Die Demografie zwingt zum mone­tären End­spiel

Immer wieder war das absehbare monetäre Endspiel Thema auf diesen Seiten.

Das monetäre Endspiel wird vorbereitet

Zweifellos bekommt es durch Corona – auch für den Letzten ersichtlich – deutlich Schub. Deshalb lohnt es, an die demografischen Faktoren, die gestern bereits Thema waren, zu erinnern, denn sie haben einen nicht unwesentlichen Anteil an der Entwicklung. Quelle sind Analysen der Deutschen Bank. Zum einen die jährliche Studie zu den “Long term asset returns” und zum anderen das “Chart of the day”.

Beginnen wir mit der einfachen Erkenntnis: Die guten letzten 30 Jahre finden ein Ende. Statt wachsender Erwerbsbevölkerung erleben wir ihr Schrumpfen und dabei vor allem einen Anstieg der Relation von Abhängigen zu Unabhängigen in der Bevölkerung:

  • “It’s easy to argue that the most recent era of globalisation has been the optimal system for global growth. After all, it dramatically improved poverty levels, reduced inequality between rich and poor nations, and produced strong asset price gains.” – bto: Bei Diskussionen hierzulande wird das gern vergessen.
  • “Many of the benefits the world consumed during this era relied on runaway levels of debt, the hollowing-out of traditional manufacturing jobs, and low wage growth for the masses.” – bto: Das liegt vor allem daran, dass der Angebotsschock billiger Arbeitskräfte vor allem die Mittelschicht getroffen hat.
  • “The current economic era perhaps started at the very end of the 1970s with China’s reemergence into the global economy (…) enhanced a decade later by the collapse of the Iron Curtain (1988-91) and the economic liberalisation of India in 1991 following the IMF bailout. Combined, this has basically added over a billion cheap workers to the global economy over this period, opened up global trade, reduced global inequality and led to dramatic changes in the balance of economic power across the world.” – bto: Und die Politik hat bisher darauf keine Antwort gefunden.
  • Und das ändert sich jetzt: “This, we argue, has shaped the entire last four decades in the global economy, inflation, politics and asset prices, amongst other things. As the graph shows, this natural demographic dividend has been peaking over the last decade and will now gently reverse after decades of rapid growth. This could now herald the global direction of economic and political travel in many areas.” – bto: Wir haben eine Trendumkehr massiver Art vor uns. Und diese betrifft dann dieselben Faktoren: Inflation, Zins, Vermögenspreise.

Quelle: Deutsche Bank

  • “A surge in workers helped suppress inflation due to downward pressure on wages as the world integrated the Chinese and EM labour markets. There was also the impact of direct central bank policy biases and the increased independence of monetary policy around the world. Lower inflation meant lower bond yields (real and nominal) and lower interest rates – and that, in turn, allowed for higher and higher company profits and equity valuations. So despite the slowing of growth in developedmarkets, stock markets generally performed well, increasing wealth for shareholders and revenue for governments.” – bto: Es waren gute Zeiten, allerdings mit zunehmenden Krisen.
  • “The problem was that this slowing of developed market growth was masked by ever-growing levels of debt, especially in the years leading up to the financial crisis in 2008-09.” – bto: und dem Wunsch der Politiker, Probleme mit Schulden zu bekämpfen und dem großen Fehler der Euroeinführung.

Quelle: Deutsche Bank

  • “(…) the GFC probably signaled the first cracks in the globalisation era as it cast severe doubts in the pyramid-type scheme of ever-increasing debt levels to aid general prosperity and offset and mask the fact that real wages had been pretty stagnant for large parts of the developed market population since the early 1980s. The regime certainly had a stay of execution during the GFC as central banks prevented a mass default cycle by propping up debt while a huge program of quantitative easing ensured that the debt pyramid scheme could continue.” – bto: Und mit Corona ging es erst richtig los!
  • “Whilst this prevented an economic collapse, it perhaps only papered over the cracks in some areas and exacerbated issues elsewhere.” – bto: Dazu kommen noch die ungedeckten Verbindlichkeiten für die alternde Gesellschaft.

Und was kommt jetzt? Nun, die Fortsetzung des Weges im beschleunigten Tempo!

  • “(…) regular readers will long be aware that I believe central bank balance sheets are on a seemingly endless march upwards in the years ahead. (…) Covid-19 has just accelerated a trend that was already likely in place.” – bto: So ist es! Und es ist die perfekte Ausrede.
  • “(…) one reason is that the developed world has seen a kind of debt pyramid scheme in recent decades that came to an end around the turn of the 2010 decade. Before that there had been a long multi-decade trend of an expanding number of workers in the population in absolute terms and relative to the old. As such accumulated debt was less of an issue as there was always a bigger group in the demographic chain to pay off the debts of the previous and current generation.” – bto: Und genau das dürfen wir nicht mehr erwarten.
  • “This means that unless the authorities are prepared to allow debt to default (they are not as that would mean the entire global equity tranche is also worthless), or make major increases to retirement ages (especially unlikely), then ‘they need to continue to plug the gap by printing money and allowing debt to look more sustainable than it would in a free market.’ (…) it’s a case of printing money to keep the ever increasing debt alive rather than making enough babies in the previous generation to pass on the burden.”

Und das sieht dann so aus:

Quelle: Deutsche Bank

zerohedge.com: “One Bank Spots The Demographic Trigger That Launched The Money-Printing Endgame”, 15. September 2020