Gedanken zur kommenden Welt­finanz­ordnung

Am kommenden Sonntag (15. August 2021) geht es um 50 Jahre “Nixon-Schock”. Ursachen, aber vor allem Folgen beschäftigen mich im Gespräch mit William White. Zur Einstimmung Zitate aus der FINANCIAL TIMES (FT): 

• „August marks the 50th anniversary of a momentous event: (The) decision to sever the dollar’s link with the gold standard, the system whereby the US government had pledged that each dollar could be exchanged for gold (at a rate of $35 an ounce), and other currencies, such as the British pound or German Deutsche Mark, were pegged to the dollar. At the time, it was shocking: the gold standard was replaced with a system of floating exchange rates, where dollars were no longer backed by gold.“ – bto: Das ist der Auftakt einer zunehmenden Entfesselung der Finanzmärkte, verbunden mit immer höherer Verschuldung und letztlich auch einer zunehmenden Abhängigkeit von den Vermögensmärkten. Sie dürfen nicht mehr fallen.
• „(…) Yale School of Management professor and former US undersecretary of commerce Jeffrey E Garten (…) has done us all a service with his chronicle, and it is especially worth pondering now for at least three reasons.  First, when Nixon called this meeting he was grappling with a variant of the same problem that haunts president Joe Biden: a clash between the rhetoric about America’s global status — that the US leads it — and reality — that America’s ability to do so is constrained.“ – bto: Die Weltwährung schafft ein Privileg, aber es kommt nicht ohne Verantwortung.  
• „Second, this clash between rhetoric and reality was particularly pronounced in 1971, because of the crucial problem that America simply did not possess enough gold to honour dollar claims. And that issue raised a bigger question that always stalks finance: what is the basis on which money commands value and trust?“ – bto: Es ist letztlich eine Vertrauensfrage und zwar die, dass das Geld nicht übermäßig an Wert verliert.
• „There are essentially two ways for money and a financial system to command credibility — sadly, both options are beset with flaws. David Graeber, a former anthropology professor, described this well in his book Debt, The First 5,000 Years. He notes that at some points in history, money has gained its value either because it was a commodity in limited supply or was tethered to one. This was the case before 1971, with the gold standard. It’s also the principle that drives cryptocurrencies. Supply is limited, or so the sales pitch goes.“ – bto: Nachteil – es führt tendenziell zu einer deflationären Tendenz, wenn der Rohstoff so knapp ist, dass das Angebot nicht mit dem Wirtschaftswachstum ausgeweitet werden kann.
• „On other occasions in history, however, the value of money relies on the credibility of an individual, institution or group. That is the world we live in now. (…) The value of the dollar now depends on whether we think the Federal Reserve will protect the currency (say, by curbing inflation) and other investors will believe it can do this (ie keep buying dollars).“ – bto: Hier kommen wir zur heutigen Welt. Noch besteht das Vertrauen, doch wie lange noch?
• „Both systems carry the seeds of their own demise. A system built around supply constraints creates value by being rigid by design. (the) lack of flexibility can also cause it to implode. This is what happened in 1971.“ – bto: Die Wirtschaft wuchs stark und das Goldsystem konnte nicht mitwachsen.
• „With the second system, however, there is the reverse problem: excessive flexibility. Most notably, since governments can create money and debt at the stroke of a pen, they are often tempted to do this for reasons of political expediency, causing debt to balloon. (…) The total global debt is now more than three times the size of the global economy, since debt — and money — has expanded inexorably since 1971.“ – bto: Der Grund dafür ist, dass die Politik die Probleme von zu vielen Schulden mit immer mehr Schulden bekämpft hat.
• „(…) this ballooning process usually leads to a social explosion or a direct or indirect restructuring of the debt via inflation, financial controls or write-offs. (…) The question now is whether this historical pattern plays out in today’s monetary system. (…) It seems most unlikely this can ever be repaid just by growth; sooner or later — and it may be much later — this will probably cause a direct or indirect restructuring or a social or financial implosion.“ – bto: immer wieder Thema dieser Seiten, um nicht zu sagen, der Entstehungsimpuls.
• „This brings us to the third reason why Garten’s account matters. (…) Garten’s book shows that the concept of monetary ‘normal’ before 1971 was very different from today; before then, nobody thought money had value because an independent central bank had an inflation target.  So (…) it is worth pondering how different ‘normal’ might look in another 50 years? Will it involve cryptocurrencies? Treasury departments running central banks? Or something else? Just don’t make the mistake of assuming that ‘normal’ will be identical to today.“ – bto: Zunächst ist die Unabhängigkeit der Notenbanken Geschichte. Dies wird am Ende die erhoffte Inflation bringen – und damit die große Krise, die zu einem Reset führt. Wie der aussieht, weiß ich nicht. Aber klar ist, dass die Vermögen/Schulden relativ zum nominalen BIP deutlich sinken werden.