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Die Suche nach der Lösung: Plan „C“ für den Euro?

Immer wieder, zuletzt in der vergangenen Woche, habe ich bei bto die Zukunftsaussichten der Eurozone diskutiert. Bekanntlich bin ich skeptisch – skeptischer als viele Leser dieser Seiten, die (wohl zurecht) darauf hinweisen, dass gerade Provisorien länger halten, als man denkt und zudem der politische Wille den Euro zu erhalten, koste es, was es wolle, enorm ist.

Dennoch sollte man sich mit Alternativen beschäftigen, wie das erneut Thomas Mayer macht, in einem sehr lesenswerten Aufsatz seines Flossbach von Storch Instituts. Der Link zu dem Paper wie immer am Ende, hier die Highlights:

  • Mayer diskutiert zunächst die unterschiedliche Philosophie mit Blick auf Geld in Deutschland und Frankreich und bringt es so auf den Punkt: “In the construction of EMU these two opposing views of the role of the state created continuing conflicts. While the German side aimed at enshrining rules for the conduct of monetary policy in binding contracts, the French side emphasized the primacy of policy discretion over rules. In many instances, compromises were found by phrasing rules in an ambiguous way or attaching escape clauses to rules. As a result, the euro was created with a Janus face. On the one side it was designed as the private means of exchange favored by the liberals, on the other side it was given the characteristics of a policy instrument in the hands of the state championed by the rational constructivists. The euro could afford having a Janus face as long as the rules were not tested in adverse circumstances.” – bto: Das erklärt sehr schön die sehr unterschiedliche Herangehensweise. Es ist aus französischer/südländischer Sicht auch völlig rational, dem Staat keine Budgetbeschränkung zu geben, da es faktisch immer die Möglichkeit einer Notenbankfinanzierung gibt.
  • “(…) through most of the first decade of its existence, the euro benefitted from very easy access of both public and private entities to cheap credit. (…) Cheap credit held EMU together during most of the first decade of its existence, and EMU came unglued when the era of cheap credit disappeared with the burst of the Great Credit Bubble.” – bto: Das kann gar nicht genug betont werden, es gab eine Party mit billigem Geld. Nichts anderes war die „Blütezeit“ des Euro.
  • Dann kam die Krise: “Confronted with the choice of sticking to the agreed rule of not bailing out countries in self-inflicted difficulties and letting the markets enforce adjustment or replacing private funding with public funding, euro area governments chose the latter. (…) The political will of keeping the project of the single European currency alive dominated the agreed rules and treaties. Instead of a project under the law EMU became a project above the law. The euro lost its face as a private means of exchange and became the ‚state money‘ cherished by the rational constructivists.” – bto: womit die Idee der “harten Budgetgrenze” hinfällig wurde.
  • Zur Wirkung der Politik der EZB: “(…) while some EUR 347 billion of financial support for countries and banks in distress was routed through the European Stability Mechanism and its predecessor (the EFSF, EFSM and bilateral loans), almost EUR 1.1 trillion of credit was extended by four countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Luxembourg) through the Eurosystem’s interbank payment system Target2 to financially weaker euro area countries. Official credit through this system has replaced private credit to banks (and credit to governments through the banks) in these countries as domestic and international creditors fled out of concern for the safety of their claims.” – bto: Das kann man laut genug wiederholen, wenngleich auch Leser dieser Seiten immer wieder bezweifeln, dass es sich bei Target2 um Forderungen handelt, die relevant sind.
  • Die Folgen erklärt Mayer sodann sehr eindrücklich: “Monetization of government debt is akin to a debt equity swap, whereby redeemable government debt is replaced by non-redeemable equity in the form of central bank money. Like equity investors confronted with new equity issuance by a company, the general public will hold the book money of banks created against the newly issued central bank money only if they have trust in the economic strength of the state issuing the money. In the case of the euro, this trust is shaky, because it is unclear which state is backing it.” – bto: Ich denke, die Märkte erwarten hier, dass alle Staaten solidarisch dafür haften und wohl zu recht. Denn die deutsche Politik wird niemals etwas anderes tun. Koste es, was es wolle.

