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Diskussion um die Fiskalunion: Beschönigen und Verschleiern

Bekanntlich zitiere ich Martin Wolf von der FINANCIAL TIMES (FT) sehr gern. Meist bin ich mit ihm einer Meinung. Doch über diesen Artikel habe ich mich gewundert: “The EU rises to meet the Covid-19 crisis” lautet der Titel. Da stehen diese Aussagen:

  • “The EU was born out of catastrophe and has advanced through crisis. Today, it confronts threats on many fronts. If it fails to rise to these challenges, it might even shatter. Fortunately, Angela Merkel understands this. The German chancellor remains the trusted leader of the indispensable European country. By agreeing a radical new financial plan with French President Emmanuel Macron, she has transformed the EU’s possibilities.” – bto: als wäre Deutschland allein in der Lage diese Lasten zu stemmen.
  • “It is another ‘whatever it takes’ moment, this time from Europe’s leading politicians, confirming that Germany and France will only let the EU fail if their electorates discard their elites, as the Americans and British have done. But history has marked the peoples of these two countries too deeply for them to risk similarly infantile politics.” – bto: Hier fängt es an: Frankreich ist Empfänger von Geld, wir bezahlen – also sehr unterschiedliche Positionen und nicht eine aus gleicher Perspektive.
  • “(…) the mishandled eurozone financial crisis divided member states and turned Italy, above all, towards Euroscepticism. One poll indicates that in an ‘Italexit’ referendum, 42 per cent of Italians would now vote to leave.” – bto: Und das genügt als Grund, damit Deutschland Geld überweist? Man kann sich Freunde nicht kaufen.
  • “As Anatole Kaletsky of Gavekal has argued, the Franco-German proposal is far more significant than such relatively modest numbers suggest. It includes two innovations: the ability of the commission to borrow on its account and so create a new class of EU bonds; and the fact that the borrowing is to be financed by new European-wide taxes on carbon emissions or financial and digital transactions. The leverage on the tax revenue allowed by the ability to borrow could be huge.” – bto: Es ist logisch, dass man bei gegebener zu hoher Verschuldung weitere Verschuldungskapazitäten finden muss.

Gehen wir direkt zu Kaletsky, der als Franzose auch einen bestimmten Blickwinkel hat. Er wird von Wolf erwähnt, also schauen wir auf seine Zahlen:

  • “The Merkel-Macron proposal involves three crucial innovations, which may sound tediously technical but will vastly increase the flexibility of EU fiscal policy and could ultimately transform European politics in a way that really proves comparable to the Hamilton-Jefferson deal. The key innovation is financing the recovery fund with bonds issued directly by the EU in its own name and guaranteed by its own revenues, instead of using funds raised by national governments, whether acting together or separately. Merkel presumably insisted on this mechanism to avoid the vexations of jointly guaranteed ‘Eurobonds,’ which German public opinion deems politically toxic and possibly unconstitutional, because German taxes could end up paying for Italian or Spanish debts.” – bto: Und so ist es doch. Denn ob es europaweite Steuern gibt, ist völlig offen. Und wenn es sie gibt, dann haben wir genau das: Deutsche Steuerzahler bezahlen für die anderen.
  • “(…) by relying on the EU, instead of national governments, to issue bonds, the Merkel-Macron plan implies a second, more controversial, innovation, which is clearly necessary to create a fiscal federation, but which European politicians have always tried to avoid. To guarantee and service hundreds of billions of euros of new borrowing on its own account, the EU will require more tax revenue than it now receives. Merkel and Macron have therefore proposed increasing the European Commission’s budget from 1.2% to 2% of EU gross national income, yielding about €180 billion per year in extra revenue.” – bto: deutscher Anteil = 28 Milliarden.
  • “The exact nature of the EU’s new taxes will presumably be the subject of fierce debate and fiercer lobbying.” – bto: Und genau da ziehen wir immer den Kürzeren.
  • “That leads to the third game-changing innovation in the Merkel-Macron plan: permitting the EU to leverage its activities with borrowing, instead of just using the EU budget as a pass-through mechanism from pan-European taxes to current spending. Because of today’s near-zero interest rates for triple-A sovereign borrowers, the leverage potentially available to the EU from a modest amount of extra revenue is enormous. If the EU issued ten-year bonds, it would probably pay interest of zero or below, potentially allowing almost unlimited borrowing, albeit with sinking funds to redeem the debts at maturity.” – bto: Genau darum geht es. Die EZB wird es monetarisieren …
  • “Better still, the EU could issue perpetual bonds with no redemption date, similar to the now-retired British and US ‘consols,’ as proposed by the Spanish government and George Soros. This would allow the EU to borrow €500 billion at an interest cost of just €2.5 billion per year.” – bto: Klar, und warum nur 500 Milliarden Euro? Ich finde, dann können es auch 5000 Milliarden sein. Kostet ja nur 25 Milliarden und die Investitionen der EU sind so super, dass sie sich immer lohnen.
  • “To put it another way, if the EU borrows €500 billion this year for a European recovery fund, then it could easily borrow another €1 trillion next year for a digital inclusion fund, and then maybe €2 trillion for a vehicle electrification fund or €3 trillion for a comprehensive climate-change fund. Such simple calculations show why European economic and political conditions could be completely transformed by the Merkel-Macron plan’s financial innovations.” – bto: klasse!
  • “If EU leaders can rise to this challenge, Europe’s ‘Hamiltonian moment’ will finally have arrived.” – bto: Das stimmt nicht, weil die EU eben keine Vereinigten Staaten sind mit erheblichen Demokratiedefiziten. Aber aus Sicht des Landes, das am meisten von dieser Schuldenunion profitiert (Frankreich), ist es ein Grund, um zu feiern. Dass Martin Wolf dies so unkritisch übernimmt, wundert mich dann doch. Denn wenn diese Politik ohne negative Nebenwirkungen ist, warum haben wir es nicht schon seit Jahren gemacht?

