FT: Die Protektionisten in den USA irren sich
Heute Morgen habe ich die Meinung des Telegraph diskutiert, nun die FT: deutlich differenzierter. Dennoch wird das Thema auf der Tagesordnung bleiben.
- “The Trump administration (…) accused Germany of ‚exploiting‘ the US through a ‚grossly undervalued‘ exchange rate. It opens up the prospect of a hostile US trade policy directed not just against Beijing and Mexico City, but Berlin and by extension, the EU as a whole.” – bto: Das scheint die Richtung zu sein, in die die neue US-Regierung zielt.
- “The belief that China and Germany destabilise the world in general and hurt the US in particular with undervalued currencies is not eccentric, but a core tenet in Washington.” – bto: Das macht es natürlich umso gefährlicher.
- “There is one advantage of his openness: it puts on glaring display the sort of economic world view one must have for it to make sense to obsess about currency manipulation.” – bto: Das kann man aber vom Euro, der zwar schwach ist, nicht übermäßig sagen.
- “Navarro (…) is on the record as wanting ‚a more Germany style economy‘ with one-fifth of the workforce in manufacturing. That view ignores the concept that the more productive your factories, the fewer workers you need (which is why Germany’s factory workforce has been falling for decades as well).” – bto: Ich halte das für illusorisch, da es auch mit dem Produktmix zu tun hat.
- “But it is true that if you want to make many more manufactures than you need for yourself, you have to ship more abroad than you buy back from the rest of the world. That is why Germans (and Chinese) consume so much less than they produce – a strange kind of benefit to want to inflict on one’s own workers.” – bto: Das stimmt – vor allem, wenn man dann noch die Ersparnisse im Ausland so schlecht anlegt!
- “US trade deficits depend not on trade deals but on the balance of spending and saving in the US economy. Trying to change any given bilateral trade deficit is like squeezing a balloon – if you pinch one part, the air will inflate another part. And all signs are that the Trump administration’s macroeconomic policies – loose fiscal spending with higher interest rates – may inflate the balloon further.” – bto: Das stimmt. Eigentlich muss die Regierung protektionistisch sein, will sie den Effekt im Land halten.
- “Given the common currency and pan-European supply chains, it is the US’s trade balance with the eurozone that is relevant – and at about €100bn annually, that is no more than 1 per cent of either eurozone or US GDP. It is hard to see why that is excessive.” – bto: Dabei haben wir schon ein Problem innerhalb Europas und der Eurozone.
- “(…) the current account deficit is at about 2 per cent of GDP. For as long as the dollar is the world’s reserve currency, attracting savings from around the world, a small deficit will be hard to avoid.” – bto: Das leuchtet ein.
- “And finally, there is no guarantee that realigning currencies would significantly alter the trade balance as Navarro wants. (…) there is no strong link between the strength of the dollar and the size of the deficit.” – bto: Das wiederum ist interessant und hat natürlich mit der Weltkonjunktur zu tun.
- “As so often, exchange rates are driven by capital movements not trade flows. It is simply wrong to think that a large trade surplus reflects a manipulated currency. At the moment, for example, the renminbi would very probably weaken rather than strengthen if Beijing let it flow.” – bto: Auch das stimmt.
- “Bilateral deficits are a red herring, exchange rate policy is a poor tool to manage overall deficits and the overall US deficit is neither large nor the scourge it is made out to be. A trade war based on this trifecta of misconceptions will not do much good for anyone.” – bto: Das spielt keine Rolle. In unserer Depression in Zeitlupe beginnt die nächste Phase. Und wir haben uns da dummerweise falsch aufgestellt, wie auch der Kommentar von heute Morgen zeigt.
→ FT (Anmeldung erforderlich): American currency confusions, 1. Februar 2017
