“‚Their Luck Is Running Out‘: Why Albert Edwards Expects A Chinese Hard-Landing”

Heute wenden wir uns China zu. Das Land steht für ein Großteil des Wachstums der Weltwirtschaft in den letzten Jahren und zunehmend im Wettbewerb im Bereich der Hochtechnologie. Donald Trump hat vermutlich auch aus strategischen Gründen den Handelskrieg mit China begonnen und es bleibt abzuwarten, ob es nun wirklich zu einer Entspannung kommt – oder es nur eine taktische Maßnahme vor den Wahlen war.

Zumindest kurzfristig scheint sich die Wirtschaft weiter abzuschwächen:

Quelle: Bloomberg

So oder so droht eine weitere Abschwächung in dem Land, das wie kein anderes auf Schulden gesetzt hat, um das Wachstum zu beleben. Das zeigt dieses Bild sehr schön:

Quelle: Twitter

Albert Edwards – Perma-Bär von SocGen – sieht das Land vor einer durchgreifenden Wende:

• Als es 1987 an der Wall Street crashte, “one key feature was investors’ surprise that the already frothy Japanese equity market and economy just sailed through the crisis more untouched than most. This was mistakenly attributed to sound policy and an unsinkable economy. As a result, confidence that Japanese policymakers could deftly manage and avert any potential crisis saw investors pour money into Japanese assets. Risk appetite inflated to previously unseen levels, and then… (…) ›when policymakers have a ‘good’ crisis, investors then become over-complacent and fail to price risk correctly.‹” – bto: Japan galt damals als unschlagbar.
• “It wasn’t just Black Monday: as Edwards notes, in 2001, in the immediate aftermath of the Nasdaq crash and with the expected deep recession averted, investors made the mistake of anointing Alan Greenspan with semi-supernatural powers of policy management ‚whereas in fact he might have just been lucky.‘ (…) Alan Greenspan and the Fed were seen by investors to have had a good crisis, and together with Greenspan’s mythical equity market put, investors became overcomplacent. The bust, when it came, was worse, precisely because over-confidence in policymakers’ ability to control events led to excessive risk and debt being taken on.” – bto: Heute haben wir großes Vertrauen in die Notenbanken und in die chinesische Regierung, alles im Griff zu haben.
• “Fast forward to today when Edwards claims that with the world suddenly focused on the US, the real trouble continues to brew enearly half a world away: namely ‚China is currently another place where there is over-complacency.‘ Investors (…) are virtually certain that China’s economy will not hard-land, mainly because the policymakers have proved the naysayers wrong time and time again. But, as in the case of 1987 and 2001, ‚is luck now running out?‘ Edwards asks, this time for Beijing.” – bto: und damit für uns alle.
• “Edwards’ argument revolves around the claim with China’s policymakers having had a very ‘good’ crisis in 2008 (which was papered over only thanks to trillions in new debt), ‚since then, naysayers, such as myself, have been consistently wrong in projecting that policymakers would lose control and that a grotesque credit bubble would burst and lay the economy low.‘” – bto: Das stimmt.
• “Edwards contends that as President Trump exerts mounting pressure on the Chinese economy via tariffs, ‚the worry is that a Chinese policy response will send the global markets into a tailspin, just as the August 2015 devaluation did.‘ Which, in turn, reminds the SocGen strategist that, as we China just unveiled its first ever current account deficit, marking a seachange in the direction of China’s capital flows, and making China’s policymakers’ job even harder, once again bringing up the question: ‚Is luck running out?‘“

→ zerohedge.com: “‚Their Luck Is Running Out‘: Why Albert Edwards Expects A Chinese Hard-Landing”, 30. Oktober 2018