Reflationsthese in aller Munde

Ambroise Evans-Pritchard (AEP) vom Telegraph teilt die These der Reflation und Starinvestor Stanley Druckenmiller handelt danach. Der Reihe nach:

Zunächst AEP mit der Makro-Betrachtung:

  •  “The judgment call we have to make is whether he actually means the outlandish things he said – mostly flippantly, and in vague terms – and whether White House duties will compel him to retreat even if he did.” hält AEP mit Blick auf die Wahlversprechen von Trump (Mauer, Rückzug aus der NATO, Auflösung NAFTA etc.) fest. – bto: Das ist eine wirklich berechtigte Frage. Ich neige zu Optimismus, was ja bei mir nicht so oft der Fall ist.
  •  It is my tentative working premise that Mr Trump is not a new Mussolini and that he will ultimately trim his excesses. Call it a ‘soft Trump’ if you like, though this too entails its own political risks.” – bto: Das stimmt. Allerdings dürfte Trump nur eine Amtszeit machen wollen, was ihm  wirkliche Unabhängigkeit gäbe, die USA auf einen neuen Kurs zu bringen (im positiven Sinne).
  •  If so, an entirely different economic picture takes shape. His manifesto amounts to a massive fiscal stimulus, with tax cuts across the board, a $1 trillion blitz on infrastructure, and an imperial navy of 350 combat ships.” – bto: New Deal wäre das passende Wort. 
  •  It is a replay of Reaganomics in the early 1980s, a form of turbo-charged Keynesian reflation, and damn the deficit. It promises a pro-cyclical economic boom, so long as Mr Trump quietly drops his threat of 35pc tariffs against Mexico and 45pc against China.” – bto: wobei er bei dem Boom natürlich schon versuchen sollte, die Handelsdefizite zu begrenzen.
  •  “Mr Trump enjoys the huge advantage of Republican control over the House and Senate. This averts the paralysing gridlock and obstructionism that surely awaited Hillary Clinton had she won. He can overcome the ideology of austerity in a way that she could never hope to do.” – bto: genau!
  •  You might equally say it looks more like Roosevelt’s New Deal, even if funded partially by private money and run on a fee-earning basis. Infrastructure spending of this kind is what Left-leaning economists such Larry Summers and Paul Krugman have been calling for all along.” – bto: Auch das ist richtig. Er würde genau das machen, was Summers schon lange fordert!
  • It starts to plug the $3.6 trillion backlog of projects identified by the American Society of Civil Engineers. It address one cause of sliding US productivity growth. It soaks up the corporate cash hoard, helping to bring investment back into alignment with savings.”
  •  “Yet in broad macro-economic terms, this fiscal rebalancing is what Keynesian and monetarist doctors It becomes easier for the US to escape the ‘Wicksellian’ trap of a negative natural rate of interest, and therefore to escape clammy embrace of quantitative easing.” – bto: absolut richtig.
  •  Trumpanomics shifts the structure of US and global credit, and exchange rates. It was the same regime of ‚loose fiscal/tight money‘ that catapulted the dollar sky high in the early 1980s, with dramatic global consequences.” – bto: Da kann ich mich geirrt haben, als ich von einem schwächeren Dollar sprach aufgrund der Geldschöpfung. 
  •  Dangers abound for everybody if mistakes are made but the fall-out from a ‘hard Trump’ is not confined to the US, whatever some in Europe and Asia fail seem to think. The lesson of the 1930s is that those countries running a structural current account surplus suffer most once protectionism takes hold.” – bto: Das sind übrigens wir. 
  •  The deficit countries get off lightly. In certain circumstances they may even benefit, as none other than Adam Smith conceded. The inexorable fact is that America that runs a $500bn deficit and serves as consumer of last resort for the world, and the world cannot afford to lose it.”
  •  “Mr Trump’s team specifically names Germany, alleging that it uses the euro mechanism to hold down its exchange rate and lock in a surplus of 8.5pc of GDP.” – bto: Da kommt was auf uns zu als Folge der verfehlten Eichhörnchen-Politik.
  •  “(…) a tit-for-tat trade war between the US and China would not be symmetric. The disguised weakness of the Chinese position would become painfully obvious, and might bring forward the day of reckoning for China’s banks and corporate debtors.” – bto: Europa und China sind verletzlich.

 bto: saubere Analyse, der nichts hinzuzufügen ist.

Während AEP es aus journalistischer Sicht betrachtet und vielleicht auch sein Geld so anlegt, ist es aus dem Munde von Druckenmiller was ganz anderes. Hier werden Milliarden verschoben, auch wenn es “nur” die eigenen sind …

  •  “Speaking to CNBC this morning on the topic of the post-Trump election economy, Stanley Druckenmiller appears to have flipped his entire worldview, and said that he is now ‚quite, quite optimistic‘ on the U.S. economy, following the election of President-elect Donald Trump. ‚It’s as hopeful as I’ve been in a long time.‘” – bto: Ja, weil es eben einen massiven Stimulus geben wird. 
  •  “As a result of the Trump presidency, Druckenmiller said he now has a large bet on economic growth. I’m short bonds, Bunds, Italian bonds, U.S. bonds‘. The trade reflect his expectation of higher deficits, stronger growth. In other words, another surge in debt.” – bto: Das ist in verschiedener Hinsicht schlecht. Bekommen wir höhere Zinsen, ist die (Euro-)Krise rasch wieder auf dem Tablett (wenngleich es den Banken gut tut, was die Krise wiederum dämpft). Zum anderen sind noch höhere Schulden natürlich nicht gut, wir brauchen eine Entwertung relativ zum BIP, also Inflation. Doch die könnten wir auch bekommen. 
  •  “Druckenmiller said that he was hoping economic policy is deferred to Pence and Ryan. ‚Ryan’s got a plan called ‘A Better Way‘. It’s a specific plan on deregulation, on how to replace – not just get rid of Obamacare. It’s got tax reform in there.” – bto: Ich hoffe und denke auch, dass Trump sich dafür die richtigen Ratgeber nimmt. 
  •  Zero Hedge kommentiert dazu: “(…) the upcoming fresh burst of debt, and higher rates, is what will provide the impetus for fresh gains in stocks and the economy, even as it leads to massive losses for global bond investors. The problem, however, is just how higher rates will impact overall debt service: as we also reported several weeks ago, it is another legendary investors, Bridgewater’s Ray Dalio, who warned that a jump in yields at a time of record global debt will not only lead to massive losses across all asset classes, not just bonds, but also lead to another economic contraction.” – bto: Das ist die große Frage. Wenn Inflation kommt, dann nicht. 

bto: Wie man es auch sieht, Trump könnte sich als – zumindest temporärer – Game Changer erweisen. Die höhere Verschuldung wird dann nur mit Inflation und/oder Helikopter-Geld zu bewältigen sein. Aber wie sagte er doch: “You print the money.”

→ The Telegraph: “Trump promises a fiscal boom and a surging dollar, if he can control himself”, 9. November 2016

→ Zero Hedge: “Druckenmiller: I Sold All My Gold On The Night Of The Election‘”, 10. November 2016