Auch die USA haben ihr Italien (oder mehrere davon)
Italien ist überall. Denn jahrzehntelange Politik auf Pump stößt unweigerlich irgendwann an eine Grenze, vor allem dann, wenn der Zugriff auf die Notenpresse erschwert ist. Verschuldung in fremder Währung ist somit ein Problem. Verschuldung in eigener Währung – siehe USA – nicht so. Italien hat Schulden in Euro, die es nicht ganz so frei produzieren kann, die US-Bundesstaaten in Dollar, die sie ebenfalls nicht ganz so leicht herstellen können. Wie werden die USA mit ihren “italienischen Regionen” umgehen? Das diskutiert die FT:
- “If Puerto Rico is America’s ‚Greece‘ then which state will be its ‚Italy‘? People disagree over the ‚most likely Italy‘: some say Illinois, others New Jersey, a few conservatives suggest California.” – bto: In den USA gibt es eigentlich eine knallharte No-Bail-out-Regel. (Naja, gab es bei uns ja auch mal …)
- “Greece and Italy are in a common currency zone as are Puerto Rico and the highly leveraged US states. Neither Greece nor Puerto Rico, though, have posed an existential risk to their continental financial markets.” – bto: einfach, weil sie klein sind.
- “Like the eurozone countries, the sovereign US states cannot just monetise their debts. Law and market practice mean they have stricter borrowing limits but their budgets are not subject to federal approval. The states have a chronic problem with the ability of their taxable subjects to move to lower-cost jurisdictions. There are fewer limits on cross-state migrants’ ability to receive social services than there are in Europe.” – bto: Und die Amerikaner flüchten wirklich, wenn es zu teuer wird!
- “Highly leveraged states such as Illinois, New Jersey and Connecticut have typically, over the years, had aggressive public sector unions. This means their state and local workforce is older and has been accruing pension benefits for longer. In the last recession, much of the Obama administration’s ‚stimulus‘ money was transferred to state and local governments. With budget shuffling, increased borrowing and deferral of pension fund payments, they kept their workforce and notional solvency.” – bto: wie Berlin, Bremen und andere Bankrotteure bei uns (allerdings Finanzausgleich, nicht so sehr Bund).
- “The willingness of the federal government to share those burdens has declined sharply. Next year, state income taxes will not be deductible against federal taxes, which will hit hardest in more unionised, high-tax states.” – bto: Die alle demokratisch wählen …
- “Illinois has the most publicly squalid politics. (…) The state is split into a largely Democratic north and largely Republican south. The state parties do not like each other much. They have been unable to agree on budgets, and in particular pension liabilities. Unfunded pension obligations are said to be $130bn or more than half the pensions’ future value, assuming absurdly generous rates of return.” – bto: Illinois ist pleite. So einfach ist das. Wir wissen aus Berlin, dass es dumm ist, als einer der Ersten pleitezugehen. Hätte die Berliner Bankgesellschaft länger durchgehalten, wäre sie im Zuge der Finanzkrise auch vom Bund “gerettet” worden, weitaus billiger als es in Wirklichkeit war.
- “Yet Illinois has, for now, a top state income tax rate of 4.95 per cent. Compare that with New Jersey (8.97 per cent), whose new Democratic governor is considering a rise to 10.75 per cent to fund pensions and other priorities. Both states suffer because rich people and well-paid workers move to places with lower tax rates.” – bto: Diese Flucht ist bei uns weitaus aufwändiger.
- “Optimistically there would be a trade-off of solvency and market access for stagnation and relative economic decline. Pessimistically? A federal bailout. (…) federal support would come in a conditional, unappetising form. The model would be the near-inedible ‚government cheese‘ once fed to welfare recipients. Pension and workforce cuts may be less repulsive.” – bto: Bevor wir jetzt lachen und sagen, ach die Amis, wir sind doch so solide. Nein, sind wir nicht.
