Die Überall-Blase am Beispiel von US-Farmland

• “It was the Red River Valley’s biggest farmland auction in years (…) With the seller in financial trouble, a huge number of acres to offload and the US-China trade war curtailing grain exports, conditions were not encouraging. ‘When this auction went off we worried about collapsing the market (…)’” – bto: Es kam nicht dazu. Dennoch zeigt das Beispiel, was passiert, wenn sich das Umfeld ändert und man es mit Schuldnern zu tun hat.
• “Despite a half-decade of falling grain prices, Midwestern farmland has held much of its value, and has become the foundation for a borrowing boom. Farm debt across the US has risen to $427bn, close to amounts that preceded the 1980s agricultural crash, when adjusted for inflation.” – bto: bei fallenden Einnahmen mehr Schulden machen? Wow.
• “Farmers remain creditworthy in the eyes of banks, even as their incomes fall, because the collateral value of land remains high. While farm income has halved from its peak in 2013, farm equity has fallen just 5 per cent because of stable land values (…) But if prices were to collapse, farm bankruptcies would widen and leave lenders (…) with big losses.” – bto: schon erstaunlich. Wie kann es sein, dass Farmland nur um 5 Prozent fällt, wenn der Cashflow, der damit erwirtschaftet wird, um 50 Prozent fällt? Ach ja, ich vergaß: Der Zinssatz ist ja in Richtung null gefallen.
• “In 2018 the ratio between loan volume and net farm income reached a 16-year high, while rates of delinquency on farm loans surpassed those on all loans by commercial banks, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Delinquencies are also creeping up inside the government-sponsored Farm Credit System, which accounts for 40 per cent of US farm debt. The number of borrowers from the Farm Service Agency, an arm of the USDA, has grown about a quarter over the past five years. That, in itself, is a mark of distress: the FSA tends to be ‘the lender of last resort’ for most farmers because they have to be rejected by at least two other lenders before applying (…)” – bto: Es wird also schon deutlich, dass die Kreditqualität abnimmt.
• “The combination of weak farm finances and sturdy land values puzzles some. ‘We’ve scratched our heads a little bit as to why the land values have held up as well as they have,’ (…)  The Federal Reserve’s decision to keep interest rates low (…) supports all asset values, land included. The administration’s $12bn bailout for farmers hurt by its trade wars — last month expanded by $16bn — has also offset income lost from Chinese tariffs on farm exports. A second reason is a lack of land supply, as farmers who built up cash during the previous crop rally hold tight to land and seek to acquire more.” – bto: die darauf setzen, dass die Preise für Nahrungsmittel wieder steigen und die sich günstig finanzieren können.
• “Land also attracts deep-pocketed institutional investors such as TIAA, UBS and Prudential, which see it as a useful way of diversifying their portfolios. (…) Higher interest rates could prompt some of these investors to turn to safer assets to generate the same return, however. Last year capitalisation rates — a measure of land returns — had the lowest premium to risk-free returns of the past decade (…)” – bto: Blasen wohin man schaut. Höhere Zinsen? Ziehen überall den Stecker, der ultimative Margin Call.
• “Farm balance sheets will be tested as the US-China trade war escalates, removing important outlets for US soyabeans and corn-based ethanol. (…) company`s scrambled this spring to re-rent land held by investors after farmers walked away from leases because they were rejected for operating loans. (…) ‘There’s stress out there — a lot of stress,’ (…)” – bto: Wenn diese Blase platzt, dann platzt alles mit. Zu breit sind Spekulation und Fehlinvestition verbreitet. In den 1930er-Jahren hat es bekanntlich die Farmen in den USA besonders schwer getroffen …

→ ft.com (Anmeldung erforderlich): “US farmers’ borrowing boom is built on shaky land values”, 4. Juni 2019