FT: Die Finanz-Tricks der EU funktionieren nicht mehr

Die FINANCIAL TIMES (FT) wirft einen kritischen Blick auf die Finanzhilfen der EU in diesen Krisenzeiten. Die Bilanz fällt ernüchternd aus und endet mit dem Fazit: Monetarisierung bleibt die Antwort:

  • Using the US-like notion of mass debt securitisation as a means of recovery from the coronavirus crash is awfulness with no economic or entertainment value. In the past few weeks, much of the EU leadership has been recaptured by the notion of securitisation. Their hope is that the frightening risks of refloating the European economy can be avoided by creating some new debt ‘vehicles’ with thick ‘tranches’ of legal and bureaucratic language covering a small, liquid core of cash.“ – bto: Wie bei der „Griechenland-Rettung“ geht es doch darum zu verschleiern, wie die Geldflüsse sind. Dazu müssen komplizierte Mechanismen gebaut werden, vor allem damit die Deutschen es nicht kapieren. Zumindest die Bevölkerung. Und dann können sich alle freuen.  
  • EU institutions can use a minimal mutual commitment and trust and turn that into what Americans would call a whole bunch of money. (…) In the case of EU support for small and medium size enterprises, the policy entrepreneurs of securitisation speak of ‘mobilising’ a couple of hundred billion for economic recovery with mere tens of billions of official funding. It is presumably hoped the spending will not be noticed by Dutch politicians, Bild readers and Austrian populists.“ – bto: So ist es und es geht nur darum. Und in diesem Hütchenspiel sind wir die völligen Amateure.
  • In the EU official imagination, ‘mobilisation’ through securitisation can make difficult political-economic choices unnecessary. On a small scale, maybe. Unfortunately, the coronavirus recession is affecting too many enterprises and employees for rescues and recapitalisations to be accomplished behind a veil of pixie dust and euphemisms. The EU’s latest securitised rescue effort for SMEs includes the European Investment Fund’s reconfigured ‘COSME Loan Guarantee Facility’, (…) According to the EIF’s slide-deck version €1bn of EIF ‘resources can, through securitisation and mandate magic, produce €8bn of additional lending for SMEs throughout Europe. This will be accomplished in part through offering financial intermediaries (‘originators’), most of which are banks, support for SME lending through a ‘mezzanine tranche’ of EIF money that could absorb some of the possible loan losses.“ – bto: Das folgt aus der Entstehungsgeschichte. Den Profis geht es ums Geldverdienen, den Politikern um das Verschleiern von Ausgaben.
  • When you read through the 12 page indicative term sheet of the COSME Loan Guarantee Facility, you begin to see the fundamental mismatch between the programme design and the reality of the coronavirus’ disastrous impact on enterprises. According to the term sheet, the ‘Final Recipient’ (the SME borrower) should not be a ‘firm in difficulty. Nor should the final recipient be ‘delinquent or in default in respect of any other loan or lease either granted by the Originator or by another financial institution’. Following a seriously compliant interpretation of these requirements, much of the economy in Europe, at least in some places south of the Rhine, would not be eligible for post coronavirus shutdown assistance.” – bto: Das ist doch wie bei uns mit den KfW-Krediten. Der Staat will Geld geben, aber nicht verlieren.
  • This ‘support’ is a foolish way to get smaller European employers through a dark time. If the intent is to reduce the human toll and create the conditions for an economic recovery, securitisation gimmicks are not the way to do it. Mere tweaking of pre-pandemic indirect EU subsidies will not do the trick. There needs to be a period of zero-interest interim cash support for SMEs on the tax rolls.“ – bto: richtig. Die Idee der Umsatzausfallzahlung.  
  • This could be paid for with zero-interest monetary instruments. Before German and Dutch readers take up their pitchforks, look in your pockets. You will find some brightly coloured zero interest monetary instruments. The US government could pay for the direct cash costs of its wars between 2003 and 2018 with its additional issuance of $100 bills. (That was about $800bn, if you were counting). Would coronavirus recovery be a less justifiable objective to be supported by monetisation?“ – bto: Das kommt doch, aber nicht für 800 Milliarden. Wir reden von Billionen.

→ ft.com (Anmeldung erforderlich):”Mass securitisation as a device for recovery has no economic value”, 25. April 2020