Es gibt Fragen, die ich nicht ernsthaft stellen würde: “Can the euro rival the dollar?”

Adam Tooze und Christian Odendahl von CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN REFORM haben sich der Frage angenommen, ob der Euro mal in Konkurrenz zum Dollar treten könnte. Ich hätte mir die Frage nie gestellt, weil

• der Euro heute so viel Anteil an den Weltwährungsreserven hat, wie früher die D-Mark (oder gar weniger …), Franc etc. also völlig entfallen sind;
• der US-Dollar durchaus krank ist – wie wohl alle Fiat-Währungen –, aber von einem Niedergang wohl eher China (und Russland? – wegen der geringen Staatsverschuldung und der hohen Golddeckung) profitieren dürften.

• “The European economy is comparable in size and sophistication to the US economy, but its currency, the euro, plays second fiddle. For a long time, the dollar’s dominance did not seem to matter much. It did bring the US major benefits: cheap and almost limitless funding for its government, firms and consumers; and the ability to impose effective international sanctions, as the dollar’s dominance meant that no firm could violate them without risking major fines.” – bto: das Privileg der Weltmacht.
• “(…) the ambition to give the euro a greater role in global markets faces huge economic and political obstacles. Not only is the dollar’s role in the world economy deeply entrenched. The policy changes that would bring about the conditions necessary for growing the euro’s role – an ample supply of European safe assets and a European Central Bank (ECB) that recognises its worldwide responsibilities – would meet fierce resistance, especially in Berlin. Likewise, the consequences of increased global demand for the euro would challenge some of the eurozone’s core policies.” – bto: In Wahrheit geht es wieder darum, dass man “sichere Assets” propagieren möchte, bei denen es nur darum geht, die Verschuldungskapazität der Eurozone zu erhöhen.
• “Three things determine whether a currency is a reserve currency. The first is a currency’s role in worldwide transactions, such as trade invoicing and the financial transactions that facilitate trade. (…) The US dollar is the most used trade currency, even when US companies are not involved (…) 80 per cent of dollar denominated imports never touch the United States itself. By contrast, almost all trade using euros involves at least one eurozone country.” – bto: Dabei ist es eine Folge des Status des US-Dollars, dass so viel Handel in ihm abgewickelt wird.
• “Trade must be financed: exporters want to receive payment at the point of shipment, whereas importers prefer to pay only once they receive the product. The time lag is usually covered by company-to- company trade credit, or by a bank. (…) And if the US dollar is not the local currency, firms committing to buying goods in US dollars will want to hedge their currency risk, by buying financial derivatives that protect them from currency fluctuations. (…) Trade invoiced in US dollars thus leads to trade credit, trade insurance and financial derivatives in dollars.” – bto: Schon klar, es beginnt aber mit dem ersten Punkt, der wiederum dem Status des Dollars als solchem geschuldet ist.
• “The invoicing of global trade in US dollars also reinforces the tendency of international investors to prefer safe dollar assets – which is the second thing that makes a reserve currency. The ultimate goal of owning a safe asset is to be able to buy goods and services in the future. If trade in those products is invoiced in dollars, then it makes sense to hold safe dollar assets instead of, say, safe euro assets, let alone local currency assets. This creates high worldwide demand for safe dollar assets such as US Treasury bonds, senior corporate bonds and US mortgage-backed securities, driving up their price and depressing their yield.” – bto: was aber zu der Grundursache führt: dem Vertrauen in den Dollar als der Währung der Weltmacht. Der Euro ist dagegen eine dysfunktionale Währung einer dysfunktionalen Währungsunion in einer dysfunktionalen europäischen Union, die ihre Probleme nicht im Griff hat.
• Was auch diese Folge hat: “(…) bilateral exchange rates hardly matter for trade; the only rate that really matters is the one vis-à-vis the dollar. In response to the dominance of the US dollar in trade and financial transactions, asset portfolios and credit markets, central banks around the world hold mostly US dollar assets (…).” – bto: Auch das ist eine Folge der anderen Faktoren und des Grundvorteils des US-Dollars (Weltmacht, keine Existenzfrage) versus Euro (Niedergang, Chaos, Zerfall). Ich denke auch, dass der Dollar nichts taugt, weil die Amerikaner übertreiben und voll auf Monetarisierung setzen. Aber der Euro??
• “It is possible to imagine a world in which the dollar and the euro stood side by side as the currencies of two large economic regions of equivalent affluence and involvement in world trade. But for them both to be reserve currencies, they would both need to produce an ample supply of safe assets for foreigners to invest in. The eurozone would also need to demonstrate willingness and ability to stabilise not only its own banks but all the financial actors worldwide that use its currency. Right now the eurozone meets neither criterion of a reserve currency.” – bto: Vor allem fehlt ihr eine glaubhafte Existenzberechtigung.
