Die nächste Liquiditätskrise ist nur eine Frage der Zeit
In Deutschland wenig beachtet, hat Lars Windhorst, einstiges Wunderkind der deutschen Wirtschaft, wieder einmal für Schlagzeilen gesorgt. Hintergrund ist die Flucht der Investoren aus dem H2O-Anleihenfonds, der erheblich in die Schulden des umstrittenen deutschen Geschäftsmannes investiert hat. Die Folgen waren die bekannten Probleme, wenn zu viele Investoren zeitgleich aus einem vermeintlich “liquiden” Produkt aussteigen wollen.
Ein “Wetterleuchten” für die Märkte, sieht die FINANCIAL TIMES (FT) doch ein strukturelles Problem:
- “(…) one sentence apparently said by someone in authority at H2O tells a much bigger story: ‘Questioning the liquidity of our funds is equivalent to ascertaining the incapability of a bank to refund its deposits, with the devastating consequences which history has taught us.’ This reads like a letter composed of words cut out from newspapers and pasted into a message sent to police: ‘STOP ME BEFORE I DISINTERMEDIATE AGAIN!!!’” – bto: Es geht genau um das Problem der fehlenden Liquidität.
- “Strictly speaking, H2O is not a bank and does not accept deposits. Asset managers’ portfolio liquidations are not bank runs. The industry does not have systemic oversight by bank regulators or central banks. Of course, neither I nor the Financial Times take any view on the legal exposures of portfolio managers whose funds have been subject to rapid withdrawals. As one US asset manager said: ‘I would not say that whoever put that out should be fired but they connected dots that should not be connected.’” – bto: Es verstärkt natürlich die Unruhe. Alle Akteure, die sich kurzfristig refinanzieren, um längerfristig zu investieren, haben das grundlegende Problem der Illiquidität im Falle eines Vertrauensverlustes.
- “(…) it has become obvious that some in the portfolio management industry desperately want to become banks, so they can have direct access to the Fed window or other central bank channels for repurchase agreement funding and non-market sources of immediate liquidity. ‘The turnround time on liquidating a mutual fund, an ETF or a Ucits fund can stretch into weeks or months. That is too much maturity transformation unless you have access to the backstop (ie, a central bank). The only way to be given access to the backstop is if you are too big to fail and have the public on your side.’” – bto: Was bekommt die Öffentlichkeit denn dafür? Wäre es nicht besser, wir würden für diese Versicherung eine Prämie bekommen und/oder andere Möglichkeiten haben, die Anreize zu ändern?
- “(…) given the more complex plumbing of derivatives trading, the shortage of high-quality liquid assets in much of the world and less cross-border amity, the cash would have to be supplemented by good collateral, that is, Bunds and US Treasury securities, perhaps accompanied by currency swap lines. To get that sort of help, you really need to be too big to fail or be part of a group that has been so designated.” – bto: Es ist eine Folge der zunehmenden Degenerierung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftspolitik. QE entfernt auch die Sicherheiten und gibt zugleich den Anreiz mehr Risiken einzugehen, die dann jene eingehen können und müssen, die im Zweifel gerettet werden. Eine massive Wettbewerbsverzerrung.
- “(…) there is no denying we have a looming liquidity crisis. It has been masked by the profligacy of the central banks in the past decade. ‘Because we no longer have the banks doing market-making, we have created the conditions for liquidity mismatching. We need (…) not confuse listed assets with liquid assets, since in a crisis, liquidity and even pricing is uncertain. We need to have a buffer of cash plus high-quality liquid assets.’” – bto: Das leuchtet ein, wird aber gegeben die Marktverzerrung die Konzentration auf immer größere Spieler erhöhen.
- “(…) how quickly, though, could any global bailout/re-regulation of asset managers be effected? I think it depends on how many millions of retail customers get a shock when they try to cash in or transfer assets, or when they get surprising monthly statements. Then it is quite possible no one will want to take more than a couple of months to come up with a common plan for prudential regulation, and, by the way, direct access to central bank liquidity and currency facilities for asset managers.” – bto: Auch das wäre eine konsequente Fortsetzung der bisherigen Politik der Risiko-Sozialisierung und der Gewinn-Privatisierung. Dürfte also kommen.
