China droht den japanischen Weg zu gehen
Schon früh(er) habe ich auf die Parallelen zwischen China heute und Japan Ende der 1980er-Jahre hingewiesen:
→ Folgt Europa Japan in das deflationäre Szenario (III)?
→ Nachtrag zur Demografie in China
Nun greift Forbes das Thema erneut auf:
- “Last Friday, bank-to-bank dealing in the overnight repurchase agreement market hit a record of more than $900 billion. This is what happens when you run out of productive things to do with the tidal waves of capital the central bank churns into the financial system. It’s precisely the sort of “liquidity trap” about which John Maynard Keynes warned decades ago. It’s how credit-creation mechanisms freeze up.” – bto: Die Rede ist hier von China, wo sehr viel Geld in den Immobilienmarkt gelaufen ist.
- “Students of Japan’s 2000s know the drill. They also know this is very much not where Xi wanted the People’s Bank of China—or his economy—to be in 2022. As economist Ming Ming at Citic Securities tells Bloomberg, ‘excess cash is piling up in the financial system instead of being funneled to the real economy.’ Despite so much PBOC-created cash sloshing around, China’s banks are resorting to the financial equivalent of talk amongst themselves.” – bto: Das sollten wir nicht kritiseren, passiert doch Ähnliches im Westen seit Jahrzehnten.
- “(…) the ‘pushing on a string’ problem China faces is arguably the last thing Xi needs as growth flatlines at the worst possible moment given his political objectives. (…) A major reason China faces recession chatter is his ‘zero Covid’ policy and the massive lockdowns it requires.” – bto: Das ist ebenso absehbar nur temporär.
- “In the first quarter alone, China’s gross debt rose $2.5 trillion, far outpacing Washington’s $1.5 trillion increase, according to the Institute of International Finance.” – bto: Auch das ist nicht neu:
→ China: Schuldenwirtschaft nach westlichem Vorbild
- “Economist Michael Pettis at Peking University says China should be studying the lessons from Japan’s lost decades—and heeding them. ‘The reason for comparing China today with Japan is that they both had, among other things, serious income imbalances, years of non-productive investment, heavily administered banks underpinned by government guarantees, vastly overvalued real restate and soaring debt,’ Pettis says.” – bto: und eine ähnliche demografische Entwicklung …
- “These imbalances led to the bubble troubles with which Japan is still grappling decades later. Japan, Pettis says, faced a ‘difficult adjustment after a forty-year investment-driven growth miracle. These were also the same conditions in every other country that followed a similar growth path, and they all had brutally difficult adjustments.’ This includes China. The PBOC losing monetary traction, like the BOJ decades before it, is an ominous sign.” – bto: Das ist ein durchaus ernst zu nehmendes Szenario.
- “(…) if Beijing wants to avoid Japan’s fate, Pettis says, ‘it must understand what actually caused it and why it is so difficult to rebalance income, and it must take specific steps Tokyo didn’t or couldn’t. Otherwise pretending it can’t happen in China almost guarantees that it will.’” – bto: Dieser Meinung bin ich auch.
→ forbes.com:„China’s Problem Isn’t Nancy Pelosi —It’s Turning Japanese“, 3. August 2022
