Richard Koo: Helikopter-Geld ist brandgefährlich
Zunächst die Erinnerung an die derzeitige Politik der Notenbanken:
Zero Hedge (verbunden mit dem erneuten Hinweis, dass dies eine Quelle ist, von der ich weiß, dass sie zur Aufbauschung neigt, allerdings ist sie eine Quelle für gutes Material) bringt Charts von der Deutschen Bank: “The European Central Bank and Bank of Japan are buying around $180 billion of assets a month, according to Deutsche Bank, a larger global total than at any point since 2009, even when the Federal Reserve’s QE programme was in full flow.”
Deutliches Bild: Die Notenbanken sind weiterhin aktiv und fluten die Märkte. Bis jetzt bringt es aber nur den Vermögenspreisen etwas, die realwirtschaftlichen Implikationen bleiben gering. Deshalb auch der Ruf nach “mehr” in Form von Helikopter-Geld.
Dazu ein interessanter Kommentar von Richard Koo, dem “Erfinder” der Theorie der Bilanzrezession:
- “Richard Koo warns, central banks may get much more than they bargained for, because helicopter money ‚probably marks the end of the road for believers in the omnipotence of monetary policy who have continued to press for further accommodation in the midst of a balance sheet recession, when such policies simply cannot work.‘” – bto: Es ist in der Tat das massive Erhöhen der Dosis einer verfehlten Politik.
- “Koo continues to unload on central bankers, slamming their ‚faith that the economy will pick up if only money is dropped from the sky‘ that has provided a psychological foundation for economists and policymakers convinced of the efficacy of monetary policy. It also explains why nothing has worked yet. The Nomura strategist then mocks ‚their belief that dropping money from helicopters would revive the economy that has led them to assume that slightly less extreme policies such as quantitative easing and inflation targeting would also have a positive economic impact (…)‘.” – bto: genau.
- “Eventually the private sector will complete its balance sheet repairs and resume borrowing. When that happens, inflation can quickly spiral out of control unless the central bank drains the liquidity it pumped into the market under quantitative easing or helicopter money. For example, excess reserves created by the Fed currently amount to some 15 times the level of statutory reserves.” – bto: Die Geldumlaufgeschwindigkeit würde rasant steigen und eben diese Inflation erzeugen.
- “That implies that if businesses and households were to resume borrowing in earnest, the US money supply could balloon to 15 times its current size, sending inflation as high as 1,500%. The corresponding ratios are 28 times for Japan and Switzerland, five times for the eurozone, and 11 times for the UK.” – bto: Dabei bliebe es nicht, denn es käme zu weit höherer Inflation, weil die Umlaufgeschwindigkeit explodieren würde. Dies hätte eine noch höher Inflation zur Folge, die dann wiederum die Umlaufgeschwindigkeit erhöhen würde. Siehe Weimar.
- “Once private-sector demand for loans recovers in these countries, confidence in the dollar, euro, and yen will plummet unless the Fed reduces excess reserves to one-fifteenth of their current level, the ECB to one-fifth, and the Bank of Japan to one-twenty-eighth.” – bto: was, wie Koo auch schreibt, technisch und faktisch unmöglich wäre! Die Wirtschaft würde kollabieren.
- “Koo suspects the thing that’s fuelling the helicopter money frenzy among policymakers is a dangerous fixation with the notion that public debt levels in developed economies have reached their limits. Some sort of covert transfer from rich to poor is thus necessary in their minds, and the preferred way to achieve this is via a mechanism like helicopter money since it doesn’t qualify as an overt capital write off for vested interests, an obvious wealth transfer by the government or some explicit form of forced tax, benevolent charity or, god forbid, capital confiscation.” – bto: Nur darum geht es doch, die Reduktion von Schulden/Vermögen.
- “The problem is, when we look at these polices over their entire lifeline, it becomes clear someone has to lose on a permanent basis to accommodate them. Small wonder policymakers are trying to engineer capital transfer tools from the private sector to the public sector which are permanent in nature.” – bto: Deshalb haben wir den Tanz. In Wirklichkeit ist es einfach, wir sind überschuldet und brauchen einen Schnitt.
- “But as Koo notes during a balance sheet recession, when private sector is already overloaded with savings despite zero or negative interest rates (effectively burning capital for the privilege of saving it safely) because there’s no-one safe to lend to other than the government, it’s unlikely interest rates will rise if the government borrows those savings to fund fiscal stimulus.” – bto: Hier wird es spannend. Koo denkt, dass wir nur genug Staatsschulden machen müssen und dann kommt das Wachstum schon wieder. Ich denke, er springt zu kurz. Demografie, Produktivität und Fehlinvestitionen führen dazu, dass Keynes nicht funktioniert. Siehe Japan.
- “In short, there’s no need for fancy helicopter-money theatricals. What’s needed is a greater allocation of long-term patient capital to government so that it can spend its way out of the private sector’s surplus savings problem productively and responsibly (ideally by committing capital to multi-generationally wealth-inducing projects that the private sector is unlikely to want to fund).” – bto: Wie gesagt, ich denke, dass das nicht stimmt. Natürlich sollte gerade Deutschland mehr investieren, weil wir sonst ohnehin unser Geld verlieren. Aber es ist keine Lösung für unser Problem.
“Governments thus need to undertake bold fiscal stimulus, and that’s that. Helicopter money doesn’t – and won’t – change that fact. As to the sort of fiscal stimulus that’s needed? Koo suggests anything which can encourage more efficient allocation of resources while maximising the productivity of the working population.” – bto: Stimmt, es genügt aber nicht.
→ FT Alphaville: “Koo on why helicopter money just won’t work”, 27. Juli 2016
