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„Brexit is a problem central banks will struggle to fix“

In einem Kommentar für die WiWo habe ich geschrieben, dass die Märkte im Zuge der damaligen noch Brexit-Ängste eigentlich die Allmacht der Notenbanken in Zweifel ziehen. In der Tat mehren sich die anerkannten Stimmen, die genau diese Frage stellen:  Können die Notenbanken überhaupt noch helfen?

So Mohamed El-Erian in einem Kommentar in der FT. Die Highlights:

  • „In the immediate aftermath of the referendum, markets were heavily influenced by a set of technical influences. The most important comes from the tug of war between cash on the sidelines and margin calls that force selling on the part of levered long accounts that had become way too comfortable with the notion that the status quo would prevail.“ – bto: Ich erinnere an dieser Stelle erneut daran, dass Spekulation auf Kredit ziemlich in die Hose gehen kann.
  • „Thereafter, corporate, economic and political factors will be in the driving seat.“ – bto: Genau, und hier ist alles natürlich unsicher.
  • „Brexit weakens the outlook for corporate profits due to lower growth in the UK and Europe, and a notably higher risk of recession.“ – bto: ganz wichtig. Die Krise trifft die Eurozone in einer schlechten Lage und dürfte deshalb die Spannungen dort erhöhen.
  • „Fluid politics will also be evident across the English Channel as anti-establishment movements feel emboldened by Brexit success, raising concerns about a domino effect in the EU.“ – bto: hier übrigens schön visualisiert:

Quelle: Zero Hedge

O. k., klingt mal wieder recht pessimistisch, zeigt aber die Größe des Problems. Nun zurück zu den Notenbanken:

  • „For quite a while now, investors have been comforted by the notion that central banks are willing and able to sustainably shield them from the detrimental effects of unusual economic and political developments.“ – bto: Hier erübrigt sich jeder Kommentar.
  • „But central banks now carry an enormous policy burden that has seen them venture ever deeper into an experimental policy terrain that includes negative nominal interest rates. In the process, they have lost policy flexibility and also put their effectiveness and credibility at risk.“

Fazit: „As such, markets now face an even bigger ‚fat tail‘ of potential policy mistakes and/or market accidents.“

In einem Beitrag ebenfalls aus der FT in der letzten Woche wurde das Problem der zunehmenden Machtlosigkeit der Notenbanken auch klar gesehen:

  • „Is quantitative failure, in other words the diminishing power of central bank bond-buying to stimulate growth, a risk for the markets? Investors certainly seem to think so. The closely watched Bank of America Merrill Lynch global fund manager survey for June cited quantitative failure as one of the main tail risks in the markets.”
  • „(…) most likely in the eurozone and Japan, where a sizeable chunk of bonds are trading at negative yields. The problem is that the central banks in these regions, particularly the Bank of Japan, have bought so many bonds that the purchases are having a diminishing impact on bond yields and the market.“ – bto: Das ist genau das auch von mir angesprochene Phänomen des abnehmenden Grenznutzens.
  • „This quantitative exhaustion may lead to another risk: that central bankers will resort to helicopter money in the eurozone and Japan.“ – bto: Streichen wir „may“, sie werden es massiv machen, auch dank des Brexit.
  • „(…) helicopter money would be the natural successor to other unconventional policies, such as zero interest rates, forward guidance, QE and negative interest rates.“

Die Notenbanken werden es tun. Ohne Zweifel. Die Frage ist: Wird es noch funktionieren?

→ FT (Anmeldung erforderlich): „Brexit is a problem central banks will struggle to fix“, 26. Juni 2016

→ FT (Anmeldung erforderlich): „Quantitative exhaustion smothers markets“, 19. Juni 2016