank ist wirklich ein hausgemachtes Problem. Dennoch sollte uns die schlechte Performance der Gruppe zu denken geben.
Quelle: FT
- “However, ASR points out that the loss of confidence in the GSifis overlaps closely with a decline in the global real money supply. In other words, it could reflect a shortage of dollars.” – bto: Damit wären wir dann doch beim Thema des Frühindikators.
Quelle: FT
- “(…) the move away from the equity of GSifis could reflect concern over widening credit spreads, which have started from a very low level. Eurozone asset managers are particularly heavily exposed to US credit, arguably because the European Central Bank has given them little choice but to look abroad to take risks.” – bto: ein klarer Krisenindikator.
- Konsequent deshalb die Schlussfolgerung der Analysten die von der FT zitiert werden: “ASR’s very bold call is that US 10-year Treasury yields will hit 2.5 per cent before they reach 3.5 per cent, because a fall of 15-20 per cent for the GSifis has typically seen 10-year yields dip by 50-100 basis points. That is not consensus.” – bto: Der Konsens übersieht ja auch regelmäßig, wie sehr wir das System geleveragt haben!
→ ft.com (Anmeldung erforderlich): “Authers’ Note: Something smells GSifi . . . ”, 13. Juni 2018