Wolf erklärt nur, dass Hamilton nicht stimmt: “(…) it is not strictly-speaking a ‘Hamilton’ moment, by which is meant the way Alexander Hamilton, first treasury secretary of the US, used the powers of the federal government to transfer the debts the states had incurred in the war of independence on to the federal balance sheet. In the EU’s case, this is not a plan to assume debt. Also, crucially, the EU does not have a federal political process. Budgetary decisions have to be taken by unanimity. Nevertheless, it is a big step forward symbolically, in that it demonstrates solidarity, and practically, in that it creates a new financial instrument to be funded by EU taxes.”

Ganz anders sieht das Wolfgang Münchau, ebenfalls in der FT:

  • “However you count this, you will struggle to identify anything that comes close to a fiscal bazooka. Furthermore, at this stage the package is only a proposal. All 27 EU member states have to agree. The final numbers are more likely to be lower than higher.”
  • “Since EU member states eventually have to contribute to the repayment of the borrowed money, a rebate for some countries means a higher burden for others, including for Italy and Spain. This will partially offset the size of the net fiscal transfer they stand to receive.” – bto: Ich denke, das “reiche Deutschland” wird das allein stemmen.
  • “The EU is not supposed to run on debt. To get around this, the commission invoked Article 311, which states that ‘the Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies’. This is the legal equivalent of ‘whatever it takes’. Someone will almost certainly take legal action against the commission, so this will probably end up in the courts.” – bto: Was natürlich irrelevant ist, denn der EUGH wird immer zugunsten der EU entscheiden.
  • “Last week’s budget proposal is as good as it can get in the current regime. The way the eurozone has been set up does not allow for more. If you want trillions, you will need to change the European treaties. You cannot fudge your way to a federal future.” – bto: Ob das stimmt? Ich denke, die EU ist so fern von einer echten demokratischen Kontrolle, dass sie das auch so macht. Es ist unvermeidlich, dass die Schulden auf EU-Ebene stark wachsen, um den Kollaps aufzuschieben.

→ ft.com (Anmeldung erforderlich): “Europe cannot fudge its way to a federal future”, 31. Mai 2020

→ ft.com (Anmeldung erforderlich): “The EU rises to meet the Covid-19 crisis”, 2. Juni 2020

→ project-syndicate.org: “Europe’s Hamiltonian Moment”, 21. Mai 2020