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Sieben (gute) Thesen zur Eurozone

Die FINANCIAL TIMES (FT) ist eine herausragende Zeitung und gerade die Kommentare von Martin Sandbu sind eine wirkliche Erleuchtung. Nicht, dass ich immer mit ihm einer Meinung wäre, dennoch, ich wünschte, wir hätten entsprechenden ökonomischen Sachverstand hierzulande.

Wenn er “sieben Thesen zur Eurozone” formuliert, sind diese zumindest diskussionswürdig. Gerade bei bto:

  • “1. The cyclical growth impulse from an economy’s trade and capital flows with the rest of the world is a function of the change in the current account (as a share of gross domestic product), not its level (as a share of GDP). (…)  An increase in an external surplus, and indeed a reduction of an external deficit, is a drag on growth elsewhere, but a constant surplus is not.” – bto: Das ist richtig, einleuchtend und wichtig. Es ist also nicht schlimm (aus dieser Sicht, für uns natürlich schon!), dass wir einen großen Überschuss haben.
  • “2. For aggregate demand externalities in the eurozone, what matters are changes in intra-eurozone current account asymmetries. It is mistaken, therefore, to blame Germany for reducing growth in the eurozone after the financial crisis. Its surplus with the rest of the monetary union shrank in 2011-13 and has remained constant since. That means it cushioned the recession in the periphery. What is true is that its growing surplus with the rest of the world passed the eurozone’s aggregate demand contraction in that period on to other parts of the global economy.” – bto: Das ist wichtig, reduziert es doch den Druck auf uns, zur “Eurorettung” im französischen Sinne beizutragen.
  • “3. Current account levels asymmetries can matter for financial stability (as opposed to aggregate demand externalities). That is because they add up over time to excessive stocks of cross-border liabilities. But that is only so if they are out of proportion to economic growth in the recipient economies, and if they take the form of hard-to-restructure claims such as debt. (…) the eurozone should also push capital flows away from shorter-term debt instruments towards very long-term debt or ideally equity-type investments.” – bto: Hier sind wir beim Problem. Die anderen sind zu hoch verschuldet, wir haben zu hohe Forderungen. Deshalb muss es knirschen!
  • “4. Fiscal union is neither necessary nor sufficient for national fiscal countercyclical stabilisation. It is not necessary so long as one allows national-level fiscal policy to be sufficiently countercyclical, and so long as there is market access (on which see the next point). It is not sufficient because the scale will be too small (the US fiscal union cushions only about 20 per cent of idiosyncratic shocks to state economies). It is also not sufficient because if any transfers are truly temporary and will later have to be paid back, then markets will take this into account when assessing the creditworthiness of a country in crisis.” – bto: Klartext: Es ist nicht groß genug, und um groß genug zu sein, müsste es gigantisch sein. So groß, wie es nie und nimmer realisiert werden kann.
  • “5. Fiscal union is neither necessary nor sufficient for sovereign “safe liabilities” — that is to say, for governments to have market access. (…) With a sufficiently long-term debt structure, temporarily high interest rates are affordable. Fiscal union is also not necessary because further alternatives exist: central bank support such as the European Central Bank’s programme to intervene against speculation that a country may leave the euro; or in extremis, various forms of debt restructuring (…).” – bto: Und genau diese brauchen wir, wobei die Befürworter bei uns immer wieder vergessen, wer dafür bezahlt.
  • “6. Fiscal union is neither necessary nor sufficient for “safe assets” often thought to be needed as benchmarks for a stable private financial system. It is not necessary because there are alternatives, such as the proposed European Safe Bonds. Besides the ECB can always issue its own liabilities for this purpose.” – bto: Auch das bestechend klar.
  • “7. Fiscal union is neither necessary nor sufficient for eurozone-level fiscal countercyclical stabilisation. It is not necessary because the European Commission can use its power over national budget policy to pursue a common fiscal stance for the eurozone. It is not sufficient because any fiscal union mechanism to insure against national shocks may have no ability to stabilise economic fluctuations that affect all countries at the same time.” – bto: Es wäre auch schlichtweg zu klein!

Fazit FT: “A combination of smarter structuring of cross-border financial claims, better use of the eurozone’s fiscal rules (which the treaty does not just allow but arguably requires) and a greater acceptance of debt restructuring (…) eventually secure risk-sharing through private channels, there is little left for a fiscal union to do.”

– bto: Die Message ist klar: Lasst uns endlich die faulen und privaten Schulden restrukturieren, statt über Umwege die Eurozone eine Runde weiterzubringen. Recht hat er.

→ FT (Anmeldung erforderlich): “Seven theses on the eurozone”, 6. Oktober 2017