• Und jetzt kommt es: “(…) the eurozone’s conservative fiscal policy means that there are not enough safe euro assets to invest in. Thanks to the tight fiscal framework adopted during the winter crisis of 2011-2012, the eurozone’s overall debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to fall from 85 per cent to 71 per cent over the next five years, according to the IMF. The available stock of German Bunds, the safe euro asset of choice, will fall to as little as 42 per cent of German GDP. The US’s, by comparison, is expected to rise to 117 per cent of US GDP.” – bto: Schlussfolgerung – nur wer so richtig viel Schulden macht, ist ein “safe Asset”. Haha. “Safe” sind die USA nur, weil wir alle wissen, dass die Fed im Zweifel alles monetarisiert.
• “Since eurobonds with joint liability are anathema in many member-states, the European Commission has suggested ‘synthetic’ eurobonds without joint liability to create a safe European asset. However, this proposal is still in its infancy, and meets fierce resistance in Berlin and rome, and lukewarm support in Paris. Other proposals to create European safe assets are equally contested.” – bto: Tja, Strukturen wie die Subprime-Bonds in verschiedenen Tranchen schaffen also “safe Assets”. Mist bleibt Mist.
• “A third challenge for the euro’s ambitions was revealed by the banking crisis of 2008. Faced with a run on the dollar-based international banking system, the Federal reserve rose to the challenge of acting as a lender of last resort not just to American banks, but to banks around the world, above all in Europe. (…) The confidence placed by global banks in the dollar as their key currency was amply rewarded.” – bto: wobei es zumindest bei einigen Sorgen gibt, dass die USA es eventuell nicht wieder machen könnten, weil es der Zustimmung des Finanzministeriums bedarf.
• Schließlich kommen auch die Autoren nicht darum herum, anzuerkennen, dass hinter dem Dollar eben mehr steht: “It is hard to imagine the euro displacing the dollar as the result of a purely ‘business-driven’ process, as many in Berlin seem to imagine. It will take an upheaval to dislodge the current equilibrium of dollar dominance. Donald Trump is doing all he can to provide that shock, and countries around the world are indeed seeking diversification away from the dollar. But the decisive impetus will not come from America alone.” – bto: Und wenn es dazu kommen sollte, dürften die Erschütterungen so stark sein, dass es die ganze Welt massiv trifft. Schwer vorstellbar, dass das politisch, militärisch und zunehmend auch ökonomisch schwache Europa davon profitieren könnte.
• Doch man darf ja träumen und dabei feststellen, dass es doch recht nett ist, wenn man eben nicht die Weltwährung stellt: “Were the euro to begin emerging as an international lead currency, this would pose new challenges to Europe’s macroeconomic policy stance. There would be strong demand for safe euro assets, pushing down interest rates in Europe – which are already very low. At the same time, demand for the reserve currency as a store of value over and above its function in trade causes it to appreciate. That makes imports cheaper, and exports more expensive. The combination of low interest rates and a strong currency is a difficult environment for an export-led growth strategy.” – bto: und undenkbar für eine Region, die nur noch über Schulden und Exporte zusammenhält.
• “(…) the eurozone’s macroeconomic policy stance would need to adjust. This would mean rebalancing away from a current account surplus. Deeper eurozone public debt markets would feed greater domestic spending and investment. (…) The eurozone would need to become ‘banker to the world’: offering safe, short-term euro assets to the world, and recycling the proceeds to invest in long-term risky assets abroad. A public-debt-financed eurozone sovereign wealth fund would be one way of achieving that.” – bto: Entscheidend dürfte der Gedanke sein, über höhere Staatsschulden zu steuern. Ein Gedanke, der gerne gehört werden dürfte in Brüssel und den anderen Hauptstädten. Vor allem, wenn es mit deutschem “Kollateral” besichert ist.
• “(…) the EU should make clear – especially to Germany – that economic policy in the eurozone needs to change if the euro is ever to become a world currency. This is, in fact, the main obstacle: many in Berlin view the attempt to internationalise the euro as a stealthy way to push Germany to accept economic policies it has already rejected. It is up to Germany to decide how much it really wants ‘European sovereignty’.” – bto: Europa wird wohl nie mehr die Weltmacht werden, womit die entscheidende Voraussetzung für den Euro als Weltwährung entfällt. Dann sind aber all diese Gedanken nichts anderes als der Versuch, die Eurozone zu einer Schulden-Transferunion zu machen. Egal, wie sehr man das Gegenteil beteuert.