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FT: Banks are designed to fall. So fall they surely will

Martin Wolf bespricht das Buch von Mervin King – hatten wir schon ausführlich bei bto. Dennoch natürlich eine Adelung, vor allem, wenn man bedenkt, dass Wolf es zum Anlass nimmt einen Beitrag zu schreiben, nach dem Motto: „Ich hatte Euch doch gewarnt“, wie er es gelegentlich tut.

  • „(…) alchemy lies at the heart of the financial system; moreover, banking was, like alchemy, a medieval idea, but one we have not as yet discarded.“ – bto: An anderer Stelle hat Wolf gar Vollgeld befürwortet. 
  • „(…) the alchemy is ‚the belief that money kept in banks can be taken out whenever depositors ask for it‘.“ – bto: Das ist aber nur ein Teil. Die wahre Alchemie ist die Möglichkeit, Geld herzustellen.
  • „This is a confidence trick in two senses: it works if, and only if, confidence is strong; and it is fraudulent. Financial institutions make promises that, in likely states of the world, they cannot keep.“
  • „In good times, this is a lucrative business. In bad times, the authorities have to come to the rescue. It is little wonder, then, that financial institutions have become so large and pay so well.“
  • „Consider any large bank. It will have a wide range of long-term and risky assets on its books, mortgages and corporate loans prominent among them. It will finance these with deposits (supposedly redeemable on demand), short-term loans and longer-term loans. Perhaps 5 per cent will be financed by equity.“ – bto: naja. Es ist natürlich von den Banken selbst geschaffenes Geld, was das eigentliche Problem ist.
  • „What happens if lenders decide banks might not be solvent? (…). Without aid from the central bank, the only institution able to create money without limit, banks will fail to meet that demand.“ – bto: Das ist natürlich richtig.
  • „Since a generalised collapse would be economically devastating, needed support is forthcoming. Over time, this reality has created a ‚Red Queen’s race‘: governments try to make finance safer and finance exploits the support to make itself riskier.“ – bto: was aber erst durch die Möglichkeit, fast unbegrenzt selbst Geld zu erzeugen, so problematisch wird.
  • „Broadly speaking, two radical solutions are on offer. One is to force banks to fund themselves with far more equity.“
  • „The other is to make banks match liquid liabilities with liquid and safe assets. The 100 per cent reserve requirements of the “Chicago plan”, proposed during the Great Depression, is such a scheme. If liquid, safe liabilities finance liquid, safe assets — and risk-bearing, illiquid liabilities finance illiquid, unsafe assets — alchemy disappears. Finance would be safe. Unfortunately, the end of alchemy would also end much risk-taking in the system.“ – bto: Damit sind wir eigentlich wieder beim Vollgeld. Alles Geld könnte nur noch durch die Notenbanken erzeugt werden mit dem Vorteil, dass bei der Umstellung vom heutigen auf das neue System ein erheblicher Gewinn entstehen würde, der zur Tilgung der Schulden verwendet werden könnte. Weniger Risiko, also weniger Kreditwachstum wird natürlich gerade auch von den Politikern ungern gesehen.
  • „Lord King offers a novel alternative. Central banks would still act as lenders of last resort. But they would no longer be forced to lend against virtually any asset, since that very possibility must create moral hazard. Instead, they would agree the terms on which they would lend against assets in a crisis, including relevant haircuts, in advance. The size of these haircuts would be a ‚tax on alchemy‘. They would be set at tough levels and could not be altered in a crisis. The central bank would have become a ‚pawnbroker for all seasons‘.“ – bto: nett. Wie wir aber an der heutigen Geldpolitik sehen, machen die Notenbanken sehr viel mehr, um eine Krise zu bekämpfen. Daran würde sich nichts ändern. 
  • „This scheme has several advantages. First, it recognises that only the central bank can create needed liquidity in a crisis. Second, it offers a path to a world without alchemy. Third, it offers an option between the status quo and the extreme of 100 per cent reserve banking. Fourth, it eliminates moral hazard, since the penalty on obtaining liquidity would be defined in advance. Fifth, it exploits today’s circumstances, including the reserves created by quantitative easing and the infrastructure created by central banks to assess and manage collateral. Sixth, regulation could then be reduced to just two rules: a higher maximum leverage ratio (of at most 10 to one) and the rule that the pledgeable value of assets at the central bank must exceed the value of liquid liabilities.“ – bto: Das klingt alles gut, ich bin aber nicht überzeugt. Ich denke, dass es dennoch zu Krisen kommen wird, weil die Grund-Alchemie der Geldschöpfung aus dem Nichts in fast unbegrenztem und zudem prozyklischem Ausmaß wenig begrenzt wird. Das Leverage-Ratio ist da der entscheidende Hebel.
  • „This scheme has drawbacks. Pledge­able values would have to vary with economic conditions, which could create a degree of stress.“

Wolfs Fazit: „Alchemy would be less lucrative; banks would be better capitalised; and runs by short-term creditors should cease. These ideas deserve open-minded consideration.“

bto: Ich denke, es ist das Mindeste, was wir tun müssen. Eine Diskussion zum Geldsystem ist auch in Deutschland mehr als überfällig.

→ FT (Anmeldung erforderlich): „Central banks as pawnbrokers of last resort“, 31. Mai 2016