Mayer beschreibt drei Möglichkeiten, die Währungsunion zu retten:

  • “Plan A: The continuation of the muddling through in response to upcoming dangers and challenges as it has been pursued since the start of the Euro Crisis in 2010.” – bto: Das ist die Grundannahme, an der wir uns orientieren sollten. Die Frage ist, wie lange kann es gut gehen? Mayer glaubt nicht daran, weil es immer mehr Interventionen der EZB voraussetzen würde, die an ihre Grenzen stoßen dürfte. Käme es zu Staatspleiten im Euroraum, dürfte dieser wohl zerfallen.
  • “Plan B: The institutionalization of the soft budget constraints for public and private entities that have allowed EMU to function so far through the establishment of a ‚Transfer Union‘.” – bto: Das ist das Ziel des Südens, vor allem mit dem ‚Soft‘ Budget Constraint, wo faktisch andere für einen bezahlen. Mayer sieht jedoch eine geringe Bereitschaft der Bevölkerungen, mehr Macht an die Zentrale zu delegieren und mehr ‚populistische Strömungen‘. Deshalb glaubt er nicht daran, dass dies die Lösung sein könnte.
  • “Plan C: The reestablishment of the euro as a common currency in a monetary union with hard budget constraints for public and private entities.” – bto: Das wäre das wünschenswerte Ziel. Wahrscheinlich??

Plan C sehen wir uns noch genauer an:

  • “In the first step, monetary union would need to be completed by making bank deposits as interchangeable as banknotes issued by different member central banks of the Eurosystem. At present, bank deposits represent private liabilities of banks created by them through credit extension.” – bto: Mayer will damit die Geldschöpfungsmöglichkeit der Banken einschränken, ein Gedanke, den er schon früher geäußert hat und den ich bekanntlich für durchaus interessant halte.
  • “Since the quality of banks’ credit portfolios and the ability of national governments to bail out ailing banks in their jurisdiction are different among euro area member countries, bank deposits are not fully interchangeable. Presently, EMU is a cash union, but no monetary union. This is the reason, why many economists insist that a common deposit insurance scheme is needed.” – bto: weshalb es auch die Flucht aus den Krisenländern gibt.
  • “To build up safe deposits, the ECB would continue with asset purchase programs until the central bank money reserves of banks would be equal to the money aggregate M1 minus cash in circulation at the time of the start of the transition. (…) This would be equivalent to about 37 percent of outstanding euro area government debt.” – bto: Das geht schon in Richtung des Chicago-Plans, allerdings ohne die elegante Beseitigung der Schulden durch Monetarisierung. Letztlich müsste die EZB dann alle Forderungen zins- und tilgungsfrei stellen.
  • “In the second step a European Monetary Fund would have to be created to give governments of fundamentally financially sound states in temporary financial difficulties limited adjustment help.” – bto: Das ist theoretisch richtig. In der Praxis wird der Ruf nach Rettung durch die Notenbank bleiben.
  • Dann kommt die Idee von Parallelwährungen ins Spiel: “Should the government after debt restructuring still be unable to access the market, all assistance would end, but the respective state could introduce its own currency parallel to the euro to fund budget deficits and pay maturing debt with currency created by itself. A national currency of this type would be similar to the stamp script used in certain regions alongside the euro.” – bto: Das halte ich für politisch undenkbar, weil es offen das Ende des Euro einläuten würde.
  • Zudem fordert Mayer Währungswettbewerb: “In addition to national parallel currencies with the character of stamp script, euro area authorities would also need to allow other private currencies, most likely in the form of crypto currencies, to circulate alongside and to compete with the euro. Currency competition would help to focus euro central bankers on their task of creating money useful for the user and not as a policy instrument for the ruling political class.” – bto: Und genau deshalb wird die “ruling class” alles daransetzen, dies zu verhindern.

Auch Mayer bleibt in seinem Fazit skeptisch: “Plan C seems to me the only viable scenario for a stable future of the euro. But it is also the least likely scenario for the future as most European governments shun the political cost of accepting hard budget constraints in their jurisdiction. (…) Hence, it seems inevitable that EMU suffers from the Tragedy of the Commons. And like the commons from overgrazing EMU is likely to be destroyed by the lack of responsibility of the participants.” – bto: Aber das kann sich noch sehr lange hinziehen.

→ Flossbach von Storch: “A plan C for the Euro”, 14. Juli 2017